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Defending Against Bandwidth DDoS Attacks

Learn about bandwidth DoS attacks, logical view of attacks, Yahoo case study, defense strategies like RON project, challenges, distributed defenses, monitoring scenarios, and fault-tolerant routing in the context of overlay networks.

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Defending Against Bandwidth DDoS Attacks

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  1. Bandwidth DoS Attacks and Defenses Robert Morris Frans Kaashoek, Hari Balakrishnan, Students MIT LCS

  2. What is a Denial of Service Attack? • Goal: make a service unusable. • How: overload a server, router, network link. • Focus: bandwidth attacks (“trinoo”, “tfn”).

  3. Logical View of Attack Net Attacker Control Traffic Master Slave Slave Slave Slave Slave Attack Traffic Victim

  4. Attack Targets Link Router Customer’s Router ISP Host Other ISPs App O/S Other Customers Customer’s LAN

  5. Attacks use IP Packets IP Header: Source Address Destination Address User Data • Routers forward each packet independently. • Routers don’t know about connections. • Complexity is in end hosts; routers are simple.

  6. Outline • Case study: Yahoo. • What happened. • Analysis. • Our framework for defense: RON.

  7. Case Study: Yahoo Attack • Early February 2000. • Took Yahoo off the net for hours.

  8. Yahoo’s Point of View ISP Router 1 Gbit/second of Ping Response packets. Yahoo’s Router www.yahoo.com

  9. Yahoo Attack Overview Co-location Centers Other ISPs Yahoo’s ISP Yahoo

  10. Attack Packet Generation Leader Slaves Co-location Center M S1 S2 … Sn Ping, DST=bcast, SRC=Yahoo Ping Responses, DST=Yahoo Internet

  11. What did the attack depend on? • Pervasive insecure hosts. • Fake IP source addresses. • Use of hosts as amplifiers. • Weak router software. • Difficulty of diagnosis.

  12. Pervasive Insecure Hosts • Required for disguise and to generate enough traffic. • How do they break in? • Buffer overruns. • Typically Solaris and Linux. • Highly automated. • Defenses? • Better programming practices. • Disable services by default. • Firewalls, intrusion detection. • Motivation for deployment is not strong.

  13. Fake IP Source Addresses • Two uses: • Hide the source of attack. • Part of weapon. • Example: SYN flooding. • Defense: • Ingress/egress filtering. • But motivation for deployment is not strong.

  14. Ingress Filtering Attacker SRC=Site2 Site 1 Site 2 ISP 1 ISP 2 ISP 3 Victim

  15. Use of Hosts as Amplifiers • Attackers need this: • To avoid using their own machines. • To generate lots of traffic. • To avoid detection via load monitoring. • Two approaches: • Break into 1000s of machines. • Trick legitimate machines into generating traffic.

  16. Weak Router Software • Routers themselves are often victims. • Why? • Forwarding and management compete for CPU. • Control and data traffic compete for net b/w. • Solutions? • Simplify and partition.

  17. Difficulty of Diagnosis • Very little automatic support for traffic analysis and correlation. • Is the high load legitimate? • What does the attack consist of? • Where does the attack come from? • How ask upstream routers to discard attack packets? • Defense: distributed analysis system.

  18. Why are these attacks easy? • Internet built around end-to-end principle: • Most functions done by end hosts. • Examples: reliable delivery. • Advantages: • Simplifies network core. • Example: IP packet forwarding. • Example: it’s easy to start an ISP. • Anyone can introduce new services. • Result: lots of innovation.

  19. Why is defense hard? • End-to-end principle conflicts with: • Centralized control. • Centralized monitoring. • Separation of data from control traffic. • Mandatory authentication. • Mandatory accounting.

  20. RON Project • End-to-end framework for: • Cooperative statistics collection. • Cooperative reaction to attacks. • Fault-tolerant control and data routing. • How: resilient overlay network (RON). • Funded by DARPA/IA/FTN.

  21. What is an Overlay Network? N2 N3 N1 ISP1 ISP2 N4 N5 • Better routing functions built in end hosts. • Can be used to build distributed defenses.

  22. Why Distributed Defenses? • Presence of attack obvious near victim. • Not obvious near sources of attack. • But control is easier near sources. • Identifying attackers requires cooperation. • Asymmetric routing. • Fake source addresses.

  23. Why Distribution is Hard • RON itself is a target. • Authorized communication between RON nodes. • Bandwidth attacks on RON nodes. • Application-level DoS attacks. • Political / deployment problems. • Needs cooperation? Or single-organization?

  24. Monitoring Scenario 1. Measure N2 N3 Victim N1 Backbone B1 2. Communicate Backbone B2 3. Control N4 N5 Attacker

  25. Fault-Tolerant Routing • Use Internet to connect multiple sites. • Inter-ISP routing: • Ignores link quality. • Ignores many available paths due to policy. • Chooses only one path. • Reacts slowly. • RON allows end-system control of routing.

  26. Fault-tolerant Routing (2) N2 N3 N1 Backbone B1 Peering Point P Peering Point Q Backbone B2 Attacker N4 N5

  27. Peer-to-Peer Networking • Multi-organization overlays. • Early work: Gnutella and FreeNet. • Data replicated at many sites. • Queries traverse reliable overlay. • Explicit protection of virtual infrastructure.

  28. Summary • Raise the bar: • Improve host security. • Make it hard to fake IP addresses. • Experiment with RON-like and peer-to-peer architectures.

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