Election of September 8, 2013 .

1. Main lessons of regional election campaigns of 2013. Trends and corridors of opportunities for political players in 2014-2015. Evgeny Golubev's report at "Continuing Grushin", the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center conference taken place in the RANEPA,Moscow, on February 27-28, 2014.

2. Election of September 8, 2013. • Regional and local elections of 2013 were the first after the beginning of realization of so-called political reform of 2012 within which so-called liberalization of the elective legislation was carried out. • The greatest interest was caused by elections: • Governors (8 regions of Russia); • Deputies of Legislative Assemblies of regions of Russia (15 regions); • Mayors of the regional centers of the Russian Federation (9 cities).

3. General results of the elections • "United Russia" victory practically in all regions and the regional centers (an exception - Yekaterinburg and Petrozavodsk); • Victorious reports about UR victory on all main TV channels as a way of the message to voters of thought of revival and party rehabilitation in the opinion of voters of the power for future elections.

4. Features of the elective campaigns of 2013. • Elections of September 8 differed in : • Keen interest of all participants of political process in elections; • Concentration of the UR resources for receiving the greatest possible result (rehabilitation before the voter); • Rigid administration of electoral commissions and vessels; • Prevention to elections of candidates from "A civil platform" in the most vulnerable for UR regions; • Selective liberalization of political process (an assumption of possibility of a victory of oppositional candidates in the certain cities and regions).

5. Выборы Губернаторов. Результаты.

6. Features of elections campaigns of Governors • Elections of Governors in 3 regions were most interesting: • Moscow, Vladimir region and Zabaykalsky Krai. • In Zabaykalsky Krai the assumption method to elections of formally oppositional candidate ("Just Russia") was applied. However the candidate of Mr. Ilkovsky was coordinated in advance with the Kremlin and in this case it is possible to say that the opposition won, but not the party. • In Moscow elections could turn into mere formality, however participation of Mr. Navalny turned these elections into competitive ones and designated real protest potential. • The Vladimir region the "Varangian" won who appeared in the Vladimir region just a few months prior to elections and he wasn't connected in any way with this region earlier. However on formally high rates of the representative of UR, all campaign was very difficult. The main strong competitors of Mrs. Orlova were serially taken out of the political process. At first the former governor of the Vladimir region was neutralized, the communist Vinogradov (he was promised a post of the speaker of regional ZS), then the representative of "Just Russia" Anton Belyakov, the deputy of the State Duma from JR was offered a post of senator in the Federation Council (and he agreed as a result ), the representative of "A civil platform" Mr. Filippov was not allowed elections on the far-fetched bases. Thus preliminary work on cleaning of an electoral field was made with success and elections actually turned into mere formality – there were no real and strong competitors in fight against the representative of UR. • As a result elections of Governors formally were victorious for the party in power, but revealed a number of difficulties – protest potential didn't disappear anywhere, the authorities should consider this factor at selection of candidates for a post of Governors, cleaning of a competitive field before official start of elections, and when carrying out actual elective campaigns.

7. Elections in Legislative Assemblies of the regions according to party lists. Results.

8. Elections in Legislative Assemblies of the regions according to party lists. Features of campaigns. • Elections in 9 regions in which the percent, according to party lists was lower than the received votes or a little more than 50% were most interesting. In these regions Governors don't enjoy wide popularity at the population and they didn't interfere with a course of election campaign. In other 6 regions the role and influence of strong and charismatic governors though not so much on a course of the electoral company was obviously felt, how many reflect their personal authority and influence on the general social and economic situation in the subordinated region (Chechnya, Bashkiria, the Kemerovo, Rostov, Ulyanovsk, Ivanovo areas). • So in 9 regions rather low results of "United Russia" on party lists, and respectively rather high rates of opposition parties were shown. • In the majority of regions more than 12 parties took part in campaigns and thus only two opposition parties showed good results– as a rule there was a CPRF (more than 10% in 13 regions) and/or LDPR (more than 10% in 4 regions - Khakassia, Irkutsk, Smolensk and Arkhangelsk areas), and/or "Just Russia" (it received more than 10% in two regions - the Republic of Sakha and the Arkhangelsk region), and/or "A civil platform" (more than 8% in two regions - the Republic of Kalmykia and the Irkutsk region). • Despite that fact that the party in power purposely expanded a competitive field at the expense of sets spoilers ("Communists of Russia", "The Russian party of pensioners for justice", "Communist party of social justice", "Labor party of Russia", "Homeland", "The union of citizens", etc., etc.) and it as a whole gave a certain effect on procrastination of voices at traditional parliamentary parties (first of all at the CPRF and at "Just Russia"), nevertheless, the protest kernel of electorate all the same voted for the traditional parties anyway opposing "United Russia".

