Lessons From Revolutionary Systems

1. Lessons From Revolutionary Systems Mark Maier mwmaier@ieee.org 19-March-2014

2. Outline of Talk • What is a “Revolutionary System?” • The big lessons • Threshold capabilities and non-linear effects • Intentional, but uncertain architecting • Co-evolution of CONOPS and technology • The DC-3 • The Global Positioning System (GPS) • Should we care?

3. What is a Revolutionary System? • We’re never going to get a precise definition, but we know one when we see one • A system with huge effect, one that makes large changes to how military operations or business is done. A system that accomplishes this through new technology. • Famous examples • DC-3, created the modern airline business • IBM 360 • Nuclear submarines, Polaris missiles • Global Positioning System • iPod/iPhone • Don’t happen very often, hugely important when they do

4. Three Big Lessons • Threshold capabilities and non-linear effects • Moderate changes in capability can lead to huge changes in impact • Big impact comes from passing a “threshold” of technical capability • The threshold is when users do new things • Intentional, but uncertain architecting • The decisions on the revolutionary systems were made intentionally, but not with knowledge of exactly where the thresholds lie • Co-evolution of technology and CONOPS • Revolution happens when technology enables a new CONOPS, and the new CONOPS drives technology • Grafting technology onto an existing CONOPS is very unlikely to have revolutionary effect, even with dramatic technology

5. New Technology Monocoque fuselage Aerodynamics New Engines Do what we do, but better Profits come from Federal airmail, carry the airmail better Boeing 247 an optimized response to existing CONOPS Clearly better airplane, but no threshold effect Using Technology to Evolve 199 produced 8 passengers Ford Trimotor 1935 1940 1945 1950 1930 75 produced 10 passengers+mail Boeing 247

6. Competitors belief in threshold Douglas won’t built what he’s asked for, builds what he thinks they need Starts with a demonstrator, scales up Big success, but no threshold In Search of the Threshold 1 produced 12 passengers DC-1 199 produced 8 passengers Ford Trimotor 1935 1940 1945 1950 1930 75 produced 10 passengers+mail Boeing 247 156 produced 14 passengers DC-2

7. Douglas takes a big step, by going much bigger New CONOPS+new technology = revolution Airlines can make profit without airmail, enables CONOPS shift Then the Breakthrough 455+10,174 produced 28 passengers DC-3 1 produced 12 passengers DC-1 199 produced 8 passengers Ford Trimotor 1935 1940 1945 1950 1930 75 produced 10 passengers+mail Boeing 247 156 produced 14 passengers DC-2

8. Reflecting on: Who Are You? • Did the architect’s of the Boeing 247 do a good job? • If the client gets what he asked for, but lives to regret asking for it, is that the client’s fault or the architect’s? • How far does the architect’s responsibility go? Does it matter if he is inside or outside the client’s organization? • Consider your own organization (local or enterprise). Is their job to build Boeing 247s or DC-3s? • If it is to build 247s, then whose job is it to build the DC-3s? Or will you wait until somebody else does? • Bigger strategic variations • Being a shaper versus and adapter. Leading or being a fast follower. • “Preparing to win the last war” syndrome and architectural competition in the large • Lessons: Threshold effect, intentionality, coupled change

9. The Roots of GPS • First origin, Transit • Serendipitous discovery • Social Context: Purpose driven, had a killer app • Timation • Key CONOPS idea, advocacy for clocks • Both evolutionary and revolutionary • Social Context: The Navy labs • Project 621B • Systematic study • The second key, the signals • Social context: The Air Force approach and California in the 60’s • The human catalyst

10. TransitThe First Navigational Satellite System • Concept of satellite navigation proposed by Frank McClure (APL) after APL analysis of Sputnik signals • Quickly realized “killer app” in SSBN inertial guidance correction • ARPA-funded project began in 1958; became a Navy project in 1960 • 15 navigation satellites and 8 research satellites launched, 1959 to 1964, IOC 1964 • Made available for civilian use, 1967 • Last satellite launched, 1988, ceases operation 1996 • Worldwide navigational aid for surface ships and submarines • Not particularly demanding requirements, 2-D only • Much better than alternatives available at the time (like LORAN-C) • Eventually, tens of thousands of civilian users (far outstripping military users) • Not scalable to global, 3-D • Signal limitations (mutual interference) • LEO constellation scalability

