POWER STRUCTURES, POLICY NETS & LOBBYING

1. POWER STRUCTURES, POLICY NETS & LOBBYING Textbook images of U.S. government gloss over the impact of political organizations & interest groups in shaping local, state, national public policies through lobbying on policy issues of great importance to their members’ and constituents’ interests. Political sociologists & political scientists study the institutional political structures and policy processes, which may help to answer some questions about such recent Congressional actions: • Why did the Republican House’s 2002 economic stimulus bill return $21 billion in corporate minimum taxes (paid since 1986!) to General Electric, IBM, General Motors & others? • Why did the Democratic Senate’s version of that bill propose personal tax rebates, extended unemployment benefits, health-care for out-of-work taxpayers? • Why did the bill give $10 million for bison-ranchers like Ted Turner, but no subsidies for depleted food pantries?

2. POWER IS RELATIONAL Power is inherently the property of a relationship between two or more actors. Max Weber’s two famous definitions explicitly asserted that power (Macht) is not the resources held by an actor, but occurs during situated interactions involving actors with potentially opposed interests and goals. ‘Power’ is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which that probability rests. (1947:152) We understand by ‘power’ the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action. (1968:962) Some power is based on force (coercion). But, if actors willingly assent or consent to obey another’s commands, power becomes legitimate authority (Herrschaft), which may be based on actors’ traditional, charismatic, or rational-legal beliefs in the rightness of their relationship.

3. COLLECTIVE ACTION SYSTEMS Collective action systems – such as legislatures, courts, regulatory agencies – make public policy decisions about numerous proposed laws and regulations. Organized interest groups hold varying pro/con preferences across multiple policy decisions. Coalitions lobby public officials to choose outcomes favorable to coalitional interests. Decision makers may also hold policy preferences, and may change their votes on some events to gain support for preferred decisions. An actor’s structural interest is “a revealed preference, for a particular outcome, resulting from identifiable social constraints or influence,” which may differ from an unconstrained preference (Mizruchi & Potts 2000:231). Models of socially embedded policymaking explore how network ties shape collective decisions through information exchanges, political resource, persuasion, vote-trading (log-rolling), and other dynamic processes.

4. POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS Are organized interest groups substantially different from SMOs? • Conventional view that social movements represent outside challengers trying to get their views heard inside the polity; e.g., feminist, anti-war, gay-lesbian, civil rights. SMOs may resort to illegitimate tactics such as street protests and violence. • Interest groups are legitimate insiders that pressure officials using conventional political tactics, such as letters, emails, and meetings. • Alternative views deny any meaningful distinctions • Both SMOs & political orgs deploy the full range of tactics in efforts to influence outcomes of public policymaking • Dual democratic functions of political orgs • Aggregate and represent some citizens’ policy preferences to elected & appointed public officials • Provide channel for officials to communicate about benefits to their electoral constituencies

5. PROLIFERATING POLITICAL ORGS Population ecology analysis of trade association founding & deaths rates reveals growth dynamics during 20th century Since 1960s, Washington and state capitals saw rapidly rising numbers of business, professional, labor, ethnic-racial, women’s, environmental, governmental, & other political interest orgs. Peak business ass’ns – NAM, BRT, Chamber of Commerce – reacted to increasing federal gov’t intervention into the workplace & economy.

6. LOBBYING TACTICS Political orgs deploy a range of lobbying tactics to influence elected & appointed officials. In descending frequency of use: • Testimony at legislative or agency hearings • Direct contacts with legislators or other officials • Informal contacts with legislators or other officials • Presenting research results • Coalitions with other groups; planning strategy with government officials • Mass media: talking to journalists; paid advertising • Policy formation: drafting legislation, regulations; shaping policy implementation; serving on advisory commissions; agenda-setting • Constituent influence: letter-writing or telegram campaigns; working with influential citizens; alerting legislators to district effects • Litigation: filing lawsuits or amici curiae (friend of the court) briefs • Elections: campaign contributions; campaign work; candidate endorsements • Protests or demonstrations • Other: monitoring; influencing appointments; doing personal favors for officials

