International Programs Security

1. International Programs Security

2. IPS Overview Foreign Government and NATO Information International Visits Defense Security Service (DSS) Multinational Industrial Security Working Group (MISWG) Documents International Transfer Process CFIUS and FOCI What about the future? Can we beat China if there was a war? Can our technology beat sheer numbers? Is technology that critical? [Of course weapons of mass destruction is the biggest factor - the need to control it] Technology levels the playing field. We must protect our technology. Why transfer technology to our allies? We need to protect our military technology, why not just don’t give it out at all? Isn’t national security at stake? World-wide competition based on leading edge technology has caused a significant increase in “economic espionage” vice military espionage for U.S. technology. Economic security is becoming an important part of American foreign policy. So, technology transfer must be controlled. But, which technologies should be controlled and to what extent?What about the future? Can we beat China if there was a war? Can our technology beat sheer numbers? Is technology that critical? [Of course weapons of mass destruction is the biggest factor - the need to control it] Technology levels the playing field. We must protect our technology. Why transfer technology to our allies? We need to protect our military technology, why not just don’t give it out at all? Isn’t national security at stake? World-wide competition based on leading edge technology has caused a significant increase in “economic espionage” vice military espionage for U.S. technology. Economic security is becoming an important part of American foreign policy. So, technology transfer must be controlled. But, which technologies should be controlled and to what extent?

3. Foreign Government&North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Information

4. Foreign Government Information Provided or jointly produced with foreign government or international organization With the expectation that it is to be held “in confidence” May be classified or UNCLASSIFIED

5. Marking FGI Marked with equivalent US classification FG RESTRICTED and Controlled Unclassified Information: “CONFIDENTIAL - Modified Handling Authorized” US documents containing FGI must be marked: “THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS (country of origin) INFORMATION” FG designations for classified information generally parallels US security classification designations “In Confidence” means US persons will treat FG info with the same security as our own for a given level. To ensure protection of FG info by EO 12858, info with a marking below “confidential” will be marked “Confidential – Modified Handling Authorized.” By adding the word “Confidential” to FG “Restricted” now gives it a term recognized by EO 12958 and gives it protection. The Handle as Confidential marking should be removed prior to returning such info to the originating government. Portion containing FGI must be marked to identify the classification level and country of origin. i.e. UK-C FG designations for classified information generally parallels US security classification designations “In Confidence” means US persons will treat FG info with the same security as our own for a given level. To ensure protection of FG info by EO 12858, info with a marking below “confidential” will be marked “Confidential – Modified Handling Authorized.” By adding the word “Confidential” to FG “Restricted” now gives it a term recognized by EO 12958 and gives it protection. The Handle as Confidential marking should be removed prior to returning such info to the originating government. Portion containing FGI must be marked to identify the classification level and country of origin. i.e. UK-C

6. Handling FGI Based on NATO requirements Storage - same, but separate Access - need to know; no transfer to third country entity Transmittal – generally same (no commercial express/uncleared overnight carriers); receipts for international; originator may waive for RESTRICTED Records - TS, S, C (receipt & dispatch) Destruction – in a manner to make reconstruction difficult

7. NATO Program Usually commonly funded Managed by a NATO agency Governed by NATO securityregulations EXAMPLE: NATO AWACS NATO has its own funding. This money funds NATO programs. NATO Production and Logistics Organization (NPLO) NATO Management Agency NATO Research Staff NATO Commands NATO has its own funding. This money funds NATO programs. NATO Production and Logistics Organization (NPLO) NATO Management Agency NATO Research Staff NATO Commands

8. NATO Information All information circulated within NATO, whether such information Originates in NATO civil or military bodies Is received from member nations Is received from non-NATO sources

9. NATO Markings COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS) NATO SECRET (NS) NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC) NATO RESTRICTED (NR) NATO Unclassified (NU) NATO Unclassified Information is similar to DoD FOUO information. It is supposed to contain dissemination markings, indicating secondary distribution.NATO Unclassified Information is similar to DoD FOUO information. It is supposed to contain dissemination markings, indicating secondary distribution.

10. NATO Information While the medium containing the information belongs to NATO, the information remains the property of the entity that originated or furnished it NATO entity having custody can disseminate further within NATO based on Need to Know, unless marked with restriction Although “NATO information” is in the NATO Security System and is called such, the rights of the originator are protected. It cannot be provided to a non-NATO entity without the consent of the originating government. For military information, the staffing is normally through the Military Committee and OJCS.Although “NATO information” is in the NATO Security System and is called such, the rights of the originator are protected. It cannot be provided to a non-NATO entity without the consent of the originating government. For military information, the staffing is normally through the Military Committee and OJCS.

11. Access requirements Requisite national clearance Need-to-Know Briefing NATO organization, staff, command or agency approves of access None for RESTRICTED Information no longer needed, debrief If you have Secret clearance for US information, that is the first step to having NATO clearance at the same or lower level. US security clearance may have access to NATO classified information at the level of their clearance only when there is a need-to-know Briefing: Must receive NATO briefing prior to receiving access to NATO classified info. Briefings must cover security requirements and the consequences of negligent handling of NATO classified info. Annual refresher. When info no longer required, debriefed, as applicable, and acknowledge their responsibilities for safeguarding the NATO information. If you have Secret clearance for US information, that is the first step to having NATO clearance at the same or lower level. US security clearance may have access to NATO classified information at the level of their clearance only when there is a need-to-know Briefing: Must receive NATO briefing prior to receiving access to NATO classified info. Briefings must cover security requirements and the consequences of negligent handling of NATO classified info. Annual refresher. When info no longer required, debriefed, as applicable, and acknowledge their responsibilities for safeguarding the NATO information.

12. NATO Security Agreement Requires nations to establish national policies which comply with agreement’s minimum standards and provide common degree of protection Implemented by C-M(2002)49 (which is approved by the Council), and supporting documents: AC-35-D/2000 thru D/2005 implement C-M(2002) 49 USSAN Instruction 1-07 and NISPOM implement for the U.S. Government

13. NATO Security Agreement Each NATO member must appoint National Security Authority (NSA) and Designated Security Authority (DSA) U.S. Secretary of Defense is “United States Security Authority for NATO Affairs” (USSAN) and has the responsibility to implement NATO security policy DUSD (TSP & NDP) is the DSA NATO requires main distribution point for receipt and distribution of NATO documents (Central U.S. Registry)

14. Central U.S. Registry (CUSR) NATO main distribution point Department of the Army manages at Pentagon Establishes sub-registries and control points within other departments and agencies Registry system accounts for CTS, NS, ATOMAL and other accountable information

15. https://secureweb.hqda.pentagon.mil/cusr/

16. Visits and Assignments of Foreign Nationals

18. International Visits International Visits Program (IVP) Defense Personnel Exchange Program (DPEP) Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO) Program DoD Personnel visits to Foreign Government/Contractor In order to control visits by foreign national to DoD facilities and cleared contractor facilities, DoD established the Intl visits Program and the Defense Personnel Exchange Program. Here is what is included with the IVP: On the computer system, participating govts can submit the requests on line through their PCs. We gave computers to about 60 foreign embassies. FLOs as well as Coop program personnel are all managed by the Intl visits Program. In order to control visits by foreign national to DoD facilities and cleared contractor facilities, DoD established the Intl visits Program and the Defense Personnel Exchange Program. Here is what is included with the IVP: On the computer system, participating govts can submit the requests on line through their PCs. We gave computers to about 60 foreign embassies. FLOs as well as Coop program personnel are all managed by the Intl visits Program.

