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AMS02 Mission Operations

Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer – 02 Phase III PSRP / SRP Mission Operations January 12, 2010 Timothy J. Urban / ESCG / Barrios Technology. AMS02 Mission Operations. Outline Timeline Pre-Launch Operations Ascent Operations On-Orbit Operations STS SRMS to SSRMS Hand-off ISS EVA Compatibility

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AMS02 Mission Operations

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  1. Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer – 02Phase III PSRP / SRPMission OperationsJanuary 12, 2010Timothy J. Urban / ESCG / Barrios Technology

  2. AMS02 Mission Operations Outline • Timeline • Pre-Launch Operations • Ascent Operations • On-Orbit Operations • STS • SRMS to SSRMS Hand-off • ISS • EVA Compatibility • Contingency Operations • OCAD Summary Timothy Urban / ESCG

  3. AMS02 Mission Operations Overall Milestone Timeline Timothy Urban / ESCG

  4. AMS02 Mission OperationsPAD Pre-Launch Operations • Activate/checkout AMS-02 avionics subsystems and thermally condition payload • Approximately 1000 ~ 1500 W for J-Crate, Cryo-valves, Cryo-coolers, Cryomagnet Avionics Box (CAB) critical functions, and Super Fluid Helium (SFHe)Tank Vent Pump • Maximum of 2 kW (peak) for calibration and contingency based upon thermal load in purged Payload Bay (PLB) • No magnet charging possible on STS – Assembly Power Converter Unit (APCU) power supplied to prime Power Distribution System (PDS) side “B” has no connectivity to the CAB • Final cryogenic servicing • Cryosystems monitoring Timothy Urban / ESCG

  5. AMS02 Mission OperationsT0 Umbilical Interfaces T0 Interfaces via Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical (ROEU) Payload Disconnect Assembly (PDA): On-Board Pump, Cryocoolers, valves, CAB critical monitoring functions, and J-Crate • Power (120 VDC) to Power Distribution System (PDS) • Direct feed to Vent Pump (110 VAC) • 48VDC for diversion valve DV09C (momentary) • 1553 for command/telemetry requirements • High Rate Data via RS422 • Continuous data using both paths (redundancy) until L-9 min to monitor health status of Cryo systems (Vacuum Case pressure and SFHe pressure/temp), supporting AMS-02 Launch Commit Criteria #1 (details to follow) Timothy Urban / ESCG

  6. AMS02 Mission OperationsPre-Launch Configuration Standard Switch Panel Configuration – Ascent Switch List AMS VENT VLV STATUS AMS VENT VLV PRI AMS VENT VLV SEC ON ON OFF OFF S16 - ON S18 - ON CB2 Closed CB4 Closed NOTE: Placards may not represent flight configuration. Timothy Urban / ESCG

  7. AMS02 Mission OperationsPre-Launch Configuration Standard Switch Panel (SSP) • Performed by ASP as late as possible in Ascent Switch List. • Minimizes the amount of time in which the payload is at-risk: • If the vent valve opens early (i.e. PAD EMI causes a failure), ingested air would freeze, rendering the vent useless and the Helium supply would be lost very early on-orbit resulting in no Magnet. • Performed as part of crew strap-in procedures to delay activation? • Crew will disable switches S16 and S18 once on-orbit, the payload is powered and the vent valve position has been confirmed at the Payload Operation and Control Center. • DS16 talkback will confirm Vent Valve powered off. Timothy Urban / ESCG

  8. AMS02 Mission OperationsPre-Launch Timeline • Installation at L-22 days through L-30 minutes operations: • L-88 hours complete Top-off SFHe activities & payload GSE interface disconnect • L-80 hours PLB door close • At L-30 minutes • Close SFHe Tank Vent Valve and deactivate Vent Pump • Deactivate Cryo-coolers • Power down all equipment with the exception of J-Crate and necessary CAB functions to monitor of cryogenics system health • Monitor health status of cryogenic systems until L-9 min: GO / NO GO LCC#1 from AMS-02 based on Cryogenic System Health • At L-9 minutes: Complete Payload Power-Down Timothy Urban / ESCG