9. Elections in Legislative Assemblies of the regions according to party lists. Features of campaigns Features of regional campaigns for elections in legislative assemblies were: • UR party in power obviously did not hoped for good results according to party lists and did everything to win; • It focused strong charismatic candidates in one-mandatory districts (and they won in most cases there); • regional election committees registered the greatest possible quantity of sets spoilers which carried out a role on procrastination of voices at opposition parties; • It used according to the full program an administrative resource both in the person of strong Governors, and represented by regional election commissions and vessels for removal of the strongest opposition candidates both in one-mandatory districts, and for removal of party lists of opposition parties for any least violations of the elective legislation. Most of all the Civil Platform party suffered from an administrative resource and it there was obviously centralized installation of the Kremlin on M. Prokhorov's discredit and his party on the eve of regional elections and especially on the eve of elections in Moscow. • Results of "Just Russia" on regional and local elections appeared much more modest, than it was expected. In the majority of regions they received less than 10% of votes according to party lists. It is represented that it is result of inaction of regional party leaders in work with the voter and decrease in activity of federal party leadership on criticism of actions of the existing power. The party lost the personality and a pronounced position which resulted in real falling of interest to it. • The LDPR acted predictable, having received low results in the southern regions of Russia and relatively good results in regions of the Central Russia, the Northwest, and also in Siberia. • The CPRF failed only in two regions – Chechnya and Kuzbass where the role of heads of regions in public consciousness is so great that to voters there are supposed to vote only for a power party. There are no options there. • "The civil platform" as a whole did not show good results on regional elections. However it is necessary to understand that this party was under the unprecedented pressure of the authorities which beat out in all possible ways from campaign. For example, in Vladimir, Mr. Filippov didn't register as the candidate for a post of the Governor on the far-fetched bases, the mayor of Yaroslavl E.Urlashov who had to head the list of "Civil platform" on elections in the Yaroslavl regional duma was arrested on suspicion in bribe extortion before the elections, the CP list on the far-fetched bases was not registered by regional election committee in the terms established by the law.

10. Results of regional campaigns for elections in legislative assemblies are formally as follows - "United Russia" has won everywhere. it didn't receive less than 40% of the votes in non of the regions, voted according to party lists. Nevertheless it is necessary to understand that if elections were held in really fair and open competition, and they were like that only in two regions (in Moscow at elections of the mayor of the capital and in Yekaterinburg at elections of the Head of the city district), they could appear a bit different. At least, it is possible to speak about it regarding regions of the Central Russia and the Northwest, and also Siberia (except Kuzbass). The authorities understood that these elections won't be simple for them and undertook a maximum of efforts in order that in all possible ways to weaken result of opposition and to strengthen result of "United Russia". However this doesn't say in any way that protest activity seriously decreased or disappeared in general. Elections of mayors of the large regional centers confirmed this. The inscription on the picture№2: «The one thin I am asking you of… just to have everything politically correct» Elections in Legislative Assemblies of the regions. Results.