19. Visit Authorization Disclosure or transfer of technical data to a foreign person is an EXPORT, regardless of the method or location of transfer (per the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)) International visits account for more transfers of Classified Military Information (CMI) or Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) than all other transfer mechanisms combined

20. International Visits Program (IVP) Controls and facilitates visits by foreigners to DoD and contractor facilities Uses automated system for processing requests through Defense Visit Offices (DVOs) Reference is DoDD 5230.20, “Visits, Assignments and Exchanges of Foreign Nationals” The Department of Defense established the International Visits Program (IVP) through DoD Directive 5230.20, “Visits, Assignments and Exchanges of Foreign Nationals,” to control and facilitate visits by foreign individuals to the DoD Components and cleared defense contractors. It also covers visits by DoD personnel and U.S. cleared defense contractors to foreign countries.   2. The Foreign Visit System (FVS) is an automated system for processing requests for visits by foreign nationals to DoD Components and cleared defense contractor facilities that are received from foreign governments. It permits the participating government through its embassy, to create visit requests in an approved electronic format and transmit them to a central FVS processor at the Pentagon which distributes them to one of four Defense Visit Offices (DVO) located in Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense Intelligence Agency. The DVO makes a decision that is returned to the submitting embassy or organization over the same electronic path used for submission of the request. The decision is based on the nature of the request.The Department of Defense established the International Visits Program (IVP) through DoD Directive 5230.20, “Visits, Assignments and Exchanges of Foreign Nationals,” to control and facilitate visits by foreign individuals to the DoD Components and cleared defense contractors. It also covers visits by DoD personnel and U.S. cleared defense contractors to foreign countries.   2. The Foreign Visit System (FVS) is an automated system for processing requests for visits by foreign nationals to DoD Components and cleared defense contractor facilities that are received from foreign governments. It permits the participating government through its embassy, to create visit requests in an approved electronic format and transmit them to a central FVS processor at the Pentagon which distributes them to one of four Defense Visit Offices (DVO) located in Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense Intelligence Agency. The DVO makes a decision that is returned to the submitting embassy or organization over the same electronic path used for submission of the request. The decision is based on the nature of the request.

21. Purposes of Visit Requests Request for Visit Authorizations (RVA) Facilitate administration (scheduling/venue) Vehicle for disclosure / export authorization if properly documented (See ITAR Part 125.5) Vehicle for providing security assurance(bona fides of visitor)

22. Types of Visits One-time (single; usually less than 30 days; for a specific purpose) Extended (single; up to one year; supports government approved program or contract) Recurring (intermittent; up to one year; supports government approved program or contract) There are three types of visits. 1. One Time Visits: Single, short-term visit (less than 30 days), for a specific purpose.   2. Extended Visits: Single visit, for extended period (up to one year), in support of a government approved program or contract. Typically, Foreign Liaison Officers (FLO) fall under this category.   Recurring Visits: Intermittent, recurring visits covering a period up to one year in duration in support of a government approved program or contract. This category covers FMS Program Management Reviews. There are three types of visits. 1. One Time Visits: Single, short-term visit (less than 30 days), for a specific purpose.   2. Extended Visits: Single visit, for extended period (up to one year), in support of a government approved program or contract. Typically, Foreign Liaison Officers (FLO) fall under this category.   Recurring Visits: Intermittent, recurring visits covering a period up to one year in duration in support of a government approved program or contract. This category covers FMS Program Management Reviews.

23. Foreign Visitor to DoD or Contractor Embassy or Military Attaché of foreign visitor submits Request for Visit Authorization (RVA) to appropriate Defense Visit Office (DVO) Each Military Dept has a DVO Defense Intelligence Agency is the DVO for OSD, Joint Staff, Defense Agencies and contractors When a visit authorization is required, the request must contain the information described in Appendix P of the IPS Handbook, which is MISWG Document #7. Failure to provide the required information in the appropriate format may result in the request being denied. Visits by foreign nationals, including foreign contractors, to DoD and defense contractor facilities that will involve U.S. or foreign government classified information must be requested through government channels. The Request for Visit Authorization should come from the embassy of the visitors’ foreign government The RVA is transmitted to a central FVS processor at the Pentagon which distributes it to the appropriate MILDEP Defense Visit Offices (DVO) located in Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense Intelligence Agency. The Defense Intelligence Agency administers requests for visits by foreign nationals to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the DoD Agencies, and their contractors. These DoD Components must ensure they obtain disclosure authorization from the appropriate DoD Principal or Designated Disclosure Authority prior to notifying DIA of the acceptance of a visit by foreign nationals. The DVO makes a decision that is returned to the submitting embassy or organization over the same electronic path used for submission of the request. The decision is based on the nature of the request. When a visit authorization is required, the request must contain the information described in Appendix P of the IPS Handbook, which is MISWG Document #7. Failure to provide the required information in the appropriate format may result in the request being denied. Visits by foreign nationals, including foreign contractors, to DoD and defense contractor facilities that will involve U.S. or foreign government classified information must be requested through government channels. The Request for Visit Authorization should come from the embassy of the visitors’ foreign government The RVA is transmitted to a central FVS processor at the Pentagon which distributes it to the appropriate MILDEP Defense Visit Offices (DVO) located in Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense Intelligence Agency. The Defense Intelligence Agency administers requests for visits by foreign nationals to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the DoD Agencies, and their contractors. These DoD Components must ensure they obtain disclosure authorization from the appropriate DoD Principal or Designated Disclosure Authority prior to notifying DIA of the acceptance of a visit by foreign nationals. The DVO makes a decision that is returned to the submitting embassy or organization over the same electronic path used for submission of the request. The decision is based on the nature of the request.

24. Visit Request Process PROCESS FOR FOREIGN VISIT APPROVAL: 1. Foreign embassy (normally their DAO) 2. Major disclosure authorities (SAF/IA, Navy IPO, or Army Deputy chief of Staff for Intel) These offices enter the visit into the Foreign Disclosure and Technology Info System (FORDTIS) computer - which is for visits, info requests, and licenses. DIA is the DVO for OSD, Joint Staff, Def. Agencies and contractors. 3. Command Foreign Disclosure Offices (MajComs, HQ, or base disclosure office) 4. Office they want to visit. THEN BACK UP Note: Many times visit requests do go through the SAO, SPOs, or other offices, but these four offices are mandatory, and the only ones required. PROCESS FOR FOREIGN VISIT APPROVAL: 1. Foreign embassy (normally their DAO) 2. Major disclosure authorities (SAF/IA, Navy IPO, or Army Deputy chief of Staff for Intel) These offices enter the visit into the Foreign Disclosure and Technology Info System (FORDTIS) computer - which is for visits, info requests, and licenses. DIA is the DVO for OSD, Joint Staff, Def. Agencies and contractors. 3. Command Foreign Disclosure Offices (MajComs, HQ, or base disclosure office) 4. Office they want to visit. THEN BACK UP Note: Many times visit requests do go through the SAO, SPOs, or other offices, but these four offices are mandatory, and the only ones required.

