Australian School of Business

1. Australian School of Business Navigating the Retirement Risk Zone: A Consumer Perspective December 2013 Hazel Bateman School of Risk and Actuarial Studies

2. How well do consumers navigate the Retirement Risk Zone?

3. Context Individuals face increased risks and responsibilities for retirement saving, investment and decumulation decisions • Participation • Superannuation fund/Pension provider • Contribution rate • Asset allocation • Retirement date • Retirement benefit type • Financial advice/advisor

4. What do Australians do? • Participation decision: MANDATORY (for employees, 90-95% coverage) • Superannuation fund: < 3% (?) choose super fund (remainder DEFAULT fund). • Contribution rate: around 2/3 contribute no more than minimum superannuation guarantee (ABS, 2009) (remainder DEFAULT at min SG, 9.25%). • Asset allocation: Around 43% assets in DEFAULTinvestment option, about 2/3 industry fund assets in DEFAULT option (? 60% members ?). • Retirement date: Choice  NO DEFAULT • Benefit choice: NO product DEFAULT. About 50% (assets) lump sum/50% (assets) account-based pension, several hundred life annuities sold annually.

5. What do Australians do? • Participation decision: MANDATORY (for employees, 90-95% coverage) • Superannuation fund: < 3% (?) choose super fund (remainder DEFAULT fund). • Contribution rate: around 2/3 contribute no more than minimum superannuation guarantee (ABS, 2009) (remainder DEFAULT at min SG, 9.25%). • Asset allocation: Around 43% assets in DEFAULTinvestment option, about 2/3 industry fund assets in DEFAULT option (? 60% members ?). • Retirement date: Choice  NO DEFAULT • Benefit choice: NO product DEFAULT. About 50% (assets) lump sum/50% (assets) account-based pension, several hundred life annuities sold annually.

6. What do Australians do? • Participation decision: MANDATORY (for employees, 90-95% coverage) • Superannuation fund: < 3% (?) choose super fund (remainder DEFAULT fund). • Contribution rate: around 2/3 contribute no more than minimum superannuation guarantee (ABS, 2009) (remainder DEFAULT at min SG, 9.25%). • Asset allocation: Around 43% assets in DEFAULTinvestment option, about 2/3 industry fund assets in DEFAULT option (? 60% members ?). • Retirement date: Choice  NO DEFAULT • Benefit choice: NO product DEFAULT. About 50% (assets) lump sum/50% (assets) account-based pension, several hundred life annuities sold annually.

7. For consumers in the retirement risk zone, retirement benefit/decumulation decisions are difficult • Involve complex financial products • Interaction with publicly provided benefits • Cannot navigate by ‘default’ • High stakes (largest non-housing asset) • Once in a lifetime decision no opportunity to learn from experience (decision made once and generally irreversible) • Mass market DC is new  little opportunity for social learning (ie, to learn from older generations)

8. We should not be surprised – this is what Behavioural Economists have been telling us… • Bounded rationality – certain types of problem are too complex for individuals to solve on their own • Bounded self control – individuals lack the willpower to execute their plans • Bounded self interest – while individuals do seek to maximize their personal utility, they are more co-operative and altruistic than predicted by economic theory • Swayed by behavioural factors – loss aversion , inertia, procrastination, framing, confusion, status quo bias, heuristics (Thaler and Mullainathan, 2000)

9. Lessons from the academic literature? 5 year ARC Discovery Grant (2010-2014): The Paradox of Choice: Unravelling Complex Superannuation Decisions Hazel Bateman (Risk and Actuarial, UNSW) Christine Eckert (Marketing, CenSoC, UTS) FedorIskhakov(CEPAR, UNSW) Jordan Louviere (CenSoC, UTS) Stephen Satchell (Cambridge UK) Susan Thorp (Finance, UTS) + Julie Agnew (Finance and Economics, College of William and Mary, USA) Investigated the ability of ordinary people to make complex retirement savings/investment/decumulation decisions

10. . Evidence of incomplete and unrealistic plans Retirement planning

11. Survey of financial knowledge, plans and values • Fielded in May 2011 • Online panel provided by Pureprofile • 920 people • Ages 50-74 • Even genders • 60% had some post-school education • 37% already retired

12. Uneven planning and expectations • Around 30% still employed had not thought about the financial aspects of their retirement and a further 20% had just started to think about it • Only around 45% of those 50+ had tried to work out how much money they would need for retirement (2012 Financial Literacy survey)

13. Uneven planning and expectations • Optimistic lifestyle expectations of pre retirees (travel/leisure) vs post retirees (carers/return to work) • Fewer than one in five discussed retirement with friends and co-workers • Fewer than one in four had attended a retirement seminar

14. Estate planning is more common than financial or workplace planning • 60% of surveyed had made a will • 70% had thought about leaving a financial or material bequest

