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Risk assessment based on interdependencies. Helsinki, Finland Hannu Sivonen, Senior Researcher MANMADE Castellanza 28-29 June 2007. National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA). Fund, independent of the state budget Public Private Partnership coordinator (23 branches, 800 experts)
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Risk assessment based on interdependencies Helsinki, Finland Hannu Sivonen, Senior Researcher MANMADE Castellanza 28-29 June 2007 Hannu Sivonen
National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) • Fund, independent of the state budget • Public Private Partnership coordinator (23 branches, 800 experts) • Government defines objectives for security of supply • NESA finances security of supply when not provided by the market mechanism • Focus areas: • Critical technical infrastructure • Food supply • Energy supply • Logistics • Critical medical substances and supplies • Defence related industries • NESA balance is 1000 million € Hannu Sivonen
Risk assessment based on interdependencies • A method for assessing the risk caused by interdependencies between technical infrastructures, basic services, and threats • Linear mathematical model similar to that used by Google • Simplifying assumptions • Complex interdependencies and accumulating effects and risks handled • Information system failures and weather conditions are major risks in Finland • Published in Finnish • Yhteiskunnan huoltovarmuuden kannalta keskeisten toimintojen riskiarviointi • http://www.huoltovarmuus.fi/julkaisut/esittely/?id=72 Hannu Sivonen
Finnish government decision 305/2002 • Technical infrastructures (14) • energy supply • communications • information systems • Basic services and supplies (29) • food supply • transport logistics • mass media • health care • financial services Hannu Sivonen
Threats from outside the infrastructure and services (17) • economic threats • threats to information systems • crisis in international logistics • weather phenomena • structural damage • strikes • environment and health threats • national security threats Hannu Sivonen
Interdependencies • = reasons • for failures recurrent (ratio 1) expected (ratio 0.1) rare (ratio 0.01) theoretical (ratio 0.001) nonexistent Hannu Sivonen
Input: Interdependencies (sample) Hannu Sivonen
recurrent (< 1 year) expected (1-10 years) rare (10-100 years) theoretical (>100 years) nonexistent Mean time between failures Hannu Sivonen
Input: Duration and mean time between failures Hannu Sivonen
Output: Relative risks pertinent to inter-dependent infrastructures Hannu Sivonen
Output: Relative risks pertinent to outside threats Hannu Sivonen
Relative component risks in food logistics *) operator = processing plant + logistics operator Hannu Sivonen
The model applied to criticality of ICT functions • 72 functions, 6 scenarios (3x2): • Duration of failure • short term (hours) • medium term (days) • long term (months) • Dependency type • cause of failure to others • obstacle to recovery of others • No assessment for MTB, just interdependencies = potential effect, criticality Hannu Sivonen
Top ten critical functions from 6 scenarios Hannu Sivonen