25. Responses Approved - visit can happen; specified info can be released Denied - visit can happen; specified info can NOT be released  Not sponsored - no apparent government purpose When a Request for Visit Authorization is submitted, the Defense Visit Office will make the approval or disapproval decision based on the purpose of the visit, the organization to be visited, and the information to be disclosed. Visit Approvals. DoD Components will approve foreign visits to contractor facilities only when the proposed visit is in support of an actual or potential government program (e.g., program involving a U.S. Government agency and the intended recipient foreign government such as government sales or an international agreement). When the DoD Component approves a visit, the notification of approval will contain instructions on the level and scope of classified and unclassified information authorized for disclosure, as well as any limitations, and will be transmitted to the contractor to be visited. Final acceptance of the visit will be subject to the concurrence of the contractor. Contractors must comply with the instructions provided by the DoD Component. The contractor must notify the DoD component when a visit is not desired. Visit Denials. If the DoD Component does not approve the disclosure of the information related to the proposed visit, it will deny the request. The requesting government and the contractor to be visited will be advised of the reason for the denial. The contractor may accept the visitor(s); however, only information in the public domain may be disclosed and no commitments are to be made concerning the subject on which disclosure authorization was denied. Non-Sponsorship. The DoD Component will decline to render a decision on a visit request that is not in support of a government program (i.e., DoD is not a party to the transaction). A declination notice, doesn’t indicate that the government doesn’t care about the visit, but rather indicates that the visit is not government sponsored. A declination notice does not preclude the visit, provided the contractor has, or obtains, an export authorization for the information involved, and, if classified information is involved, has been notified by the DoD Component that the requesting foreign government has provided the required security assurances on the proposed visitors. The normal visit request procedure is used to obtain this assurance, even though the contractor has a license authorizing the disclosure of specified information. It is the responsibility of the contractor to consult applicable export regulations to determine licensing requirements regarding the disclosure of export controlled information during such visits by foreign nationals. When a Request for Visit Authorization is submitted, the Defense Visit Office will make the approval or disapproval decision based on the purpose of the visit, the organization to be visited, and the information to be disclosed. Visit Approvals. DoD Components will approve foreign visits to contractor facilities only when the proposed visit is in support of an actual or potential government program (e.g., program involving a U.S. Government agency and the intended recipient foreign government such as government sales or an international agreement). When the DoD Component approves a visit, the notification of approval will contain instructions on the level and scope of classified and unclassified information authorized for disclosure, as well as any limitations, and will be transmitted to the contractor to be visited. Final acceptance of the visit will be subject to the concurrence of the contractor. Contractors must comply with the instructions provided by the DoD Component. The contractor must notify the DoD component when a visit is not desired. Visit Denials. If the DoD Component does not approve the disclosure of the information related to the proposed visit, it will deny the request. The requesting government and the contractor to be visited will be advised of the reason for the denial. The contractor may accept the visitor(s); however, only information in the public domain may be disclosed and no commitments are to be made concerning the subject on which disclosure authorization was denied. Non-Sponsorship. The DoD Component will decline to render a decision on a visit request that is not in support of a government program (i.e., DoD is not a party to the transaction). A declination notice, doesn’t indicate that the government doesn’t care about the visit, but rather indicates that the visit is not government sponsored. A declination notice does not preclude the visit, provided the contractor has, or obtains, an export authorization for the information involved, and, if classified information is involved, has been notified by the DoD Component that the requesting foreign government has provided the required security assurances on the proposed visitors. The normal visit request procedure is used to obtain this assurance, even though the contractor has a license authorizing the disclosure of specified information. It is the responsibility of the contractor to consult applicable export regulations to determine licensing requirements regarding the disclosure of export controlled information during such visits by foreign nationals.

26. RVAs not Necessary - Contractor Unclassified info is not subject to export controls (Public Domain info) Unclassified info for which contractor has export license / no contract requirement; visit has no direct impact on DoD activities Visitor is foreign national employee of US contractor RVA = Request for Visit Authorization In the first 2 cases the contractor has a license and it is unclassified and visit to a contractor facility. But if classified info is to be disclosed, then a visit authorization is required because need security clearance for the visitor - and that can only be govt to govt. Visitors is foreign national employee of US contractor covered in Chapter 6 of NISPOM RVA = Request for Visit Authorization In the first 2 cases the contractor has a license and it is unclassified and visit to a contractor facility. But if classified info is to be disclosed, then a visit authorization is required because need security clearance for the visitor - and that can only be govt to govt. Visitors is foreign national employee of US contractor covered in Chapter 6 of NISPOM

27. 1006 - 27 RVA over the FVS is NotNecessary - DoD Facility / event is open to public, AND Information is public domain OR, non-U.S. citizen employee Access to a DoD installation by foreign nationals employed by the installation or by contractors servicing the installation are subject to control procedures established pursuant to DoDI 5200.08. The U.S. Government cannot obtain a security assurance on such individuals, because they are not representing another government – DoD is solely responsible for such individuals.Access to a DoD installation by foreign nationals employed by the installation or by contractors servicing the installation are subject to control procedures established pursuant to DoDI 5200.08. The U.S. Government cannot obtain a security assurance on such individuals, because they are not representing another government – DoD is solely responsible for such individuals.

28. Other Visit Request Processes Hosted Visits - DoD invites foreign national; worked through appropriate DVO Emergency Visits - legitimate purposes only; no amendments Amendments - change to LATER date and / or list of visitors; NO change to purpose or information HOSTED VISIT: Does not require the complete visit request process, however the DVO must obtain the security assurance on the visitors from the appropriate embassy. Also the designated disclosure official must authorize the release of info prior to the invitation. A good example of the Hosted visit is a big conference - the DVOs will work on it. BULLET #2: EMERGENCY VISIT: You need to get the authorization from the DVO: SAF/IA, Navy IPO, or Deputy Chief of Staff for Intel for the Army. An Emergency visit request is a one-time visit submitted for approval less than 21 working days before the visit start date. This one qualifies only if failure to make the visit would jeopardize performance on a contract or program, or cause the loss of contract opportunity. Requires justification. The requester should coordinate the emergency visit in advance with the person to be visited to include a justification and the address, phone number and name of a knowledgeable foreign government POC. Then the host notifies the Defense Visit Office (DVO) who will use expedited procedures. HOSTED VISIT: Does not require the complete visit request process, however the DVO must obtain the security assurance on the visitors from the appropriate embassy. Also the designated disclosure official must authorize the release of info prior to the invitation. A good example of the Hosted visit is a big conference - the DVOs will work on it. BULLET #2: EMERGENCY VISIT: You need to get the authorization from the DVO: SAF/IA, Navy IPO, or Deputy Chief of Staff for Intel for the Army. An Emergency visit request is a one-time visit submitted for approval less than 21 working days before the visit start date. This one qualifies only if failure to make the visit would jeopardize performance on a contract or program, or cause the loss of contract opportunity. Requires justification. The requester should coordinate the emergency visit in advance with the person to be visited to include a justification and the address, phone number and name of a knowledgeable foreign government POC. Then the host notifies the Defense Visit Office (DVO) who will use expedited procedures.