11. Elections of mayors of the large regional centers of the Russian Federation. Results.

12. Elections of mayors of the large regional centers of the Russian Federation. Features of campaigns. • It is represented that elections of mayors of the large regional centers of Russia were the most interesting and rather free and transparent elections in 2013. 8 mayors were elected in the uniform voting day on September 8, 2013, and early elections of the mayor of Tomsk took place on October 13, 2013. • So, formally candidates from UR didn't win elections in 3 regional centers. Though there is one intricacy - representatives of UR lost after all just in two cities - in Petrozavodsk and in Yekaterinburg . In Abakan the acting mayor N. Bulakin didn't want to be elected UR candidate and went to elections as the independent candidate, and UR didn't begin to propose other candidate. Probably, Mr. Bulakin made everything correctly as the result turned out worthy for him – 81,79%. • In Petrozavodsk G. Shirshin's independent candidate (the director of JSC Izdatelsky Dom Guberniya) carried out campaign excellently and outstripped the representative of UR, the former mayor of Petrozavodstvk N. Levin, G. Shirshin managed to pull together all protest electorate on 13 items in fact, representatives of other opposition parties didn't receive more than 5% of votes. • In Yekaterinburg E.Royzman nominated from "A civil platform", won elections an oversight of regional administration. They needed to agree with the representative of "Just Russia", the deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation A. Burkov about removal of its candidate from elections, then probably the part of electorate of A. Burkov would vote for Ya. Silin, the representative of UR. And so voices stretched between 3 main candidates and as a result E.Royzman, the representative of "A civil platform", has won 33,31% with the maximum result for this party.

13. Elections of mayors of the large regional centers of the Russian Federation. Features of campaigns. • In a number of the cities, representatives of "United Russia" won elections that is called in one gate, with big advantage, without leaving any chances to competitors even on potential success. There are three cities – Khabarovsk, Tomsk and Vladivostok. Here representatives of UR won and received about 60% of votes. • In Khabarovsk A. Sokolov who was the acting mayor, despite his age (and at the time of elections he was 63 years old) showed the good result among all mayors of the regional centers which have moved forward from UR on September 8, 2013 - 67,9%. The authority of the mayor, played its role here rather than a party rating. It just that case when the person drags out party, instead of party dragging a person. • In Tomsk early elections of the mayor took place on October 13, 2013, Ivan Klein nominated by UR, and earlier working as the director general of JSC “Tomskoye pivo” became the winner with a result of 62,2%. It is the same case when the party was very serious concerning the choice of the candidate. The local beer king, the business executive and simply charismatic person was pleasant to all – both to elite, and the people. • In Vladivostok everything wasn't so unambiguous though the former mayor I.Pushkarev gathered rather large number of voices too - 59,45%. Unlike the first two cases on elections in Vladivostok after all there was a competition and the representative of the Green Alliance parties V. Cherepkov, the former mayor of Vladivostok and the deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation gained 18,9%. It is clear that " Green Alliance " used authority V. Cherepkova at certain segments of the population, but after all Cherepkov agreed with it. Anyway protest moods in Vladivostok were shown significantly above, than in Tomsk and Khabarovsk. In addition, the representative of the CPRF O. Velgodsky gained another 10,3% of votes.

14. Elections of mayors of the large regional centers of the Russian Federation. Features of campaigns. • In a number of the cities, representatives of "United Russia" formally won elections, however they had to put obvious big effort in it. These are Vologda, Voronezh, Veliky Novgorod, the cities of the center and the Northwest of Russia. • In Vologda E.Shulepov , the acting mayor, won elections formally with result of 48,2%. However nobody expected the unknown candidate from the party "A civil platform", N. Lukichev(1960), the chief of administrative department "Institute of management of education" the Russian Academy of Education, will take 23,4% of votes of the city where the opposition was never pronounced earlier differed during campaign. It is clear that in many respects the power helped as always constantly pressing on a staff of the oppositional candidate ( withdrew circulations of newspapers, didn't give the chance to meet voters etc. etc.). But also representatives of other opposition parties collected another 15% of votes which didn't get to the representative of UR. • In Voronezh the representative of UP A, Gusev, the former first deputy of the regional Government, gained 43,62%. It seems to be a high percent, it is a sure victory. However Galina Kudryavtseva (1945), the grandmother of the Voronezh democracy, the former head of a regional cell of LDPR, and nowadays the representative of Alliance of the Green party, collected 26,6% of votes. And another 18,3% were gained by the representative of the CPRF K.Afishin. It seems that the representative of the CPRF also rescued UR from defeat if he wasn't declared on elections , the representative of UR would lose precisely. The staff of UR in Voronezh understood it and obviously supported secret arrangements with a CPRF staff. • In Veliky Novgorod, the representative of UR Yu.Bobryshev, the former mayor, won elections in general with a scratch – 38,5% Evgeny Kuzikov nominated from "Just Russia", the deputy head of the Novgorod management of Federal Treasury, received 23,9% of votes, and another 18,7% were received by the independent candidate, the deputy of the Novgorod City Council S. Svetlov. It seems that he rescued from defeat of the representative of UR also as well as in Voronezh.