  9. AMS02 Mission OperationsPre-Launch Safety Launch Commit Criteria Loss of vacuum case seal immediately prior to launch results in over-pressurization of the SFHe Tank during ascent, over-pressurizing the PLB and possibly damaging the Aft Bulkhead • Worst case leak in Vacuum Case (VC) requires 23 minutes to generate sufficient He to burst disks, releasing gas into PLB • PLB over-pressurization must occur between L+30 seconds and L+1 minute to result in STS safety hazard • Monitor VC health / status until L-9 minutes • Compared to trend data established over the lifetime of the experiment to indicate occurrence, and make the GO / NO GO Call • Minimum of three measurements of temperature and pressure within the SFHe Tank will provide this data on redundant paths • For operational scenarios that involve the burst disks rupturing at any other time, no hazard has been identified Timothy Urban / ESCG

  10. AMS02 Mission OperationsAscent SFHe Tank Nominal Vent Valve Operation • He Vapor pressure in SFHe tank must be maintained at a pressure to keep LHe temperature superfluid • Endurance & Mission Success • Vent valve to open when PLB pressure is less than the SFHe vapor pressure (< 20 millibars) • Must occur during Powered Flight • Porous plug, which allows He vapor vent while containing the liquid within the tank • When the valve is opened, liquid must not be in contact with the porous plug, which could act as a pump to drain the SFHe liquid from the tank • Not a safety issue, due the rate of pumping that would occur • Endurance & Mission Success • Porous plug is designed to be parallel to the acceleration vector during ascent. G-forces during powered flight will ensure only vapors are in contact with the plug at vent opening. Timothy Urban / ESCG

  11. AMS02 Mission OperationsAscent SFHe Tank Nominal Vent Valve Operation (continued) • Avionics: Baroswitch Electronics (BSE) will open the vent valve: • Barometric switch to trigger the BSE when PLB pressure is less than the SFHe (15 ~ 20 millibars) • Time-tagged Discrete Output Low (DOL) command via Backup Flight System (BFS) General Purpose Computer (GPC) to trigger BSE as a backup @ L+180 seconds • Once on-orbit, if payload monitoring indicates that this valve failed to open during ascent, contingency operations provide for payload commanding of the valve to open commensurate with +X on-orbit maneuver. • In the event of an STS abort, the barometric switch will trigger BSE to close the vent valve during descent (non-hazard) Timothy Urban / ESCG

  12. AMS02 Mission OperationsSTS On-Orbit Interfaces Upstream Inhibits (first level) Timothy Urban / ESCG

  13. AMS02 Mission OperationsSTS On-Orbit Configure AFD Equipment • Disable Baroswitch Electronics (BSE) [ascent vent valve] • Configure PDIP1 and PDIP2 • Un-stow and activate Digital Data Recorder System-02 (DDRS-02) • Operated on Payload General Support Computer (PGSC), as of now referred to as “AMS Laptop” pending OPSNOM approval • Serves as a back-up recording device for payload data that is down-linked via the Ku-Band • Single hard disk in the PGSC will provide recording capability for 40 hours worth of check-out data • Stowed in Mid-Deck Locker • Back-up hard-disks flown (contingency) • Activate Assembly Power Converter Units (APCUs) • Powers AMS-02 Payload Timothy Urban / ESCG

  14. AMS02 Mission OperationsSTS On-Orbit Standard Switch Panel (SSP) • Crew will disable switches S16 and S18 once on-orbit, the payload is powered and the vent valve position has been confirmed at the Payload Operation and Control Center. • DS16 talkback will confirm BSE (Vent Valve) powered off. Timothy Urban / ESCG

  15. AMS02 Mission OperationsSTS On-Orbit Configure Payload Data Interface Panel#1 (PDIP1) NOTE: Placards may not represent flight configuration. Timothy Urban / ESCG

  16. AMS02 Mission OperationsSTS On-Orbit Configure Payload Data Interface Panel#2 (PDIP2) NOTE: Placards may not represent flight configuration. Timothy Urban / ESCG

  17. AMS02 Mission OperationsDigital Data Recorder System (DDRS02) USB/422 Adaptor Box with Integrated PDIP Cable PGSC based “AMS Laptop” Timothy Urban / ESCG

  18. AMS02 Mission OperationsSTS On-Orbit Payload Power-up and Check-out • Cryo-coolers and housekeeping data at ~ MET 2 hr 30 minutes • Activate/checkout AMS-02 avionics subsystems and thermally condition payload • Peak power draw on shuttle 2.5 kW based on APCUs • Thermal loads in PLB may constrain operations • No magnet charging possible on STS – APCU power supplied to prime PDS side “B” has no connectivity to the CAB. • Dock with ISS (MET Day 3) • Make GO / NO GO Call prior to transfer on MET Day 4 • Power down AMS-02 prior to transfer operations Timothy Urban / ESCG