15. Pessimism about length of retirement • Typical respondent was • Pessimistic about near-term survival (75-85) • Optimistic about survival at older ages (90 onwards) • Men in their 50s • Underestimated lifetime by 6 years on average • Men in their 60s • Close to improved life table expectations • Women in their 50s • Underestimated lifetime by 7 years on average • Women in their 60s • Underestimated lifetime by 5 years on average

16. . Evidence of poor financial literacy, system and product knowledge

17. Measuring financial literacy in Australia • Survey fielded in June 2012 – Australian extension to Financial Literacy around the World (FLaT) study • Online survey using PureProfile Web Panel (600,000+ Australians) • 1,024 respondents • Nationally representative sample • Age ranges from 18 to 84 • 742 respondents aged 25-65 and non-retired

18. 3 Key Financial Literacy Questions (1)Interest rates:Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow? • More than $102 -Do not know • Exactly $102 -Refuse to answer • Less than $102 (2) Inflation:Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account? • More than today -Do not know • Exactly the same -Refuse to answer • Less than today (3) Diversification: Buying shares in a single company usually provides a safer return than buying units in a managed share fund. • True -Do not know • False -Refuse to answer

19. Only 42% respondents answered 3 key questions correctly

20. The same survey indicated somewhat poor super knowledge Only 14% of those who said ‘yes’ were correct

21. Of concern: If your superannuation account is invested in a ‘balanced’ investment option, this means that it is invested exclusively in safe assets such as savings accounts, cash management accounts and term deposits .

22. A related study revealed mixed awareness of products to provide income in retirement Survey of 920 superannuation fund members, 50-75 years old, May 2012

23. In particular, retirement income products are not well understood Survey of 920 superannuation fund members, 50-75 years old, May 2012.

24. . Consumers are swayed by Behavioural factors

25. Consumers making retirement benefit decisions likely influenced by • Mental accounting (narrow framing) • Loss aversion (eg, focus on impact of dying young) • Misleading heuristics (insurance is for bad events) • Illusion of control (wealth vs income) • Hyperbolic discounting • Framing (consumption vs investment frame) • Complexity => Use defaults or other decision rules

26. FRAMING: Brown et al (2008) Why don’t people insure late life consumption? American Economic Review Benefits calculated to be actuarially equivalent. Weak bequest motive 26

27. FRAMING: Brown et al (2008) Why don’t people insure late life consumption? American Economic Review Benefits calculated to be actuarially equivalent. Weak bequest motive 27

28. FRAMING: Brown et al (2008) Why don’t people insure late life consumption? American Economic Review Benefits calculated to be actuarially equivalent. Weak bequest motive 28

29. Discrete choice experiment of retirement benefit decisions • September 2011 (repeated Sept 2012) • Initial - online web panel of 854 participants with a superannuation account (ages 50-64, not retired) Survey instrument included: • TASK: Hypothetical allocation of ‘retirement accumulation’ between life annuity and investment account • Longevity expectations, health expectations • Product knowledge/Financial literacy • Demographics/personal information.

30. Income stream choice task Investment account, flexibility, risk of account depletion, Annuity, guarantee 4 levels of risk of running out of funds

31. Two-stage model of decision making: first understand the products then make the choices • Who is involved? Test for who recalls the features of the products correctly: • People who understand the decision • People who are paying attention in ‘real time’ • Who is risk aware? Test for who chooses to reduce the chance of low income as the risk (of running out of funds) rises

32. Who understand the products and is ‘involved’ with the decision?

33. Risk-aware choices depend on understanding the products and ‘real time’ interest.

34. Benefit choices experiment: conclusions • People with higher financial capability pay more attention (more ‘involved’) • More numerate and more attentive people are better risk managers • Detailed understanding of specific products is critical to risk-perception Repeat experiment identified use of heuristics (decision rules) • diversification (1/n) heuristic (50/50 allocation) • default (stay with initial allocation) • Extremes (100% annuity, 0% annuity)

35. What have we learnt about navigating the retirement risk zone? • Incomplete plans, unrealistic expectations • Poor financial skills, system/product knowledge • Numeracy, financial competence and system/product knowledge enhances interest/involvement • ‘Involvement’ and numerical ability facilitates risk awareness (and better decisions) • Role of decision heuristics (1/n diversification, defaults)

36. Navigating the retirement risk zone – is this the consumer perspective???

37. Thank you

38. Relevant papers Papers • Economic rationality, risk presentation and retirement portfolio choice (CenSoc and UNSW Working Paper) • Financial competence, risk presentation and retirement portfolio preferences (Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, forthcoming). • Financial competence and expectations formation: evidence from Australia (Economic Record 2012). • Superannuation knowledge and plan behaviourJASSA, 2013. • Work, money, lifestyle: Plans of Australian retirees JASSA, 2013. • Financial literacy and retirement planning in Australia (Numeracy, 2013). • Involvement: A partial solution to the annuity puzzle (CenSoC and UNSW Working Paper)