7. LOBBYING STRATEGIES Lobbying is NOT political bribery nor overt quid pro quo dealing. Influence requires making the most persuasive case: Lobbyists give friendly policy makers the information, substantive analyses, & politically accurate arguments about why they should support the org’s preferred solutions, instead of their opponents’ clearly inferior & indefensible proposals. • Successful political orgs mobilize their resources to achieve three strategic goals (Browne 1998): • Winning attention – “outside game” keeping the publicity spotlight on the org’s issue agenda, through the mass media & in legislative and regulatory arenas • Making contact – “inside game” of schmoozing & building close network ties to officials, lobbyists, and other brokers • Reinforcement – “lobbyists keep coming back, showing their issues are still alive, reinforcing both their access and previously discussed policy matters”

8. POLICY DOMAINS Policy network analysts seek to explain the formation of state-interest organization networks, their persistence & change over time, and the consequences of network structures for public policy-making outcomes. Developers include British (Rhodes, Marsh), German (Pappi, Schneider, Mayntz), American (Laumann, Knoke) political scientists & sociologists POLICY DOMAIN:“a set of interest group organizations, legislative institutions, and governmental executive agencies that engage in setting agendas, formulating policies, gaining access, advocating positions, organizing collective influence actions, and selecting among proposals to solve delimited substantive policy problems, such as national defense, education, agriculture, or welfare.” (Laumann and Knoke. 1987. The Organizational State) “A policy network is described by its actors, their linkages and its boundary. It includes a relatively stable set of mainly public and private corporate actors. The linkages between the actors serve as channels for communication and for the exchange of information, expertise, trust and other policy resources. The boundary of a given policy network is not in the first place determined by formal institutions but results from a process of mutual recognition dependent on functional relevance and structural embeddedness.”(Kenis and Schneider 1991)

9. The ORGANIZATIONAL STATE The Organizational State (1987) conceptualized national policy domain’s power structures as multiplex networks among formal organizations, not elite persons. These connections enable opposing coalitions to mobilize political resources in collective fights for influence over specific public policy decisions. Power structureis revealed in patterns of multiplex networks of information, resource, reputational, and political support among organizations with partially overlapping and opposing policy interests. (See blockmodel figures of U.S., German, Japanese labor policy domains in Chapter 8 of Knoke et al. [1996].) Action setis a subset of policy domain orgs that share common policy preferences, pool political resources, and pressure governmental decisionmakers to choose a policy outcome favorable to their interests. After a policy decision, the opposing action sets typically break apart as new events give rise to other constellations of interest orgs.

10. POLICY DOMAIN COMMUNICATION NETS • National policy domains– orgs and institutions engaged in efforts to create/change specific policy proposals to solve substantive problems • EX: health, energy, labor, agriculture, defense • Individuals are agents acting on behalf of orgs’ interests (Marsh & Smith 2000), encountering principal-agent problems Orgs central in a policy domain maintain numerous communication ties, facilitating collaboration & policy information exchanges with potential partners and with their opponents (for political intelligence gathering) Fig 9.6 (next slide) is a MDS plot showing the core of the U.S. labor policy domain in 1988. These interest orgs lie at short direct or indirect communication distances, even though many took the opposing sides on recurrent labor policy fights (e.g., AFL-CIO vs National Assn of Manufacturers, Business Round Table, Chamber of Commerce)

11. LABOR DOMAIN COMMUNICATION CORE +1.5 0.0 -1.5 NLRB HD ACLU SD NEA SR UAW ABC AARP CHAM NAM BRT DOL HR AFL-CIO TEAM OSHA ASCM NGA WHO -1.5 0.0 +1.5 SOURCE: Knoke. 2001. Changing Organizations. Westview.