15. TheResults of elections of mayors of the large regional centers of the Russian Federation in 2013 in our opinion are as follows: 1 . On elections of mayors of the large cities with rare exception there is a competition and oppositional candidates can win against representatives of the party in power even taking into account serious administrative pressure. 2 . candidates from UR won a with big advantage Approximately in one third of all cases, approximately cases candidates from UR win a third with great difficulty in the condition of the presence two-three strong candidates from opposition parties on elections which only stretch protest voices to each other. Approximately in one third of all cases the opposition can really win elections of the mayor, however it is caused more by miscalculations of local staffs of UR on strategy and tactics of conducting election campaign of the candidate. 3 . Elections of mayors from authorities in power are won by only those candidates who has something to present the voter from the point of view of results of the activity. 4 . UR began to treat much more seriously a choice of candidates for positions of mayors and if it has no confidence of a victory of the acting mayor, it changes the candidate on more authoritative and respected among the population. Application of a method of involvement of the nonparty candidate (independent candidate) and his vowel or secret support isn't excluded from UR. 5 . Oppositional candidates win elections of mayors of the large cities only under two conditions – on condition of presence of the strong charismatic candidate and arrangements with other large opposition parties (first of all with the CPRF and "Just Russia" about coordinated actions during election campaign at least and as at most, about promotion of the single candidate from opposition who, conditionally speaking, "will pick up" all protest votes. The inscription on the picture: «Radiant future is in stock for us! No fools!! I am serious!» Elections of mayors of the large cities of the Russian Federation. The Results.

16. Trends and corridors of opportunities for political players in 2014-2015. Party in power. Elections of Governors and mayors of the regional centers (except for item 4): 1 . Strong, local, charismatic, not old candidate, probably, independent candidate. Preliminary promotion of the candidate in case of a new person. 2 . The novelty aspect is important, if not the candidate but elements of his program, sign, recognizable and actual "counters" are necessary. 3 . Preliminary negotiations with potential strong candidates and their parties about possibility of their pre-election neutralization (money, positions, threats, etc.) or on the contrary their participations in elections for creation of visibility of legitimacy and competition of elections, but actually for hauling of a protest field among many opposition candidates (negotiations with the CPRF and "Just Russia" in the presence of a strong candidates are especially important). 4 . Neutralization of strong candidates through so-called "the municipal filter". 5 . Bright, memorable election campaign with a maximum of "live" meetings with voters. 6 . Refusal of application of an administrative resource in favor of open and fair elections. Elections of deputies of regional Legislative assemblies: 1 . The greatest possible number of strong candidates in one-mandatory districts. 2 . The strong first three of candidates according to the party list, their active participation in direct selective actions. 3 . Pseudo democratic rhetoric of election programs with novelty aspects of approaches to the solution of important social and economic tasks and problems. 4 . Involvement of new, nice, clever, spotless people in party lists. 5 . Criticism of certain officials and shortcomings of work of the local and federal authorities. 6 . Knowledge of local problems and the offer for their decision via concrete mechanisms of their realization. 7 . Involvement of local voters to work in the staff, their involvement in the solution of specific local problems. 8 . The long list of sets spoilers for procrastination of voices at parliamentary parties. 9 . Refusal of application of an administrative resource in favor of open and fair elections.