29. DoD Personnel to Foreign Government / Contractor Policy - DoDD 4500.54, “Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad”, and DoD 4500.54-G, “Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG)” DoD component appoints responsible official and follows FCG All CMI and CUI to be taken to the foreign country must be cleared IAW DoDD 5230.11 and DOD 5200.1-R. Normally 30 days advance notice, but may be longer depending on the country to be visited. When US government personnel need to travel to a foreign country to visit either foreign government or foreign contractor facilities, we must also follow procedures. The guidelines for overseas visits are prescribed in DoD Directive 4500.54 and the Foreign Country Clearance Guide. These visit requests from the DoD to the foreign government are required even though classified information may not be involved, and for visits to cleared contractor facilities involving the disclosure or possible disclosure of classified information. They also require the requests be received by a specified number of days in advance of the visit. Normally these visit requests are transmitted to the US embassy in the foreign country, and the US embassy coordinates with the foreign government. Any Classified Military Information or Controlled Unclassified Information which will be taken out of the USA must be cleared. When travel of DoD persons will involve the disclosure or presentation of CMI, the request for travel orders will contain a statement that the appropriate disclosure authorization has been approved in compliance with DoD Directives 5230.11 and C-5230.23, “Intelligence Disclosure Policy” (reference q). If the travelers must carry classified material, the request for travel orders also must state that they are aware of and will comply with the requirements to protect CMI as described in DoD 5200.1-R “Information Security Program Regulation”(reference oo). If the traveler is expected to have access to foreign government classified information, additional certification may be required by the Foreign Clearance Guide. When US government personnel need to travel to a foreign country to visit either foreign government or foreign contractor facilities, we must also follow procedures. The guidelines for overseas visits are prescribed in DoD Directive 4500.54 and the Foreign Country Clearance Guide. These visit requests from the DoD to the foreign government are required even though classified information may not be involved, and for visits to cleared contractor facilities involving the disclosure or possible disclosure of classified information. They also require the requests be received by a specified number of days in advance of the visit. Normally these visit requests are transmitted to the US embassy in the foreign country, and the US embassy coordinates with the foreign government. Any Classified Military Information or Controlled Unclassified Information which will be taken out of the USA must be cleared. When travel of DoD persons will involve the disclosure or presentation of CMI, the request for travel orders will contain a statement that the appropriate disclosure authorization has been approved in compliance with DoD Directives 5230.11 and C-5230.23, “Intelligence Disclosure Policy” (reference q). If the travelers must carry classified material, the request for travel orders also must state that they are aware of and will comply with the requirements to protect CMI as described in DoD 5200.1-R “Information Security Program Regulation”(reference oo). If the traveler is expected to have access to foreign government classified information, additional certification may be required by the Foreign Clearance Guide.

30. https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg.cfm

31. DoD Personnel to Foreign Government / Contractor Theater Clearance - visits to a country within the GCC AOR Country Clearance - visits to a host government or contractor facility for classified discussions approved by host government Clearance procedures may require both country clearance and theater clearance. A theater clearance is always required if the visit is to a U.S. military facility. A theater clearance also may be required to visit a particular country or when the subject of the visit is of direct interest to the Unified Commander. A country clearance and host-government approval is required (for classified and unclassified visits) if the visit is to a host-government organization or to a contractor facility where classified information might be discussed. Clearance procedures may require both country clearance and theater clearance. A theater clearance is always required if the visit is to a U.S. military facility. A theater clearance also may be required to visit a particular country or when the subject of the visit is of direct interest to the Unified Commander. A country clearance and host-government approval is required (for classified and unclassified visits) if the visit is to a host-government organization or to a contractor facility where classified information might be discussed.

32. Role of the SDO/DATT for International Visits When DoD is the host No official SDO/DATT responsibility SDO/DATT acts as second channel for coordination purposes only When Bandaria is the host SDO/DATT receives country clearance request per FCG Coordinates Host Nation approval of the visit Arranges for necessary support to US delegation Grants country clearance and coordinates on theater clearance as necessary

33. Assignment of Foreign Nationals Foreign Liaison Officers - represent their governments. Exchange Officers - work for US supervisor, but not “integrated.” Can’t be both.

34. Defense Personnel Exchange Programs (DPEP) Exchange of personnel of equivalent rank and qualification between U.S. and foreign government. Represent foreign government pursuant to international agreement; not DoD employees. Types of DPEPs: Military Personnel (MPEP) Administrative and Professional Personnel (APEP) Engineer and Scientist (ESEP) Defense Intelligence Personnel (DIPEP) This program is established by law (10 U.S.C. 130(c)). DoD reports to Congress have recognized only four types of DPEP assignments - there should be no others. The purpose of the program is to exchange personnel of substantially the same grade and qualifications and familiarize them with the organization and operations of the other government to facilitate cooperation between the governments. Foreign national assignees are not DoD employees and should not be treated as such. They are employed by a foreign government, and assigned to a DoD Component pursuant to an agreement between the governments - - they are representatives of a foreign government. They may have access to only that classified and controlled unclassified information which can be authorized for disclosure to their government. Some DoD Components have indicated that they (the DoD component) have the foreign national sign a “non-disclosure statement”, and thus they can have access to information that is not releasable to their governments. This is bogus! They are required to sign statements, but these are primarily related to matters such as: proprietary rights in information and inventions, recognition of their status, disciplinary matters, compliance with DoD security policies, etc. NOTE: If someone raises the issue, foreign nationals can be assigned under the so-called “Gift” legislation (passed during the first ”Gulf War”), but this is very rare. DoD Comptroller controls the activity and is not known to approve but a few. This program is established by law (10 U.S.C. 130(c)). DoD reports to Congress have recognized only four types of DPEP assignments - there should be no others. The purpose of the program is to exchange personnel of substantially the same grade and qualifications and familiarize them with the organization and operations of the other government to facilitate cooperation between the governments. Foreign national assignees are not DoD employees and should not be treated as such. They are employed by a foreign government, and assigned to a DoD Component pursuant to an agreement between the governments - - they are representatives of a foreign government. They may have access to only that classified and controlled unclassified information which can be authorized for disclosure to their government. Some DoD Components have indicated that they (the DoD component) have the foreign national sign a “non-disclosure statement”, and thus they can have access to information that is not releasable to their governments. This is bogus! They are required to sign statements, but these are primarily related to matters such as: proprietary rights in information and inventions, recognition of their status, disciplinary matters, compliance with DoD security policies, etc. NOTE: If someone raises the issue, foreign nationals can be assigned under the so-called “Gift” legislation (passed during the first ”Gulf War”), but this is very rare. DoD Comptroller controls the activity and is not known to approve but a few.

