Sanctions, Leniency and Settlement

1. WHAT MAKES COMPETITION POLICY WORK? Sanctions, Leniency and Settlement Stefano Macchi di Cellere 3rd Lear Conference on the Economics of Competition Law – Rome, June 26, 2009

2. EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS:EU-US DETERRENCE • DETERRENT EFFECT • Proportionality vs. Predictability of Sanctions • Fines vs. Damages • Administrative vs. Criminal Sanctions Stefano Macchi di Cellere 3rd Lear Conference on the Economics of Competition Law – Rome, June 26, 2009

3. LENIENCY PROGRAMMES • STRENGHTS • Cartelist: fine reduction or immunity • Competition Authority: time and cost savings efficiencies • Consumers: augmented discovery of cartels • ISSUES • Confidentiality and Certainty • Private Damages - Amount of Sanctions Balance • Multiple Jurisdictions Protection Stefano Macchi di Cellere 3rd Lear Conference on the Economics of Competition Law – Rome, June 26, 2009

4. EU SETTLEMENT / US PLEA BARGAINING • TRANSPARENCY While the Commission enjoys a broad discretion in the proceeding, the DoJ has to evaluate the case in light of established principle • CERTAINTY The EU program lacks predictability as to the possible outcome of the negotiations, while the US program places great emphasis on the possibility for the parties to predict the outcome of the case • CONFIDENTIALITY Both jurisdictions grant confidentiality to the parties that decide to lodge a settlement submission • AWARDING OF REDUCTIONS The Commission can apply only a fixed 10% reduction of the total fine, while the DoJ takes into account the specific circumstances of the case to decide the amount of the reduction Stefano Macchi di Cellere 3rd Lear Conference on the Economics of Competition Law – Rome, June 26, 2009