Show Me the Money! Selective Amnesty and Reward Programs in Counterinsurgency

1. Show Me the Money! Selective Amnesty and Reward Programs in Counterinsurgency Colin Jackson and Austin Long MIT Working Group on Insurgency and Irregular Warfare October 2005

2. Outline • Introduction • General elements of programs • Malaya case • Vietnam case • Conclusions

3. A Way Out of the Dead End • Victory in warfare seldom a result of pure attrition; surrender of enemy a key component • Amnesty and reward programs complement coercive/military strategies by making surrender more attractive

4. Benefits of Amnesty and Reward • Removes insurgents • Defectors invaluable source of intelligence and possible additional manpower • Demoralizes remaining insurgents, weakens insurgent networks • Forces insurgents to increase efforts to limit defection

5. Basic Elements of Programs • “Safe passage” to surrender • Guarantee of reasonable and fair treatment • Protection from insurgent reprisal • Reintegration into society • Possible monetary reward

6. Typology of programs • Defector- amnesty (plus possible reward) for individual defectors who cooperate • Facillitator- rewards for those acting as go-betweens to encourage defection • Informer- rewards for those providing information which leads to insurgent capture

7. Obstacles to programs • Efficiency objections • Serial defection • Signals weakness • Can be exploited by non-insurgents • Normative objections • Rewards murderers • Massive payouts to traitors • Allows insurgents to enter legitimate political sphere

8. Malaya 1948-1960

9. The Malayan Setting • Ethnically divided Malay Federation (5.3 MM) • 2,600,000 Malay (49%) • 2,040,000 Chinese (38.5%) • 578,000 Indian (11%) • 12,000 European • 70,000 Others • Malaysian Communist Party overwhelmingly Chinese (90%+) • 50,000 square miles, 80% uncultivated jungle (1.5%)

10. The Malayan Emergency (1) • Prewar activities of Malayan Communist Party (MCP) • WWII Alliance between UK and MCP • Postwar MCP agitation (1946-1948) • Outbreak of Emergency (1948) • Opening moves (1948-1950) • Large scale British sweeps • MCP terror

11. The Malayan Emergency (2) • Briggs Plan (1950) • War Executive Committees • Small unit patrolling • Resettlement (500-700K rural Chinese, 410 “New Villages”) • Special Branch reforms • Mass surrenders (1958) • Mopping up (1958-1960)

12. Rewards for Surrender:The Opening Phases (1948-1950) • Surrendered and Captured Enemy Personnel (SEPs vs. CEPs) • CEPs – Those who declare continued loyalty to MCP • SEPs – Those willing to cooperate with government • Gurney Amnesty (September 1949) • Pardon terrorists not implicated in capital crimes • Insurgents doubt government promises of safe treatment • Minimally effective

13. Hugh Greene's Reforms(1950-1952) • WWII propaganda experience • Early recognition that “propaganda is essentially an auxiliary weapon and cannot operate in a vacuum.” • Greene’s Reforms • Suspended prosecution of all SEPs • Fair treatment of all SEPs • Vast increases in scale of rewards ($US 158,257 for Chin Peng, $US 5,275 for rank and file members) • Weapons programs • Half rates offered for surrendering SEPs

14. Greene’s Objectives • Goals (Greene) • Attack morale • Drive wedge between leaders and troops • Encourage defection • Use of defectors to develop products and refine propaganda message • Sympathy • Avarice • Limited emphasis on violence Core Themes

15. Templer’s Changes • Alleviating pressure on Chinese population • Extending citizenship to 1.2 MM Chinese • ↓ Detention • ↓ Collective punishment • Creation of “White” Areas • Increased scale of bounties on senior MCP leaders • Problems • Rewards do not capture risk/reward of individual cases • Increased bounties confer hero status on senior leaders • Fears of political impact of wholesale pardon • Final Position: Under-promise, over-deliver Improved perception of government

16. Final Phase (General Bourne, 1954-1958) • Rising pressure on insurgents • “Dominating tactics” • Geneva Agreements sap MCP morale • Loyalist Chinese groups (GCC) in “New Villages” • Publication of sliding scale, rewards schedule • Tunku Abdul Rahman negotiations and Merdeka amnesty (full immunity for all SEPs, August 1957) and ultimatum • Mass surrenders ensue (1958)

17. Bourne Rewards Schedule (1955) • Four categories • Above District Committee Rank • District Committee Leader • Branch Committee Leader • Below Branch Committee • Reduced bounties for top tiers • Published figures are minimums subject to revision upwards

18. Top Rewards • Chow Fong (State Committee Member): $USD 633,029 (2005) for 118 terrorists delivered • Hor Lung (Central Committee Member): $USD 651,492 (2005) for 160 terrorists delivered • Kim Cheng (District Committee Secretary): $USD 131,881 (2005) • Point of comparison (Average Rubber Tapper monthly salary (USD, 2005): $USD 263)

19. Rewards Schedule, 1951 Source: Stephen Enke, “Vietnam’s Other War”

20. Templer Major Trends in Emergency Briggs Plan/ Greene Reforms Gurney Amnesty Bourne Rewards Merdeka Amnesty

21. Guerilla Communism in Malaya • Interviews with 60 SEPs during climax of Emergency • Case study of MCP motivations • Conclusions • Motives for defection related to motives for joining MCP (personal frustration, ambition) • Limited role of official Party policy • “Losing cause” and party corruption as tipping issues • Rapid swing in allegiance • Very little guilt about actions while in party (FAE)