35. Defense Personnel Exchange Programs Cannot substitute for FLO Not a conduit for exchange of tech data Cannot be assigned to positions requiring access to information not available to the parent nation Cannot be assigned to contractor facilities

36. Defense Personnel Exchange Programs (Con’t) BULLET #2: Custody is different than possession. No security responsibilities - they cannot be escorts for other FSNs Per Chuck Wilson, there was one office where a Canadian was working who eventually lost his foreign identity (he didn’t say “eh” at the end of each sentence, and no longer talked only about hockey) “long a” and was even assigned as the security officer. He even had the combination to the safe. BULLET #2: Custody is different than possession. No security responsibilities - they cannot be escorts for other FSNs Per Chuck Wilson, there was one office where a Canadian was working who eventually lost his foreign identity (he didn’t say “eh” at the end of each sentence, and no longer talked only about hockey) “long a” and was even assigned as the security officer. He even had the combination to the safe.

37. DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE (DSS) Role in International Programs

38. Defense Security Service Industrial Security Mission Administers the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) on behalf of USD (I) Provide Government Contracting Agencies (GCAs) with an assurance that the U.S. contractors are both eligible to access and will safeguard classified information

39. The National Industrial Security Program (NISP) Established in 1993 by Executive Order (E.O.) 12829 Four Signatories - Cognizant Security Agencies (CSAs): Department of Defense (DoD) Department of Energy (DoE) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Describes industry’s responsibilities for protecting classified information Secretary of Defense is Executive Agent for the NISP NISP Operating Manual (NISPOM) published in 1995 NISP Supplements

40. NISP Objectives: Deter and/or detect unauthorized access to classified information in industry Counter the threat posed by traditional adversaries and others who target U.S. classified information in industry These are the two main objectives of an industrial security program. The premise is simple: to ensure that classified information is afforded a commensurate degree of protection against inadvertent disclosure or compromise. The basis of the international aspects of the NISP can be found in the many cooperative agreements, arrangements and treaties the United States has entered into with various foreign governments. If international military programs or contracts include classified information and clauses on the use of contractors, each signatory government agrees to safeguard any classified information released to it by the other government. Under these terms, the DoD and in turn DSS, is obligated to implement the provisions of these industrial security agreements, and to provide security products and services for the protection of U.S., NATO and classified foreign government information. The NISP is becoming more and more involved with international issues as a result of these arrangements, the increasing trend toward co-development/co-production of weapons systems, as well as official U.S. government encouragement of U.S. industry to become increasingly involved in foreign markets. These are the two main objectives of an industrial security program. The premise is simple: to ensure that classified information is afforded a commensurate degree of protection against inadvertent disclosure or compromise. The basis of the international aspects of the NISP can be found in the many cooperative agreements, arrangements and treaties the United States has entered into with various foreign governments. If international military programs or contracts include classified information and clauses on the use of contractors, each signatory government agrees to safeguard any classified information released to it by the other government. Under these terms, the DoD and in turn DSS, is obligated to implement the provisions of these industrial security agreements, and to provide security products and services for the protection of U.S., NATO and classified foreign government information. The NISP is becoming more and more involved with international issues as a result of these arrangements, the increasing trend toward co-development/co-production of weapons systems, as well as official U.S. government encouragement of U.S. industry to become increasingly involved in foreign markets.

41. Authority for the DSS International Security Functions Arms Export Control Act (AECA)/International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) - security requirements for classified exports Industrial Security Annexes - U.S. implementing agency North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security policy - assure implementation in industry NISPOM - maintain oversight; assure compliance at cleared facilities DoD Directive 5105.42 – ITAR and international responsibilities DSS’ international responsibilities are delegated from a variety of sources. The OUSDP (Policy Support) and State Department rely on DSS to provide assistance in international industrial security matters and NATO and classified exports. The Arms Export Control Act governs the sale and export of defense articles and services and related technical data, and covers commercial and government sales. The ITAR (part 125) implements section 38 of the AECA for commercial sales, and identifies DSS as the entity responsible for classified exports in accordance with the NISPOM. DSS is responsible for ensuring that FGI and NATO information entrusted to cleared US contractors is properly protected under the terms of International Industrial Security Annexes, and for notifying the foreign government or international organization if a security violation or compromise involving their information has occurred. Chapter 10 of the NISPOM provides policy governing the control of classified information in international programs and provides security procedures for those aspects of the ITAR dealing with classified information.DSS’ international responsibilities are delegated from a variety of sources. The OUSDP (Policy Support) and State Department rely on DSS to provide assistance in international industrial security matters and NATO and classified exports. The Arms Export Control Act governs the sale and export of defense articles and services and related technical data, and covers commercial and government sales. The ITAR (part 125) implements section 38 of the AECA for commercial sales, and identifies DSS as the entity responsible for classified exports in accordance with the NISPOM. DSS is responsible for ensuring that FGI and NATO information entrusted to cleared US contractors is properly protected under the terms of International Industrial Security Annexes, and for notifying the foreign government or international organization if a security violation or compromise involving their information has occurred. Chapter 10 of the NISPOM provides policy governing the control of classified information in international programs and provides security procedures for those aspects of the ITAR dealing with classified information.

42. Industrial Security Objectives: Deter and/or detect unauthorized access to classified information in industry Counter the threat posed by traditional adversaries and others who target U.S. classified information in industry These are the two main objectives of an industrial security program. The premise is simple: to ensure that classified information is afforded a commensurate degree of protection against inadvertent disclosure or compromise. The basis of the international aspects of the NISP can be found in the many cooperative agreements, arrangements and treaties the United States has entered into with various foreign governments. If international military programs or contracts include classified information and clauses on the use of contractors, each signatory government agrees to safeguard any classified information released to it by the other government. Under these terms, the DoD and in turn DSS, is obligated to implement the provisions of these industrial security agreements, and to provide security products and services for the protection of U.S., NATO and classified foreign government information. The NISP is becoming more and more involved with international issues as a result of these arrangements, the increasing trend toward co-development/co-production of weapons systems, as well as official U.S. government encouragement of U.S. industry to become increasingly involved in foreign markets. These are the two main objectives of an industrial security program. The premise is simple: to ensure that classified information is afforded a commensurate degree of protection against inadvertent disclosure or compromise. The basis of the international aspects of the NISP can be found in the many cooperative agreements, arrangements and treaties the United States has entered into with various foreign governments. If international military programs or contracts include classified information and clauses on the use of contractors, each signatory government agrees to safeguard any classified information released to it by the other government. Under these terms, the DoD and in turn DSS, is obligated to implement the provisions of these industrial security agreements, and to provide security products and services for the protection of U.S., NATO and classified foreign government information. The NISP is becoming more and more involved with international issues as a result of these arrangements, the increasing trend toward co-development/co-production of weapons systems, as well as official U.S. government encouragement of U.S. industry to become increasingly involved in foreign markets.