  19. AMS02 Mission OperationsSTS On-Orbit Payload Deploy • Grapple Flight Releasable Grapple Fixture (FRGF) with Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) • Disconnect Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical (ROEU) and operate Payload Retention Latch Actuators (PRLAs) • AMS-02 removed from PLB by SRMS Timothy Urban / ESCG

  20. AMS02 Mission OperationsPayload Deploy • Grapple Power and Video Grapple Fixture (PVGF) with Space Station RMS (SSRMS) located on Mobile Transporter • External Berthing Cues System (EBCS) utilized to verify final approach to Attach Site (Power and Video functions routed through SSRMS) • SSRMS supplies power for AMS-02 Heaters during Transfer Ops • Magnet charging on SSRMS Operationally Controlled • SSRMS Nominal power bus is connected to Power Distribution System (PDS) side “B”, which has no connectivity to the Cryomagnet Avionics Box (CAB) • Magnet charge initiation requires a series of up-linked commands, none of which are stored on-board the computer • The payload has no communications via the PVGF to receive these commands Timothy Urban / ESCG

  21. AMS02 Mission OperationsPayload Deploy Payload Hand-Off (continued) • SRMS release of AMS • Transfer to S3 attach site • Attach AMS-02 to S3 upper inboard site mechanical/ electrical (via Passive Attach System [PAS]) • Deactivate power via PVGF • SSRMS Un-grapple • Mate Umbilical Mechanism Assembly (UMA) and apply power • Power up AMS avionics, perform abbreviated avionics checkout to verify payload power and communications Timothy Urban / ESCG

  22. AMS02 Mission OperationsPayload Deploy Transfer to ISS 1 2 3 4 Timothy Urban / ESCG

  23. AMS02 Mission OperationsPayload Deploy Berthing to ISS – S3 Upper / Inboard Timothy Urban / ESCG

  24. AMS02 Mission OperationsISS Interfaces Upstream Inhibits (first level) Timothy Urban / ESCG

  25. AMS02 Mission OperationsISS On-Orbit • Power-up and complete systems check-out • Thermal monitor and condition cryosystems • Power-down all subsystems except those integral to magnet charging • Begin magnet charging operations • Post-magnet charge systems power-up and check-out Timothy Urban / ESCG

  26. AMS02 Mission OperationsISS On-Orbit • Experiment Science: • 3+ years operation with magnet • After LHe depletion and magnet is no longer functional, the payload will continue with further physics goals • Nominal End of Mission: • No STS flights for return of AMS-02 Payload. • Will remain on ISS for duration of ISS mission life, and re-enter with ISS vehicle Timothy Urban / ESCG

  27. AMS02 Mission OperationsISS On-Orbit • Primary control of AMS-02 is from ground • Only safety related operation is Cryomagnet charge • Only safety hazard when EVA/EVR operations on AMS-02 • Requires a series of up-linked commands (not stored on-board) • Data down-linked via ISS Ku-Band • Contingency use of S-Band to downlink minimal health data • In case of loss of power and/or communications, payload is safe without services Timothy Urban / ESCG

  28. AMS02 Mission OperationsEVA Compatibility Translation Paths • Translation paths were evaluated by Worksite Analysis and in NBL • EVA translation in proximity to and in contact with AMS-02 payload approved for both STS and ISS EVA • EVA suit certification for operations in magnetic field: • EMU: 300 Gauss • Orlan: 175 Gauss • Hazard avoided by magnet discharge prior to EVA or limiting EVA exposure via Keep Out Zones for AMS-02 specific EVAs • Translation allowed between attach sites on truss with magnetic field Timothy Urban / ESCG

  29. AMS02 Mission OperationsEVA Compatibility S3 Truss Translation Paths (representative) Timothy Urban / ESCG

  30. AMS02 Mission OperationsEVA Compatibility Translation Path Timothy Urban / ESCG

  31. AMS02 Mission OperationsEVA Compatibility EVA Keep Out-Zones • The AMS-02 Vacuum Case (VC) ribs are not designed to withstand EVA Kick-loads • Worked with the EVA Projects Office • Reviewed during NBL operation • Not deemed a concern • VC is classified as an STS EVA Keep Out Zone • Additionally, the Star Tracker Baffles are also considered EVA Keep Out Zones (sharp edges) • Detailed thermal analysis shall be performed to determine if any additional areas of concern are identified due to EVA touch temp violations Timothy Urban / ESCG

