Paradoxes and Tensions in Post-Reform Chinese Media Politics

1. Paradoxes and Tensions in Post-Reform Chinese Media Politics Yuezhi Zhao Professor & Canada Research Chair in Political Economy of Global Communication Simon Fraser University, Canada Changjiang Chair Professor, Communication University of China

2. Although China is the most populous country in the BRICS, I have only asked for 5 minutes to make a few observations about Chinese media politics in this presentation. • The theme of this conference is “Mass Media after Post-Socialism;” to the extent that China still has not officially abandoned “socialism”, I think it more appropriate to speak about “post-reform” China.

3. There is a noted “abnormality” in the post-reform Chinese political economy (vs the West and post socialist countries) : On the one hand: • The Chinese economy has become the second largest in the world and highly integrated with the global economy, so much so that Ferguson even called it “Chimerica” On the other hand: • Not only the CCP is still in charge and continues to push for market oriented reforms, • But also it has declared (once again!) in the just concluded 18th Congress that it would not follow the “deviant” path of changing its banner of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”

4. In the media field, the media has been dancing “between the party line and bottom line” during the past 30 years of “reform”. On the one hand, there has been a reinforced regime of state control; On the other hand, there has been • excessive commercialization and explosive growth of media markets; • aggressive promotion of new media technology: China now has the world’s largest Internet population

5. Within this context, one notes many paradoxes and tensions in Chinese Media Politics, and I only have time to highlight the following three • Yes, there is censorship, but guess who is the CCP most afraid of? It’s the neo-Maoists and its influential websites such as Utopia! This was most visible in the pre-18th Congress power struggles leading to the downfall of Bo Xilai in spring 2012

6. Although it is simplistic to speak of “left” and “right” in dichotomous terms, it seems that Deng’s initial instruction to “guard against the right, but primarily the left” at the beginning of the reform period not only remains true, but also has become more relevant as leftist critiques of the negative social consequences of the reforms become more vocal

7. 2. Yes, the new media elite claims to “speak for the people” and posits itself as the “grassroots” in a “state vs society” framework, but in China’s cyberspace today, “public intellectual” has become a term of abuse, while the CCP has compelled mainstream journalists to “go to the grassroots” by going back to the Maoist tradition of “mass line” journalism and going against excessive commercialism and tabloid journalism

8. Clearly, the CCP and the rising liberal media and intellectual elite & its urban middle class netizenfollowers are competing for the “hearts and minds” of the Chinese population and it remains to be seen whether the liberal elite within the CCP and the media can be successful in pushing for a “democratic” breakthrough, i.e. (the end of one party-rule).

9. 3. Yes, there has been a concerted effort to expand the Chinese media in the global realm in a quest for Chinese “soft power”, but there are tensions between reaching the Western elite and the global “99%,” and between “going out” or “going down” (i.e., to reach China’s lower social classes and allow them to speak out). To what extent can there be a “China rise” without the rise of China’s lower social classes?