17. Trends and corridors of opportunities for political players in 2014-2015. Opposition. Elections of Governors and mayors of the regional centers: 1 . Strong, local, charismatic, not old candidate, probably, independent candidate. Preliminary promotion of the candidate. 2 . The novelty aspect is important, if not the candidate but elements of his program, sign, recognizable and actual "counters" are necessary. 3 . Not to give in to offers of a staff of UR focused on decrease in the real competition in elections for their candidate. Strictly to conduct the strategic line. 4 . To agree about possibility of interaction of various opposition parties in elections (uniform rhetoric, uniform offers, etc.) and potential opportunity to unite round the single candidate from opposition. 4 . 5 . Bright, memorable election campaign with a maximum of meetings with voters. 6 . The reasoned criticism of the party in power for concrete mistakes and problems with specific proposals according to their decision. Elections of deputies of regional Legislative assemblies: 1 . The greatest possible number of strong candidates in one-mandatory districts. 2 . The strong first three of candidates according to the party list, their active participation in direct selective actions. 3 . Pseudo democratic rhetoric of election programs with novelty aspects of approaches to the solution of important social and economic tasks and problems. 4 . Involvement of new, nice, clever, spotless people in party lists. 5 . Criticism of the party in power for concrete mistakes and problems with the argument and specific proposals according to their decision. 6 . Knowledge of local problems and the offer to their decision via concrete mechanisms of their realization. 7 . Involvement of local voters to work on the staff, their involvement in the solution of specific local problems. 8 . Criticism of unfair methods of conducting competitive fight from candidates from the party of the power.

18. Trends and corridors of opportunities for political players in 2014-2015. The general. Results. For candidates and parties which want to become winners in elective campaigns of 2014-2015 regardless of the party in power they represent or opposition, it is important to understand that the following will be the main criteria to success: • Presence of the strong, charismatic, bright candidate/candidates, wishing to win elections. • The novelty aspect is necessary in campaign, fresh elements of an election program are necessary, sign, recognizable and actual "counters" are necessary. • To adhere strictly to strategy of election campaign, not to give in on provocation of competitors. • To agree about possibility of interaction with various parties about interaction. • Bright, memorable election campaign with a maximum of "live" meetings with voters is necessary. • The reasoned criticism of the party in power / certain officials and the ministries and departments for concrete mistakes and problems with specific proposals according to their decision. Conclusion: • Corridors of opportunities for a victory of any candidate and party are really limited. Any candidate has opportunities for a victory - they are clear, interconnected and limited on the set and means of their realization.

19. Contacts • Leancor, Analytical Center • Evgeny Golubev, director of field researches and political sociology, e.golubev@leancor.ru • Т.+7 (4852) 72-74-72, 72-55-20, ext.317 • Post address – 150000 • Yaroslavl, Russia, Central Post Office,p.o.b 688 • Actual Address – Oktyabrya pr. 56, of.308,Yaroslavl

20. Instead of an epilog. Elections in Novosibirsk. • After carrying out Grushin conference, on April 6, 2014, the first large election campaign of 2014 – elections of the mayor of Novosibirsk ended. The communist, the deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Anatoly Lokot who outstripped the representative of UR, won against the acting mayor of Novosibirsk Mr. V. Znatkov on 4,18 items, and gained 43,75% of votes. It is the highest percent of votes which was received on the last elections by representatives of opposition. In Novosibirsk the opposition could consider all lessons of the previous election campaigns and really could unite round one strongest opposition candidate, A.Lokot. However, the power helped candidate from the opposition to win – local pro-imperious local elite couldn't unite around one most serious and strongest candidate (resignation of the Novosibirsk Governor Mr. Yurchenko became a result), thereby having passed forward the representative of the CPRF. • This Novosibirsk campaign confirmed our conclusions drawn earlier and given in this report completely. The inscription on the picture:«Choose!»