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China and the responsibility to protect (R2P): the implications of the Libyan intervention

China and the responsibility to protect (R2P): the implications of the Libyan intervention. Andrew Garwood- Gowers QUT Human Rights and Governance Colloquium 24-25 November 2011. Overview. R2P and its evolution China’s relationship with R2P prior to Libya R2P and the Libyan intervention

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China and the responsibility to protect (R2P): the implications of the Libyan intervention

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  1. China and the responsibility to protect (R2P): the implications of the Libyan intervention Andrew Garwood-Gowers QUT Human Rights and Governance Colloquium 24-25 November 2011

  2. Overview R2P and its evolution China’s relationship with R2P prior to Libya R2P and the Libyan intervention China’s engagement with R2P in Libya R2P post-Libya: Syria/Yemen Implications of the Libyan intervention: - a new phase in China’s relationship with R2P? - consolidation or weakening of R2P’s normative status?

  3. R2P and its evolution Developed following incidents in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Kosovo in 1990s Reconceptualises state sovereignty as “responsibility” rather than “authority” Original concept: 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report Modified version unanimously endorsed – 2005 World Summit Outcome Document Current form: 2009 UN Secretary-General’s report (Implementing the Responsibility to Protect)

  4. R2P’s three pillars A political/moral commitment to implementing existing principles of international law – limited to 4 mass atrocity crimes Pillar one: the protection responsibilities of the state Pillar two: international assistance and state capacity-building Pillar three: timely and decisive response by other states if state is “manifestly failing” - military intervention only if authorised by the Security Council

  5. China and R2P pre-Libya R2P challenges China’s traditional rigid interpretation of state sovereignty and non-intervention Features of China’s relationship with R2P: 1. Initial criticism of R2P in 2001 2. Subsequent cautious support for a conservative interpretation of R2P 3. Emphasis on prevention and state capacity-building (pillars 1 & 2) 4. Ongoing concerns over non-consensual military intervention (pillar 3)

  6. R2P and the Libyan intervention Libya = first Security Council (SC) authorisation of use of force for civilian protection purposes against wishes of “host” state R2P framed international community’s response to violence against civilians: 1. SC Res 1970 (unanimous) 2. SC 1973 (10 votes for, 5 abstentions): - “all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” – established a no-fly zone - “excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”

  7. China and R2P in Libya Abstention on Res 1973 = a softening of Chinese attitudes to R2P and intervention? Libya as a “perfect storm” for R2P 1. clear, urgent threat of violence 2. Gaddafi’s international isolation 3. regional consensus on need for intervention But China still had “serious difficulty with parts of the resolution” China (and other BRIC states) critical of scope of NATO’s military action: - accused Western powers of exceeding Res 1973’s mandate for force - perception R2P was used as a pretext for “regime change”

  8. R2P post-Libya: Syria & Yemen “Libya has given R2P a bad name”: Indian ambassador to the UN BRIC states view NATO action in Libya as confirmation of their longstanding concerns over R2P’s potential for misuse/abuse Political backlash against R2P has prevented consensus on decisive civilian protection action in Syria/Yemen: - 4 October 2011: China, Russia vetoed draft resolution on Syria - 21 October 2011: SC Res 2014 on Yemen

  9. China and R2P post-Libya A third phase in the relationship = hardened Chinese resistance to R2P? Signs of a renewed strategy of containing R2P’s development: - “various parties still hold divergent views on the responsibility to protect” - “the General Assembly should continue its discussion on this matter” China is supported by other BRIC states in opposing further implementation of R2P

  10. Libya’s impact on R2P Consolidation or weakening of R2P’s normative status? Libya as a unique case – not a fundamental shift towards agreement on R2P’s military dimension R2P faces significant challenges: 1. political fall-out from divisions over Libya – need to develop criteria for SC decision-making 2. drafting/interpretation of SC resolutions authorising use of force 3. conceptual and operational issues: civilian protection vs. “regime change” In short/medium term further operationalisation of R2P’s military dimension appears unlikely

  11. Concluding comments Libyan intervention = product of an unusual confluence of political factors (not a fundamental normative shift towards agreement on R2P) Significant divisions between Western states and China (plus other BRIC states) over R2P may hinder civilian protection Libya as a case of “one step forward, two steps back” for R2P’s military dimension?

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