43. Essential Elements of a Facility Security Clearance (FCL) Sponsorship Organizational Structure Key Management Personnel Foreign Ownership Control or Influence (FOCI) Personnel Clearances Storage Capability Security Agreement Before a company can be granted access to classified information, it must obtain a facility clearance. A facility clearance is based on five separate elements, all of which are considered during the initial security clearance process. The Facility Clearance process starts when there is a sponsorship for the clearance based upon a bona fide procurement need. DISCUSS EACH ELEMENT BRIEFLY

44. Defense Security Service Role in International Programs Validates export licenses (classified exports) Plant visits by foreign nationals Transportation plans (classified material) Contractor hand carriage arrangements Provides security assurances 1. Must have a U.S. Government representative validate the licenses. 2. Oversight responsibilities for these visits 3. Transportation plans for commercial overseas shipments of classified material. 4. Intl. Hand carriage arrangements. 5. DSS provides security assurances to other Govts for U.S. contractor facilities and personnel and obtains assurances on foreign facilities and personnel. When I was in Madrid the U.S. with NATO decided to do massive air strikes against the Serbs in Yugoslavia. Even Spain was taking part in the air strikes. Serbs who were living and working in Spain were doing huge (somewhat violent) demonstrations against the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, stopping traffic and throwing stuff over the Embassy walls at the building. Then one of my QARs came in and said that there is a Serb working at INDRA on our U.S. Govt (Navy) contracts. I thought, great, his family is back in Yugoslavia getting bombed while he builds U.S. weapon system components. I called my boss who said - “Don’t worry about it, let the prime contractors deal with it”. What I needed to do was advise DSS. They are in charge of all contractors’ security. I was especially sensitive due to all the briefings I got, plus the VISA Viper program. (Basilio Garcia always got searched.)1. Must have a U.S. Government representative validate the licenses. 2. Oversight responsibilities for these visits 3. Transportation plans for commercial overseas shipments of classified material. 4. Intl. Hand carriage arrangements. 5. DSS provides security assurances to other Govts for U.S. contractor facilities and personnel and obtains assurances on foreign facilities and personnel. When I was in Madrid the U.S. with NATO decided to do massive air strikes against the Serbs in Yugoslavia. Even Spain was taking part in the air strikes. Serbs who were living and working in Spain were doing huge (somewhat violent) demonstrations against the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, stopping traffic and throwing stuff over the Embassy walls at the building. Then one of my QARs came in and said that there is a Serb working at INDRA on our U.S. Govt (Navy) contracts. I thought, great, his family is back in Yugoslavia getting bombed while he builds U.S. weapon system components. I called my boss who said - “Don’t worry about it, let the prime contractors deal with it”. What I needed to do was advise DSS. They are in charge of all contractors’ security. I was especially sensitive due to all the briefings I got, plus the VISA Viper program. (Basilio Garcia always got searched.)

45. Defense Security Service Role in International Programs Security compliance by contractors Protects foreign government information Guidance to contractors Supports U.S. contractors overseas Counter Intelligence Training and Support Technology Control Plans “Security Clearances”: U.S. Govt authorizes the clearance. (Foreign Govt does it for that country.) 1. Compliance with security provisions of intl. Contracts and provisions of security agreements. 2. Ensures proper protection of FGI held by U.S. contractors. 3. Advise to contractors on the applicable PPP. 5. Ensures companies have adequate TCPs in place for long-term foreign natl visitors and foreign natl. employees. “Security Clearances”: U.S. Govt authorizes the clearance. (Foreign Govt does it for that country.) 1. Compliance with security provisions of intl. Contracts and provisions of security agreements. 2. Ensures proper protection of FGI held by U.S. contractors. 3. Advise to contractors on the applicable PPP. 5. Ensures companies have adequate TCPs in place for long-term foreign natl visitors and foreign natl. employees.

46. Technology Control Plan Protection of information by cleared contractor, by Controlling access by foreign national visitors and employees, regardless of their status

48. Technology Control Plan Identifies what is to be protected Controls access Controls equipment Requires training plan for employees Indoctrinates foreign personnel Identifies program monitor NISPOM 2-310 “reasonably foreclose the possibility of inadvertent access by non-U.S. citizen employees and visitors to information for which they are not authorized. “ NISPOM 10-509 - “required to control access by foreign nationals assigned to, or employed by, cleared contractor facilities unless . . .” ITAR 126.13(C) - ”facilitate processing . . .”NISPOM 2-310 “reasonably foreclose the possibility of inadvertent access by non-U.S. citizen employees and visitors to information for which they are not authorized. “ NISPOM 10-509 - “required to control access by foreign nationals assigned to, or employed by, cleared contractor facilities unless . . .” ITAR 126.13(C) - ”facilitate processing . . .”

49. Overseas Operations NISPOM; Chapter 10 Contractor Overseas Operations Assignment of Foreign Nationals Storage Employee assignment notification and briefings Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO)

50. MISWG

51. MISWG Ad hoc group comprised of NATO countries (less Iceland plus Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland) to develop standard security procedures and practices for multi-national programs Expanding to EU/PfP and other countries Currently 20 MISWG documents in effect Listed in ODUSD (TSP&NDP) IPS Handbook HTTP:/www.Avanco.com Provide base-line multilateral agreements on international security These standard procedures can be used on a case-by-case basis in various international programs. 19 of them. 2ND BULLET: You can use these documents for different purposes, they are available. Note: PFP is Partnership for Peace, Former Eastern Block and non-aligned countries to provide aid to poorer countries. Ad hoc: For a particular end or case at hand without consideration of wider application. MISWG was initially developed to standardize procedures among NATO member nations working jointly on a non-NATO project, the MISWG documents contain procedures that may be used in any bilateral or mutilateral program , including NATO projects.Therefore they should be used as the baseline in preparing individual arrangements or when consolidated in a Program Security Instruction (PSI), for intl programs. These are NATO Ad hoc agreements, first with NATO countries. These are procedures and various fill-in-the-block forms. MISWG’s are in the back of the DUSD (PS) handbook. These standard procedures can be used on a case-by-case basis in various international programs. 19 of them. 2ND BULLET: You can use these documents for different purposes, they are available. Note: PFP is Partnership for Peace, Former Eastern Block and non-aligned countries to provide aid to poorer countries. Ad hoc: For a particular end or case at hand without consideration of wider application. MISWG was initially developed to standardize procedures among NATO member nations working jointly on a non-NATO project, the MISWG documents contain procedures that may be used in any bilateral or mutilateral program , including NATO projects.Therefore they should be used as the baseline in preparing individual arrangements or when consolidated in a Program Security Instruction (PSI), for intl programs. These are NATO Ad hoc agreements, first with NATO countries. These are procedures and various fill-in-the-block forms. MISWG’s are in the back of the DUSD (PS) handbook.

52. MISWG Documents MISWG # 1: “Arrangements for International Hand Carriage of Classified Documents, Equipment and/or Components” MISWG # 5: Program/Project Security Instruction (PSI) MISWG # 7: “International Visits” MISWG # 10: “Transportation Plan” MISWG # 11: “Control of Security Cleared Facilities MISWG # 15: “International Transfer by Commercial Carriers of Classified Documents and Equipment or Components as Freight” #1 Cross border handcarry of classified, must stay in personal possession, don’t turn over to customes #10 Describes content and use of TP including format #11 Annex to #5, Project Security Instruction #15 Used in conjunction with #10#1 Cross border handcarry of classified, must stay in personal possession, don’t turn over to customes #10 Describes content and use of TP including format #11 Annex to #5, Project Security Instruction #15 Used in conjunction with #10

53. InternationalTransfers

54. Government to Government Transfer Through official government channels or channels approved by the responsible governments Government accountability and control maintained until custody is officially transferred and recipient government assumes responsibility Designated Government Representatives (DGR) Security assurance DGR must kiss the item goodbye from here. Covered in detail in the section on International Transfers.DGR must kiss the item goodbye from here. Covered in detail in the section on International Transfers.

