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Practical AVC-Edge CompactFlash Modifications can Amuse Nerds

Practical AVC-Edge CompactFlash Modifications can Amuse Nerds. J. Alex Halderman University of Michigan. Ariel J. Feldman Princeton University. Nerds!. Diebold AccuVote-TS. . EVT 2007. “Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine“ A. Feldman, J. A. Halderman, and E. Felten.

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Practical AVC-Edge CompactFlash Modifications can Amuse Nerds

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  1. Practical AVC-Edge CompactFlash Modifications can Amuse Nerds J. Alex HaldermanUniversity of Michigan Ariel J. FeldmanPrinceton University

  2. Nerds!

  3. Diebold AccuVote-TS  EVT 2007 “Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine“A. Feldman, J. A. Halderman, and E. Felten

  4. HovavShacham SteveCheckoway Sequoia AVC Advantage EVT 2009 “Can DREs Provide Long-Lasting Security? ....” Checkoway, Feldman, Kantor, Halderman, Felten, and Shacham

  5. Sequoia AVC Advantage  AndrewAppel EVT 2009 ‘’The NJ Voting-machine Lawsuit and the AVC Advantage ...’’ Appel, Ginsburg, Hursti, Kernighan, Richards, Tan, and Venetis

  6. Nedap ES3B RopGonggrijp EVT 2007 “Studying the Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B Voting Computer: A Computer Security Perspective.” Gonggrijp and Hengeveld.

  7.  HariPrasad Indian EVM CCS 2010 “Security Analysis of India’s Electronic Voting Machines” Wolchok, Wustrow, Halderman, Prasad, K., S., Y., and Gonggrijp

  8. JoeHall

  9. JeremyEpstein

  10. The Sequoia AVC-Edge 2008: Used in 161 jurisdiction with 8.9 million registered voters

  11. “The testers were able to gain access to the internals of the system, by, for example, unscrewing screws to bypass locks. The screws were not protected by seals.” — TTBR red team report on the AVC Edge TTBR 2007

  12. Let’s reprogram it!

  13. Let’s put Linux on it!

  14. Booting “Damn Small Linux”

  15. Booting “Damn Small Linux”

  16. Problem:Watchdog timer

  17. OK. What else can it do?

  18. EVT 2007 “Studying the Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B Voting Computer: A Computer Security Perspective.” Gonggrijp and Hengeveld.

  19. Based on these initial experiments, we now presentthe future of DREs…

  20. FeaturesPortableBattery powered1 or 2 playersUnlimited quarters

  21. FreeDOS + MAME Original 1980 Pac-Man (Celebrate the 30thanniversary)

  22. Challenges No math coprocessor, no logical block addressing. Writing a config.sys file(remember himem.sys?)

  23. Security Risks Someone could hack in and reprogram it to count votes fairly

  24. Conclusion DRE voting machines will soon be widely decommissioned. Their future lies in emulating classic gamesto amuse nerds.

  25. Practical AVC-Edge CompactFlash Modifications can Amuse Nerds J. Alex HaldermanUniversity of Michigan Ariel J. FeldmanPrinceton University

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