  32. AMS02 Mission OperationsStar Tracker EVA Keep Out Zone SHARP EDGES Knife Edges Star Tracker Baffles EVA Keep Out Zones Star Tracker Locations EVA Keep Out Zones T. J. Urban / ESCG

  33. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - STS • AMS-02 designed to be compatible with: • Manual ROEU disconnect • Access issue only • Can be performed from Orbiter Sill • Manual Payload Retention Latch Actuators (PRLA) operation • Access issue only • Can be performed from Orbiter Sill • Flight Releasable Grapple Fixture (FRGF) Release • Access issue only • Can be performed from Orbiter Sill or post-deploy Timothy Urban / ESCG

  34. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - STS AMS-02 in PLB (ROEU and PRLA Access) Timothy Urban / ESCG

  35. FRGF Detail AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - STS FRGF Release Standard STS EVA Ops Timothy Urban / ESCG

  36. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS • EVA Connector Panel • Passive UMA Removal contingency operation as required by SSP-57003 • Capture Bar Unloading and Release contingency operation as required by SSP-57003 • PVGF Contingency Release • PVGF Grapple Release • Latching End Effector (LEE) Release Timothy Urban / ESCG

  37. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS EVA Interface Panel • EVA Interface Panel allows for redundant avionics interfaces in contingency scenario • Connectors are EVA mating/demating compatible • Connections are swapped to effect changing A (prime) / B (redundant) channels in the event that prime capability is lost: • Data: Payload Redundancy Only • Power: Payload and ISS Redundancy • Contingency release of failed UMA • Cryomagnet charge can be performed on UMA powered PDS A-side (prime) bus only. Timothy Urban / ESCG

  38. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS Payload Power or Data Bus Swap Timothy Urban / ESCG

  39. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS UMA Contingency Release Timothy Urban / ESCG

  40. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS Capture Bar Unload/Release • WIF/PFR location identified on Truss for this operation (as necessary) • Handrails on Keel accessible during operation, Keel available for additional handhold location • Capture Bar Load Release Screws are captive and can be loosened with PGT/extension • Once unloaded capture bar handle must be lifted and pulled to release • Procedure/access verified by NBL Test Timothy Urban / ESCG

  41. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS With Removal Handle PAS Platform Passive Half Timothy Urban / ESCG

  42. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS Capture Bar Unload Apex Upright to LUSS Aft Uprights To LUSS Release Mechanism (2) EBCS Load Release Screw (7/16 EVA Bolt) Retractable Capture Bar Handle Approximately 80 turns Alternating for balanced load release Timothy Urban / ESCG

  43. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS Capture Bar Unload Capture Bar Locking Mechanism Wedge Timothy Urban / ESCG

  44. Capture Bar Handle Handrail Locations AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS Capture Bar Handle Release – Handrail Locations Timothy Urban / ESCG

  45. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS PVGF Release • PVGF can be released by releasing Grapple Pin or by releasing LEE (ISS EVA standard procedure) • Handrail placement on USS provides translation path • WIF location on USS Sill Beam for PFR Access w/ nearby handrails for installation of PFR • Both Grapple Pin release and LEE release accessible from same location, operation performed with PGT/extension • Access verified by NBL Test Timothy Urban / ESCG

  46. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS PVGF Release Detail of PVGF Timothy Urban / ESCG

  47. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS PVGF Handrails/WIF Timothy Urban / ESCG

  48. AMS02 Mission OperationsNBL Testing • First access test in NBL completed in March 2002 with low fidelity mockup (only Passive PAS) • Second NBL access test (with higher fidelity mockup, full experiment envelope) performed in November 2002 • No mission specific NBL testing required • No specific EVA training requirements at this time, but they are planned. Timothy Urban / ESCG

  49. AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs • Testing to evaluate AMS-02 Contingency EVA interfaces was performed November 12th thru 15th, 2002 (five astronauts performed tasks) • Testing included: • PVGF Contingency Release • PVGF Grapple Release • LEE Release • Capture Bar Unloading and Release • Connector Panel Access/Evaluation • Passive Umbilical Mating Assembly (UMA) bolt access • And, crew translation path evaluation Timothy Urban / ESCG

  50. AMS02 Mission Operations NBL Test Results • All tested tasks were deemed “acceptable” as documented in Crew Consensus Report (reference letter CB-02-129) • Only minor issues identified with: • Labeling (updates completed and approved) • Fit-checks (verified with flight hardware at Lockheed Martin) • Connector clocking (updated and approved) • STS-134 Crew Review of EVA Hardware: JSC Oct. 2009 Timothy Urban / ESCG

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