55. International Transfers of Classified Material U.S. Government control & accountability until officially transferred to the recipient government Even if title has transferred Transfer must be by government-to-government channels, or other channels mutually agreed by governments. Military Postal System DoS Diplomatic Pouch Service Defense Courier Service Other official Government courier (including recipient government) 6 basic policies - Classified material is subject to increased risks during transfers. Therefore, transfers must be consistent with the Government-to-Government principle. The means that it must be by a designated courier or cleared escort, or U.S. Military registered mail (APO or FPO). Note: Big difference between transfer of title vs. transfer of security accountability and control. Using the Government-to-Government Principle to transfer classified material requires a policy of United States Government Control and Accountability while transferring the material. Remember, in previous discussions concern title transfer, even though title transfers at the dock, responsibility for the security of the article or information will not transfer until it is received by the foreign government at which time the customer is responsible for security. 6 basic policies - Classified material is subject to increased risks during transfers. Therefore, transfers must be consistent with the Government-to-Government principle. The means that it must be by a designated courier or cleared escort, or U.S. Military registered mail (APO or FPO). Note: Big difference between transfer of title vs. transfer of security accountability and control. Using the Government-to-Government Principle to transfer classified material requires a policy of United States Government Control and Accountability while transferring the material. Remember, in previous discussions concern title transfer, even though title transfers at the dock, responsibility for the security of the article or information will not transfer until it is received by the foreign government at which time the customer is responsible for security.

56. International Transfers of Classified Material Transportation Plan (TP) required: Government shipment through Defense Transportation System (DTS) Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) Receipt required for all classified material. Exception - Foreign Government RESTRICTED info (like FOUO) TOP SECRET always through government courier or government approved electronic communications. Usually these instructions are in the form of a Transportation Plan. 2. For Government. sales, preparation of the instructions for intl. Transfer is the responsibility of the DoD executing agency of the LOA. 3. For commercial sales, it’s the U.S. contractor in collaboration with the foreign customer, and then have them approved by the DSS Cognizant Security Office (CSO) and the recipient Government. security authority. Example: the Army was shipping Patriot Missiles to Greece. The Army released them to the Freight Forwarder who put them on a Russian Ship. The Army as the executing agent was responsible for the transportation plan. [Negotiated and then approved by DSS, and then part of the contract]. The Army tried to blame the Freight Forwarder by saying that it was the Freight Forwarder who was responsible to prepare the TP. International transfer of classified material must be in writing, usually in the form of a transportation plan or applicable DoD and service regulations. United States policy requires receipts for international transfer of all levels of classified information. TOP SECRET information is always transferred by Government courier or by Government approved secure electronic communications. Usually these instructions are in the form of a Transportation Plan. 2. For Government. sales, preparation of the instructions for intl. Transfer is the responsibility of the DoD executing agency of the LOA. 3. For commercial sales, it’s the U.S. contractor in collaboration with the foreign customer, and then have them approved by the DSS Cognizant Security Office (CSO) and the recipient Government. security authority. Example: the Army was shipping Patriot Missiles to Greece. The Army released them to the Freight Forwarder who put them on a Russian Ship. The Army as the executing agent was responsible for the transportation plan. [Negotiated and then approved by DSS, and then part of the contract]. The Army tried to blame the Freight Forwarder by saying that it was the Freight Forwarder who was responsible to prepare the TP. International transfer of classified material must be in writing, usually in the form of a transportation plan or applicable DoD and service regulations. United States policy requires receipts for international transfer of all levels of classified information. TOP SECRET information is always transferred by Government courier or by Government approved secure electronic communications.

57. Delivery of Classified Material to Foreign Customer Outside U.S. U.S. Military Postal Service (MPS) registered mail USG Courier Service to a USG activity for delivery to recipient foreign government Hand Carry by USG employee Hand Carry by Contractor, by complying with MISWG #1 and NISPOM Approved by Cognizant Security Office (DSS) There are exceptions to these rules, depending on the country. Some countries it must go DTS, must be Govt to Govt, like to Central Asia to go right to the embassy, with courier. LAST BULLET: Under MISWG document #1. This is where MISWG comes into play. Security agreement does not cover it. MISWG 1 provides the procedures. We (the Govt) carry classified all the time but we must have courier orders. (one of the worst jobs in DoD). What if the foreign govt customs or security people demand to open your classified package - we really can’t stop them because they have guns. But what actually really happens is that we know in advance if there might be trouble and make arrangements. IE One officer as a courier went to Germany and was met in the Airport by our own Embassy person who walked it right through customs and security (had some kind of authorization or badge). U.S. Military Post or diplomatic pouch is usually sufficient security, but with some countries we have to go with a courier. The APOs & FPOs put out a list of zip codes with restrictions “Do not send classified” - or other instructions. There are exceptions to these rules, depending on the country. Some countries it must go DTS, must be Govt to Govt, like to Central Asia to go right to the embassy, with courier. LAST BULLET: Under MISWG document #1. This is where MISWG comes into play. Security agreement does not cover it. MISWG 1 provides the procedures. We (the Govt) carry classified all the time but we must have courier orders. (one of the worst jobs in DoD). What if the foreign govt customs or security people demand to open your classified package - we really can’t stop them because they have guns. But what actually really happens is that we know in advance if there might be trouble and make arrangements. IE One officer as a courier went to Germany and was met in the Airport by our own Embassy person who walked it right through customs and security (had some kind of authorization or badge). U.S. Military Post or diplomatic pouch is usually sufficient security, but with some countries we have to go with a courier. The APOs & FPOs put out a list of zip codes with restrictions “Do not send classified” - or other instructions.

58. Freight Forwarders Freight forwarder must be cleared by DSS Must be under contract to: U.S. Government agency U.S. contractor, or Recipient foreign government Freight forwarder must be identified In the LOA for FMS or In the license application for DCS Like Proctor & Gample uses same FF to send soap as for clas. Documents. Emery Express here at the Airport is used for the AF(?) as their FF. The FF is just a shipper. The FF works for and is under contract with the customer (purchasing country). Generally the FF ships items, not documents. A FF is not a unique security assistance job. It may be totally not defense items. If controlled item, then the FF must be cleared. They must have a valid facility security clearance and storage capability at the appropriate level. Like Proctor & Gample uses same FF to send soap as for clas. Documents. Emery Express here at the Airport is used for the AF(?) as their FF. The FF is just a shipper. The FF works for and is under contract with the customer (purchasing country). Generally the FF ships items, not documents. A FF is not a unique security assistance job. It may be totally not defense items. If controlled item, then the FF must be cleared. They must have a valid facility security clearance and storage capability at the appropriate level.

59. Committee on ForeignInvestment in the U.S.(CFIUS)  Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI)

60. Exon-Florio

61. Exon-Florio “NATIONAL SECURITY” is not defined. They won’t define it either - that is up to the President to decide on case by case basis.“NATIONAL SECURITY” is not defined. They won’t define it either - that is up to the President to decide on case by case basis.