22. Vietnam: The Chieu Hoi Program • Selective amnesty (defector) initiated in 1963 for Vietcong, North Vietnamese, and other non-communist nationalists • No cash reward for defection • Large scale program- over 200,000 defectors over the course of the war

23. Chieu Hoi Defections by Month 1963 1964 1965 1966

24. Benefits of Chieu Hoi • Source of intelligence through defector interviews (RAND, CIA, Simulmatics) • Converted defectors into security forces (PRT, APT, Kit Carson Scouts) • VC devoted significant effort to deterring and punishing defectors

25. Problems of Chieu Hoi • Major reintegration issues (jobs, relocation and housing) • South Vietnamese always fearful and suspicious of ex-insurgents • Attracted few if any high level defectors • Program lacked consistent attention and integration with other programs • Guarantee of good treatment not sufficiently convincing

26. Benefits of Selective Amnesty • Simple attrition with limited collateral damage • Complements offensive action (release valve) • Damages morale; invites purges • Positive contributions of defectors • Intelligence • Propaganda • Scout roles • Pseudo-operations • Marginal benefit often high • Advances political reconciliation

27. Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (1) • Defection the product of interaction of military pressure (threat) and amnesty offers (reassurance) • Effective amnesty programs require detailed study of insurgent motivations • Each movement composed of some mix of soft and hard targets • Government and military ambivalence towards amnesty programs

28. Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (2) • Government treatment of defectors/prisoners central to credibility of amnesty programs • Serial defection (returning to enemy) rare • Three elements for defection (Kitson) • External pressure (stick) • Credible offer (carrot) • Plausible rationale for defection • Greatest gains come in final stages of COIN conflict (cascade effect)

29. Iraq

30. Rewards for Justice • Program established in 1984 to provide large but flexible cash rewards for information leading to terrorist apprehension • Program centers on “most wanted list” (Zarqawi = $25 MM) • Payouts • $57 MM over life of program; 43 recipients • Maximum payout: $30 MM for Uday and Qusay • Average payout ($650K/informer)

31. U.S. Rewards for Information Program • Established in January 2005 by MNSTC-I • Total Funding: $60,000 • Total Spent (Jan-Mar 2005): $9,500 • Average monthly spending rate: $2,000 -3,200/month • No set rewards schedule • Review Board: J-2, J-3, J-8, SJA • Rewards range: $100-2,500

32. Observations on Iraq vs. Malaya • U.S. Rewards for senior leaders far higher ($650,000 (Chin Peng) vs. $25 MM (Zarqawi)) • U.S. spending on tips and weapons buy backs far smaller in absolute and relative terms • No attempt to pay for surrender • Sliding scale of rewards with very low upper bound

33. Coalition Weapons Rewards

34. Malaya Weapons Rewards

36. Amnesty Programs in Iraq:Allawi (June-August 2004) • Allawi’s announces desire to extend broad pardon for those involved in “resistance” • Domestic push back: Shi’ites resist amnesty for suicide bombers or sectarian killers • American push back (Negroponte, Armitage): no amnesty for those who have killed American soldiers • Amnesty proposals “neutered”

37. Amnesty Programs in Iraq:Talabani (April 2005) • Attempt to distinguish between legitimate resistance and terrorists • Iraqi politicians support amnesty for killers of Americans • Americans reject distinctions between American and Iraqi casualties • Amnesty discussions shift into courtship of Sunni notables (group appeals)

38. Gaps in Coalition Programs (1) • No major effort to encourage individual defection • Sectarian overtures (e.g. appeal to Sunnis en masse) • Tribal/group overtures (e.g. American and Iraqi talks with local leaders, resistance groups) • No corresponding appeal on individual level • Rewards for Justice – focus on hard targets • Tips programs offer small sums for information on insurgents (limited resources allocated) • Abortive Iraqi government amnesty concepts center on pardons not rewards

39. Gaps in Coalition Programs (2) • Limited research on composition and motivation of insurgency • Exploitation/cooptation of prisoners • Use of defectors • Limited integration of ex-insurgents into ISF, coalition effort • Net effect: no release valve for potential defectors

40. Room for Improvement? • Anecdotal evidence suggests multiple cleavages within resistance • Foreign vs. Local • Secular vs. Religious • Economic vs. Ideological motivation • Leaders vs. rank and file • Some portion of resistance economically motivated (IEDs, ambushes) • $200-400/attack on coalition forces (JIR) • Bounties for successful attacks on U.S. troops • Potential to combine pardon, rewards, and reintegration offers • Peel off economically motivated rank and file • Focus military attack on hard core – foreign and FRE

41. Sources • Kumar Ramakrishna, “’Bribing the Reds to Give Up’: Rewards Policy in the Malaya Emergency,” War in History, 2002 • Robert Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect, RAND 1972 • Lucian Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya • Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five • Anthony Short, In Pursuit of Mountain Rats • Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency • Richard Clutterbuck, Conflict & Violence in Singapore & Malaysia, 1945-1983 • Jeanette Koch, The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971, RAND 1973