12. LOBBYING TOGETHER or ALONE? Interest org confronts transaction-cost and free-riding questions in deciding when to join others in an action set or to lobby alone? • Its actions would have almost no impact on obtaining the “collective good” (public policy) • It would maximize its gains by contributing nothing yet enjoying whatever policy benefits the other participants might succeed in producing Mancur Olson’s solution? Offer selective incentives for orgs to join a coalition: access to contacts, insider information, enhanced org’l reputation as a powerful policymaking “player” in a policy domain • Marie Hojnacki (1997) found that fewer than one-third of 172 orgs worked alone in lobbying on five policy proposals: • Org with very narrow issue interests was more likely to work by itself • If opponents were strongly organized & allies saw the interest org as crucial to their policy success, then it was more likely to join coalition

13. LOBBYING COALITIONS When its interests are at stake in a Congressional bill or regulatory ruling, a political org can lobby alone or in coalition • Most political orgs work in coalitions; a division of labor • Coalitions are short-lived affairs for specific narrow goals • EX: impose or lift restrictions on Persian rug imports • Partners in next coalition change with the specific issues • “Politics makes strange bedfellows” EX: Civil liberties • Orgs that lobby together succeed more often than soloists • Broad cleavages emerge within some policy domains • EX: Business vs Unions in labor policy domain (next slide)

14. POLITICAL CLEAVAGES on EVENTS Memberships in action sets for 3 U.S. labor policy domain events revealed overlapping patterns of organizational interests in influencing these policy decisions. The labor and business coalitions comprise a core set of advocates (AFL vs. Chamber of Commerce) plus event-specific interest organizations, particularly nonlabor allies of unions. SOURCE: p. 354 in Knoke. 2001. Changing Organizations.

15. WHO WINS POLICY FIGHTS? • We know much less about the systematic influence of political action on the outcomes of public policy fights • No single political organization or enduring coalition prevails on every issue & event of importance to it; incrementalism prevails • What implications for Ruling Class, Elite, & Pluralist models? • Biggest PAC contributors & campaign workers may enjoy greater access, easier victories on uncontested policy & pork proposals • But why Big Tobacco’s setbacks? Union failure to block NAFTA? • Roll-call analyses of Congressional votes find small lobbying effects relative to other factors • Lobbying impacts greatest in particular policy events, depending on strength of opposition’s resources & political arguments • Elected officials also pay attention to unorganized voter opinions • Shockingly, some even hold ideological principles & hobby-horses!

16. DIALECTICAL INFLUENCES Marsh & Smith’s dialectical model depicts policy outcomes as feeding back to change actors and network structures Policy outcomes may affect networks by: 1. Changing network membership or the balance of resources within it 2. Altering social contexts to weaken particular interests in relation to a given network 3. Causing agents, who learn by experience, to pursue alternative policy influence strategies & actions

17. References Aldrich, Howard E. and Udo Staber. 1988. “Organizing Business Interests: Patterns of Trade Association Foundings, Transformations, and Death.” Pp. 111-126 in Ecological Models of Organizations, edited by Glenn Carroll. New York: Ballinger. Browne, William P. 1998. Groups, Interests, and U.S. Public Policy. Washington: Georgetown University Press. Hojnacki, Marie. 1997. “Interest Groups’ Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone.” American Journal of Political Science 41:61-87. Kenis, Patrick and Volker Schneider. 1991. “Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox.” Pp. 25-62 in Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, edited by Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz. Boulder/Frankfurt: Campus/Westview Press. Knoke, David. 2001. Changing Organizations: Business Networks in the New Political Economy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Knoke, David, Franz Urban Pappi, Jeffrey Broadbent and Yutaka Tsujinaka. 1996. Comparing Policy Networks: Labor Politics in the U.S., Germany, and Japan. New York: Cambridge University Press. Laumann, Edward O. and David Knoke. 1987. The Organizational State: Social Choice in National Policy Domains. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Marsh, David and M. Smith. 2000. “Understanding Policy Networks: Towards a Dialectical Approach.” Political Studies 48(4):4-21. Mizruchi, Mark S. and Blyden B. Potts. 2000. “Social Networks and Interorganizational Relations: An Illustration and Adaptation of a Micro-Level Model of Political Decision Making.” Research in the Sociology of Organizations 17:225-265. Weber, Max. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Free Press. Wber, Max. 1968. Economy and Society. New York: Bedminster Press.