62. Exon-Florio

63. CFIUS Implementation Presidential responsibility for implementation of Exon-Florio delegated to CFIUS Eleven general members (Treasury Chairs) but other interested departments may participate as well DoD representative is from DTSA DoD emphasis is on Contracts involving CMI Sole Source supplier to DoD Impact on defense industrial base Presidential action requires written report to Congress DTRA - Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Eleven general members not listed here, - all MILDEPS, plus DTRA, DOS, DOA, DOD, DOC, etc. DOD concerned with contract with CMI (Classified Mil Info). We don’t want to lose a valuable supplier of parts or even a weapon system. Additional factors for investigation and determination: Factors that are considered: Capability & capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense requirements, if there is any concern regarding possible: sale of military items or technology to any country that supports terrorism, possible missile proliferation, possible proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, or possible sale to a country that is on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Special Country List. I.E. Libya wants to buy Ratheon. Beyond the possible loss of an important industry there is a huge risk of diversion of technology. They are not trustworthy enough, even if they promise to not be on the board of directors, and not make decisions for the company. If a company from Canada or the U.K. wanted to buy Ratheon, then it would be different ARTICLE: HOUSE MEMBERS ASK PROBE OF DEAL DTRA - Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Eleven general members not listed here, - all MILDEPS, plus DTRA, DOS, DOA, DOD, DOC, etc. DOD concerned with contract with CMI (Classified Mil Info). We don’t want to lose a valuable supplier of parts or even a weapon system. Additional factors for investigation and determination: Factors that are considered: Capability & capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense requirements, if there is any concern regarding possible: sale of military items or technology to any country that supports terrorism, possible missile proliferation, possible proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, or possible sale to a country that is on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Special Country List. I.E. Libya wants to buy Ratheon. Beyond the possible loss of an important industry there is a huge risk of diversion of technology. They are not trustworthy enough, even if they promise to not be on the board of directors, and not make decisions for the company. If a company from Canada or the U.K. wanted to buy Ratheon, then it would be different ARTICLE: HOUSE MEMBERS ASK PROBE OF DEAL

64. Exon-Florio Procedures CFIUS has 30 days after notification to initiate investigation Investigation must be completed in 45 days President has 15 days to decide Report to Congress Once CFIUS becomes involved in the consideration of a possible transaction (as the result of a notification by the investors, on its own initiative, or at the request of a third party), it has 30 days to decide whether to initiate an investigation. The investigation must be completed not later than 45 days after its commencement, at which time the Committee must present a recommendation to the President. The President is required to render a decision within 15 days after completion of the Investigation. If the President decides to take action as the result of a CFIUS investigation, he must submit a written report to Congress on the actions that he intends to take, including detailed rationale for his findings. The entire process may take up to 90 days to complete.Once CFIUS becomes involved in the consideration of a possible transaction (as the result of a notification by the investors, on its own initiative, or at the request of a third party), it has 30 days to decide whether to initiate an investigation. The investigation must be completed not later than 45 days after its commencement, at which time the Committee must present a recommendation to the President. The President is required to render a decision within 15 days after completion of the Investigation. If the President decides to take action as the result of a CFIUS investigation, he must submit a written report to Congress on the actions that he intends to take, including detailed rationale for his findings. The entire process may take up to 90 days to complete.

65. FOCI Defined A foreign interest has the power to direct or decide matters affecting the management or operations of a company in a manner that may result in unauthorized access or adversely affect the performance of classified contracts. In other words, a foreign interest may get our classified information to duplicate or neutralize weapons systems or disrupt performance of our vital defense work. In other words, a foreign interest may get our classified information to duplicate or neutralize weapons systems or disrupt performance of our vital defense work.

66. FOCI Risk Factors

67. Negate or Mitigate FOCI If FOCI determination made: Cancel or suspend facility clearance Company must agree to negate or mitigate risks Company required to provide input to DSS- both parties develop plan to negate or mitigate risks To protect classified or controlled info in a U.S. company. If a company’s debt is controlled by a foreign entity, then that U..S. company could be influenced, Like if Ratheon became a major subcontractor to a Chinese company, or they got a big loan from a company from Pakistan. The NISPOM acknowledges that it is in the interest of the U.S. to allow foreign investment in the defense industrial base where it is not inconsistent with U.S. national security interests. WHY? FOREIGN MONEY COMING INTO U.S. CAN BE TAXED, CAN CREATE JOBS. IT BUILDS OUR INDUSTRIAL BASE. U.S. Government contracts requiring access to classified info may be awarded to companies under FOCI when adequate safeguards exist to protect national security interests (such as system capabilities and vulnerabilities). Basically foreign interests must not have the power to direct or decide matters affecting the management or operations of a company operating under a facility security clearance (FCS) if such power may result in the unauthorized disclosure of classified and controlled unclassified information, or may adversely affect the award or performance of classified contracts. When it is determined that they can exert such power, measures must be established to negate the FOCI or mitigate the associated risk. To protect classified or controlled info in a U.S. company. If a company’s debt is controlled by a foreign entity, then that U..S. company could be influenced, Like if Ratheon became a major subcontractor to a Chinese company, or they got a big loan from a company from Pakistan. The NISPOM acknowledges that it is in the interest of the U.S. to allow foreign investment in the defense industrial base where it is not inconsistent with U.S. national security interests. WHY? FOREIGN MONEY COMING INTO U.S. CAN BE TAXED, CAN CREATE JOBS. IT BUILDS OUR INDUSTRIAL BASE. U.S. Government contracts requiring access to classified info may be awarded to companies under FOCI when adequate safeguards exist to protect national security interests (such as system capabilities and vulnerabilities). Basically foreign interests must not have the power to direct or decide matters affecting the management or operations of a company operating under a facility security clearance (FCS) if such power may result in the unauthorized disclosure of classified and controlled unclassified information, or may adversely affect the award or performance of classified contracts. When it is determined that they can exert such power, measures must be established to negate the FOCI or mitigate the associated risk.

68. Summary Foreign Government and NATO Information International Visits Defense Security Service (DSS) Multinational Industrial Security Working Group (MISWG) Documents International Transfer Process CFIUS and FOCI What about the future? Can we beat China if there was a war? Can our technology beat sheer numbers? Is technology that critical? [Of course weapons of mass destruction is the biggest factor - the need to control it] Technology levels the playing field. We must protect our technology. Why transfer technology to our allies? We need to protect our military technology, why not just don’t give it out at all? Isn’t national security at stake? World-wide competition based on leading edge technology has caused a significant increase in “economic espionage” vice military espionage for U.S. technology. Economic security is becoming an important part of American foreign policy. So, technology transfer must be controlled. But, which technologies should be controlled and to what extent?What about the future? Can we beat China if there was a war? Can our technology beat sheer numbers? Is technology that critical? [Of course weapons of mass destruction is the biggest factor - the need to control it] Technology levels the playing field. We must protect our technology. Why transfer technology to our allies? We need to protect our military technology, why not just don’t give it out at all? Isn’t national security at stake? World-wide competition based on leading edge technology has caused a significant increase in “economic espionage” vice military espionage for U.S. technology. Economic security is becoming an important part of American foreign policy. So, technology transfer must be controlled. But, which technologies should be controlled and to what extent?

69. International Programs Security