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Voting systems

Voting systems. Chi-Kwong Li. Outline. How do we define a “good” voting system? Voting between two candidates Voting among three or more candidates Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem Discussion. Social choice theory: How can we measure individual interests

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Voting systems

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  1. Voting systems Chi-Kwong Li

  2. Outline... • How do we define a “good” voting system? • Voting between two candidates • Voting among three or more candidates • Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem • Discussion

  3. Social choice theory: How can we measure individual interests and preferences and combine them into one collective decision? • Goal: Finding an outcome that reflects “the will of the people”

  4. Preference List Ballot A rank order of candidates: often pictured as a vertical list with the most preferred candidate on top and the least preferred on the bottom

  5. Choosing Between Two Candidates Majority rule: Each voter indicates a preference for one of the two candidates and the candidate with the most votes wins. Assumption: The number of voters is odd.

  6. Advantages of Majority Rule • All voters are treated equally. 2. Both candidates are treated equally. 3. It is monotone: If a new election were held and a single voter changed her ballot from the loser of the previous election to the winner, but everyone else voted exactly as before, the outcome of the new election would be the same.

  7. Can we find a better voting system? • Proven by Kenneth May in 1952 • Mark Fey extended the theorem to an infinite number of voters in 2004

  8. What about elections with three or more candidates? Several different possibilities for voting systems exist: • Condorcet’s Method • Plurality Voting • The Borda Count • Sequential pair-wise voting • The Hare System

  9. 1. Condorcet’s Method A candidate is a winner if he or she would defeat every other candidate in a one-on-one contest using majority rule. • A defeats B (2 to 1) • A defeats C (2 to 1) Therefore, A wins! • B defeats C (2 to 1)

  10. Condorcet’s Voting Paradox With three or more candidates, there are elections in which Condorcet’s method yields no winners! • A defeats B (2 to 1) • C defeats A (2 to 1) No winner! • B defeats C (2 to 1)

  11. 2. Plurality Voting • Only first place winners are considered • The candidate with the most votes wins • Fails to satisfy the Condorcet Winner Criterion, e.g. 2000 US presidential election • Manipulability

  12. 3. The Borda Count • Assigns points to each voter’s rankings and then sums these points to arrive at a group’s final ranking. • Each first place vote is worth n-1 points, each second place vote is worth n-2 points, and so on down. Method: count the number of occurrences of other candidate names that are below this candidates name. Applications: senior class rank, sports hall of fame, track meets, etc.

  13. Problem with the Borda Count... • Does not satisfy the property known as “independent of irrelevant alternatives”.

  14. Failure of the IIA Borda scores: A = 6, B = 7, C = 2  B is the winner! Borda scores: A = 6, B = 5, C = 4  A is the winner But no one has changed his or her mind about whether B is preferred to A!

  15. 4. Sequential Pairwise voting • Start with a (non-ordered) list of the candidates. • Pit the first candidate against the second in a one-on-one contest • The winner then moves on to the third candidate in the list, one-on-one. • Continue this process through the entire list until only one remains at the end. • Example: choosing a favorite color:

  16. Problem with Sequential Pairwise Voting... • It fails to satisfy the “Pareto Condition.”

  17. 5. The Hare System “[The Hare System] is among the greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government.” ~ John Stuart Mill • Arrive at a winner by repeatedly deleting candidates that are “least preferred”, in the sense of being at the top of the fewest ballots. • If a single candidate remains after all others have been eliminated, it alone is the winner (otherwise, it is a tie).

  18. Applying the Hare System Eliminate B, C. So, A is the winner. However, if the last column changes to [A,B,C]^T, then….. Then, C wins!

  19. Problem with the Hare System • It fails to satisfy the property of monotonicity.

  20. A summary of voting systems for three or more candidates

  21. Can we do better? • Is it possible to find a voting system for three or more candidates as “ideal” as majority rule for two candidates?

  22. Another possibility? Approval Voting • We have seen that any search for an idealvoting system of the kind we have discussed is doomed to failure. • One alternative possibility is approval voting: Instead of sing a preference list ballot, each voter is allowed to give one vote to as many of the candidates as he or she finds acceptable. • No limit is set on the number of candidates for whom an individual can vote. • The winner under approval voting is the candidate who receives the larges number of approval votes. Approval voting is used to elect new members to the National Academy of Science and the Baseball Hall of Fame.

  23. Discussion • Other applications? • Which method do you think is most easily manipulated? • Which might be a good method for electing the US president, as an alternative to the Electoral College, if any?

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