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Water Resource Policy. Who is winning? Who is bravest?. Water Policy Reform. Much in common India, Vietnam, NZ, China, Australia and USA Important Observations Substantial gains from trading But be careful, look beyond water prices and markets (infrastructure, governance)
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Who is winning? Who is bravest?
Water Policy Reform • Much in common • India, Vietnam, NZ, China, Australia and USA • Important Observations • Substantial gains from trading • But be careful, look beyond water prices and markets (infrastructure, governance) • Setting up markets is a long and tortuous process • Issues • Savings – who gets them? • Governance – what structure for large systems?
Water as commodity • Input into production system • Intensive margin (Technology) • Extensive margin (Land-use change) • Supplier of unpriced ecosystem services • Ground and surface systems are connected • Efficient production of all goods and services is the goal
Top down v’s bottom up market development • China and India are trialling bottom-up • Evolving • Progressively expanding the scale • Australia now trying to align its systems • Research Questions • Decide where and how entitlements should be defined • How many types? • Farmer, village, regional and system level? • Governance systems that work across scales – who is responsible
Social v’s Private Contracts – Meenakshi Social Contract (equity) Private Contract Tube well owners also have land without wells Repeat player game
Vietnam – Jim, Mark & Claudia • “Charge-subsidy” reveals problem with pricing approaches • Unusual way of describing the first step in a process of assigning quasi-entitlements and eventually establishing entitlement and allocation markets
Starting up markets – Irene Parminter • Very difficult to begin, systems takes time to build. • China is trialling bottom-up approach • Australia fixing up problems that a plethora of systems created • NZ is searching for a template for unregulated, fast changing systems • How many formal products in one region? • Sequencing is critical • Markets can allow you to trade into trouble and increase the cost of fixing problems • Theory • Trading prices for scarcity • Then only have to get a supply charges and contracts right and manage externality
China – Jinxia, Ric and Steve • Moving to trade but have not started on price • Challenges • Urban-Rural transfer (Australia & USA too) • Rural-Environment • Major warnings • Infrastructure capacity • Supply reliability (India on electricity) • g-water connectivity • Yellow River over-allocation solved administratively! (After 17 in 20 yrs no flow it reflowed in a drought)
Climate change and over-allocation John Quiggin • Need state-contingent allocation rules • Market v’s administrative control of storage?(Dams stop small floods) • Unbundle at two scales • Individual and system level • Design of robust instruments to manage for system uncertainty is in its infancy
Salinity and Wetlands – Keith & David • Reuse provides opportunity • Discounting • Compensating projects • Permit trading and banking
Environmental water management - Anna Heaney • As markets develop more and more products will emerge • State contingent instruments (Portfolio) • Entitlements • Option contracts • Leases • Counter-cyclic trading has big potential • but has challenging governance implications
Frontiers • Governance (Institutions) • Accounting • Flow reducing activities (risks) • System losses • Exchange rates • Infrastructure management (Privatize?) • Third party aspirations • Communication
Design Contact: Prof Mike Young Water Economics and Management Email: Mike.Young@adelaide.edu.au Phone: +61-8-8303.5279Mobile: +61-408-488.538