11. Timation: First set of Key Ideas • Starts as Roger Easton’s program for precision time transfer among fixed earth locations • Easton realizes multiple satellites with clock signals can allow simultaneous time and position determination • Started flying precision clocks in space in the late 1960’s • Clock corrections and ephemeris determined by ground segment, embedded into the satellite signal • Satellite broadcasts side-tone ranging signal • Poor anti-jam performance, poor frequency management, good penetration • Receiver does all position determination from satellite signals • NRL development model • In house satellite development, mostly of LEO satellites • Lab-centric development and system integration, external sub-contracting • Envisioned growing to global 3-D constellation

12. Program 621B: The Air Force and the second key • Analytical work done by The Aerospace Corporation on a global navigation concept for aircraft, 1960-1963 • Air Force created an official program in 1963 - Project 621B • Broad operational objective - better positioning system for its aircraft, 3-D worldwide • Conducted systematic study of satellite, ground-station, and terminal approaches • Woodford-Nakamura study identified eventual GPS as preferred concepts, but assessed it as overly high risk (in the late 1960’s) • Devised a single-frequency, spread-spectrum, coded signal (CDMA) • Eased frequency spectrum allocation problems • Substantially reduced vulnerability to jamming and interference • Tested it from aircraft

13. Right People, Right Time Convergence • Not much progress toward a global solution • “Locked in a death struggle and going nowhere” • Brad Parkinson arrives at SMC to take over 621B. Sells DDR&E on the concept of a global program (on his own initiative) • Takes it to the DSARC, and is rejected • Labor Day weekend 1971, the “Lonely Halls Meeting.” GPS as we know it today emerges. • An actual best-of-breed synthesis, not a political compromise • CDMA signal approach from the Air Force (very sporty in 1973, key for today) • Atomic clocks and overall concept from Timation • Compromise on orbits (Timation with an AF-inspired twist) • Many practical details from Transit, like ionospheric compensation • Envelopes performance requirements to the most stressing (very aggressive, problematic, and yet critical choice) • Is approved and becomes a JPO

14. A GPS Timeline Last Launch System Terminated IOC First Satellite Civilian Use Transit Influence Rebadged TIMATION Launches Commercial Use Begins Block 11R and M Launches (15+) TIMATION IOC, FOC TIMATION 1, 2 Launch GPS Block II, IIA Launches (28) Air Force Precursors Block 1 Launches (11) Labor Day Design Pseudolite Experiments 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

15. GPS and Lessons • Threshold and Non-Linear Effects • The very aggressive technical choices made in 1973 (performance targets, signals, and atomic clocks) enabled the wide range of applications we see today. Less likely would not have cut it. • Intentionality and Uncertainty • Parkinson and company allowed for civilian signals and access, even though licensing came later (but Transit precedent) • Signals and atomic clocks were architectural choices for the long-term • Coupled technology and CONOPS changes • The largest impacts of GPS are not from the user knowing his position, it is from the compounded change • Consider location-based social media, B-1 bombers as close support aircraft, guide-the-weapon, network time synchronization, and now emerging vulnerabilities

16. Should We Care? • Maybe not. Maybe we are fully satisfied building “Boeing 247s.” • Maybe we are in the contractor model, we build what we are told to build, and we try to be as competitive as possible at it • But…maybe we really do need to care • We are immersed, willingly or not, in a situation where technology and CONOPS are changing rapidly. • Sometimes the price of not building a revolutionary system is for somebody else to pull the revolution • It can be very expensive, in various “currencies,” to be the second or third to the revolution • And…maybe we want to care • Maybe we are in a position where we want to build a revolution and we need to know how