Scott Gates and Kaare Strøm

1. Fragile Bargains: Civil Conflict and Power-sharing in Africa Scott Gates and KaareStrøm

2. Fragile Bargains:Civil Conflict and Power-sharing in Africa Scott Gates Center for the Study of Civil War, PRIO and Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU) and Kaare Strøm University of California, San Diego and Center for the Study of Civil War, PRIO

3. The Challenge of Postconflict Institutional Design • Good Governance & Sustainable Civil Peace • Good governance – effective and fair provision of public goods and services • Credible commitments to uphold conflict resolution agreements

4. Power Sharing as a Postconflict Institutional Solution • Involve all potential spoilers in government decision-making • Give all parties a stake in cooperation and provide mutual guarantees of security and basic interests • Reduces the threat of conflict

5. The Logic of Power Sharing • Focus on ex postcertainty and fairness • Fair division of the political pie • Counters perceptions of bias and exclusion • Entice warring parties to cease fighting

6. Is Power-sharingDemocratic? • Przeworski’s (1991) conception of democracy: • ex ante uncertainty and • ex ante openness of democratic contestation • Strøm (1992) adds • procedural performance sensitivity • Ex post guarantees run counter to all three characteristics of democracy

7. EssenceofPower-sharing • Ex postfairness over • Ex ante uncertainty and • Procedural Performance Sensitivity • Importance of fairness in post-conflict environments

8. Expanding the Notion of Power Sharing • Inclusive Power sharing – mandate inclusion • Dispersed Power sharing – mandate constraints

9. Inclusive Power-sharing Arrangements • Grand (cabinet) coalitions • Inclusive executive or advisory councils, such as electoral commissions • Mutual veto arrangements • Proportional or broadly inclusive rules for civil service and other administrative appointments • Reserved executive offices for particular parties or social groups • Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, especially closed-list

10. Dispersed Power-sharing Arrangements • Autonomous sub-national levels of government • Independent institutions that ban partisan representation (e.g. Judicial appointments) • Non-partisan electoral commissions • Restrict civil servants from membership in political parties • Separation of religious communities and the state • Electoral systems featuring primary elections, personal preference votes, or transferable votes

11. Problems with Power Sharing • Spoilers • Rigidity • Transaction costs • Inclusion squeezes out civil society

12. Power-sharing and Ex Post Fairness • Spoiler Problems • Military leaders – credible outside option • Splinter groups • Incumbents unwilling to leave office

13. Problems with Dispersed Power Sharing • Implementation • Trust issues • Weak civil society • need to work to foster and develop indigenous NGOs

14. Power-sharing in Sub-SaharanAfrica • Problems of patrimonial societies • Perceptions of procedural bias and exclusion • Role of civil society