Media Access, Service Delivery and the Poor: Results from Benin

1. Philip Keefer The World Bank Development Research Group June 2011 Media Access, Service Delivery and the Poor: Results from Benin

2. Why are the poor. . . poor? • One axis of debate about persistent poverty: it is the consequence of • a political breakdown (in the extreme, an oligarchic elite extracts rents at the expense of the majority) • or behavioral distortions (in the extreme, high levels of risk aversion and lack of information prevent the poor from undertaking actions in their own interests). • While political breakdown affects all public policies, public policies to correct behavioral distortions almost surely easier to implement than those that transfer rents. • Providing information to the poor can potentially address either or both issues. • Looking at media access can similarly inform either.

3. The question: does media access help the poor – and if so, how? • Information plays a critical role in service delivery: • Accountability • Take up • And media potentially plays a large role in providing information • About government activities • About the value of services • Prior research has shown that media matters – but we’re not sure it helps the poor. • Stuti’s and my research looks at the effects of community radio access across a poor population in northern Benin. • Significant service delivery effects (literacy, bed net acquisition) • Little evidence of an accountability channel, and greater evidence of a behavioral channel. • This shouldn’t be surprising: • Complementary political features needed for accountability are missing. • In particular, organizations like parties that permit citizens to act collectively.

4. Previous research argues for accountability effects • Unemployment assistance, US Great Depression (Strömberg). • Counties with greater radio density received more transfers (controlling for income, literacy, schooling, employment, and using geologic characteristics to instrument for radio density). • Interpretation: radio facilitated political accountability (effects strongest in competitive counties). • Can’t interpret effect of radio on the poor. • Radio helps targeting (transfers go to poor with radio) or • Radio undermines targeting (transfers to those with radios, independent of their income). • Disaster relief greater in Indian states with greater newspaper penetration (controlling for state fixed effects, etc.) (Besley /Burgess). • Again, can’t say for sure that this makes the poor better off. • Indeed, no reason to expect it to. • But again, interpretation is an accountability one.

5. Also arguments for behavioral effects from media access • Large behavioral effects (e.g., rates of divorce) from variation in exposure to mass media (Chong and La Ferrara, 2009; La Ferrara et al, 2008) • Behavioral constraints to acquisition and use of bed-nets (Mahajan et al, 2009; Dupas, 2009; Hoffman, 2009) • Use of mass media to persuade households about the value of using bed-nets (Roll Back Malaria Campaign), but untested.

6. Our data • Difficult to research whether and how media affects service delivery • information on content of media programs (bed nets? education?) • data on policy implementation/household behavior • and exogenous variation in radio access. • We surveyed all the radio stations in Benin and verified extensive health and education programming by community radio broadcasters. • Household data on bed net ownership/literacy/spending on education for 4,200 households in 210 villages in 32 of the 77 communes in Benin. • Significant, exogenous within-commune differences to community radio access. • Stations cater to the commune in which they are based. • But variation driven by out-of-commune broadcasters. • Small variations in distance/topology: large differences in access to neighboring commune-based radio across villages within the same commune. • Variations are uncorrelated with village-specific characteristics. • Alternative to previous ID strategies: large geologic differences.

10. Observable characteristics of villages unrelated to access

11. Literacy and media access • Our first project explores effects of media access on education performance. • Susceptible to both household decisions and to government action (e.g., in contrast to road quality). • Primary education is well-funded in Benin (a donor priority) – should be politically salient. • Very, very few kids go to private school (no “exit”). • Measuring education performance: do students learn? • Literacy test for 2,100 2nd graders across 210 villages. • Avg age: 8.75 yrs. • 19% could read simple sentences/paras in French • 32% of villages: no child could read at this level. • 12%: more than half of children could.

12. Radio and literacy • To test whether community radio access affects quality of education, estimate: • Because within-commune variation in village access to radios is exogenous, B1 is fully identified after controlling for commune fixed effects. • Controls: besides observables: • education of village chief; • availability of other public goods (paved roads, literacy centers, health centers, potable water); • village access to other types of radios (commercial, religious, public). • Controls generally not significant. • With controls: 1 SD increase in community radios (1.5) increases share of literate children by 8 percentage points (.40 SD).

13. Next question: Mechanisms? • Are villages with greater access exposed to more programs? YES • Does greater exposure affect accountability (collective action, government inputs)? NO • Radio access has no effect on student-teacher ratio; textbooks/pupil; teacher absenteeism; # classrooms; level of PTA activity. • Measurement issues, so not as high-powered as we would like. Still – high consistency across quite varied indicators. • Or behavior (household investment in education)? YES • Test 1: HHs in villages with more access buy books/ pay fees for more kids • Test 2: HH that listen to more community radio (IV = access) buy books/ pay fees for more kids

14. Bed nets and media access • Our second project explores effects of media access on HH acquisition of bed nets (free government, or paid bed nets). • If accountability effects dominate, expect more media access to be associated with greater access to free government nets, no effect on paid bed nets. • If behavioral effects dominate, expect the reverse. • Behavioral obstacles to free nets much less than for paid nets. • Indeed, radio access could lead to reluctance to seek out bed nets if raises concerns about crowding/bed net quality.

15. Community radio and bed net ownership(p-values, clustered SEs)

16. Again, mechanisms? • Are HHs with better radio access more likely to know about free bed net distribution? NO • Most respondents know about the program. • Tells us that knowledge of program is not sufficient for access • NB: >25% of HHs report no free bed nets, despite universal transfer rules. Targeting to children/elderly doesn’t explain this. • Are supply decisions influenced by radio? NO • Visits by health workers significantly assoc. with free bed nets • But radio access not associated with health worker visits. • Are HHs with better radio access more likely to know behaviorally-relevant info? YES • Among HHs where women were respondents or with more children, respondents in villages with greater radio access were more likely to know that ORS is the correct treatment for diarrhea. • More radio access, greater knowledge of child mortality in Benin.

17. Robustness/Alternative explanations No accountability effects b/c of rigorous targeting? Unlikely. • HHs with young children, elderly, no more likely to report gov’t nets. • Kids’ test is powerful: 2,190 HHs with children under 5. HH results robust to • DV = share of HH bed nets rather than number. • Dropping all controls except commune FEs • Controlling for health worker visits • Using only 1,187 HHs with no gov’t bed nets. • Jointly estimating the decision to acquire government or non-gov’t bed nets using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. • Using only HHs in villages with paved roads • Excluding 25 percent of sample closest to bus stop • Excluding 25 percent of sample furthest from bus stop • Jointly estimating effects of community radios inside and outside of commune. Outside have a significant, positive effect on own-acquired bed nets. Village-level observations • Results significant using wide array of village controls (proximity to urban area; transportation; presence of literacy/health centers, private schools; education level of village chief; paved road; village population).

18. Conclusion • First evidence that (a particular kind of) media access has a substantial effect on public goods or goods with substantial spillovers (literacy, acquisition of bed nets). • Direct evidence on separate mechanisms. • Unique identification strategy: • not reliant on significant cross-jurisdiction geographic/topographic differences (quality of soil – Strömberg; mountains – Olken, Yanagizawa), • more plausible “excludability” • Policy: • Media effects on accountability can’t be taken for granted – depend on broader conditions in political markets. • Media financed by government and donor purchases of time may be particularly unlikely to offer “accountability” programming. • However, media can have a substantial effect on HH behavior, with measurable consequences for development outcomes.