After the Catastrophe: IP Network Availability and Resiliency In The Post-Disaster Environment.

1. After the Catastrophe:IP Network Availability and Resiliency In ThePost-Disaster Environment. Rakesh Bharania Network Consulting EngineerCisco Tactical Operationshttp://www.cisco.com/go/tacopsE-Mail: rbharani@cisco.comTwitter: @densaer

2. Agenda – After the Catastrophe • The Need for Information In A Post-Disaster Environment • Questioning Assumptions • The role of Cisco in the Infrastructure picture • Examples: • 1. September 11, 2001 attacks • 2. 2011 Japan Earthquake and Tsunami • 3. 2010 San Bruno, CA gas pipeline explosion

3. Transportation Defense Public Safety Healthcare Critical Infrastructure National, State & Local Government 3 3 The Fundamental Problem… NGO / International Orgs In complex disasters with multiple response organizations … How to deliver the right information in the right format to the right person at the right time?

4. Changing Technologies Affect Mission Success Radio, Phone Integrated Mobile/Fixed Single Device Any Device Voice only Voice, Video, Data Closed Teams Open Collaboration Command&Control Centric In the field, social media, public Fixed Locations Deployable anywhere Evolution in People, Process and Technologies to support Disaster and Humanitarian relief Goal: Mission workflowand productivitybenefits that save livesand speed recovery.

5. Mythbusting • Assumption: “When a disaster happens, telecommunications will go down.” • Reality: Not always. About 60% of Haiti telecom stayed operational after quake. Other examples: Chile Quake, Japan. • Assumption: “I have a cellphone, an ordinary telephone line, a PBX (etc). Why should I care about the IP network?” • Reality: Everything is IP now –and has been for some time. • Assumption: “The Internet is an optional luxury for public safety.” • Reality: Not anymore – just as critical as radio communications. Haiti was a data-driven response.

6. Cisco’s Role in IP Resiliency • As a vendor, Cisco doesn’t have direct responsibility for the health of the national telecommunications infrastructure (owned by the Service Providers such as AT&T, Verizon, etc.) • But our products constitute a large part of the national communications infrastructure, We have an obligation to produce secure, reliable products and to assist where appropriate with our expertise. • We participate in the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (DHS) – http://www.ncs.gov/ncc/ - ongoing public/private coordination for tech companies, service providers,Federal gov. agencies. • Cisco has aggressive customer support available for crisis situations: CAP, Cisco Tactical Operations, etc.

7. September 11, 2001 • Infrastructure to note: WTC 1/2: below-ground fiber from transatlantic cables & Telehouse and 60 Hudson St. • 60 Hudson St: termination point to many transatlantic cables • NYIIX at 25 Broadway Telehouse: peering site for 40 ISPs from NY, Europe South America and South Africa. • WTC 2 collapse severed fiber between 60 Hudson and 25 Broadway • Reachability disruption to <1000 BGP prefixes(less than 1% of advertised prefixes globally) • No global Internet routing instability occurred (But there was with Nimda worm on 9/18/2011) • Global Internet routing continued normally.

8. Location of Critical Internet Infra on 9/11/2001

9. 2011 Japan Quake and Tsunami • M9.0 quake/tsunami on March 11, 2011 Internet impact:Both IIJ redundant backbone fiber links Tokyo/Sendai were severed. • 20% of Japan’s total traffic dropped immediately due to outages. • 3 of 8 fiber links failed to USA, but good links remained available. • Japanese ISPs: “outside of immediately affected areas, no region was disconnected from Japan or the world.” • Internet was used heavily by the Japanese public for streaming video, social media, etc. • Rapid recovery from the event:One of the major Tokyo/Sendai fibers restored by March 12 • All three trans-Pacific fibers restored by T+28 hrs • ISPs reported 85-90% normal traffic T+10 days after quake • Were we lucky? Most of Japan’s core Internet infrastructurewas outside of the affected region.

10. Example: SINET4 • Japan’s Science and Information Network (SINET4) links 700 universities, colleges, and national laboratories. • While there was some network disruption (Sendai), restoration was rapid. Network continued to work normally outside of immediate area and was used for emergency information use (heavy ustreamtraffic, etc)

11. San Bruno CA Explosion • Local communications disruption to cellphones, mobiledata services immediately around the affected neighborhood. • Cisco TacOps mutual aid request via NCRIC in supportof San Mateo County OES. • Provided communications support to Incident Command Post. • GIS support through Google disaster responseteamfor NTSB. • Extensive After Action:“San Bruno Fire TechnicalDebrief” from CMU-SV DMI

12. Conclusion • Internet infrastructure in developed countries is highly resilient to disasters at a macro scale – redundant links + dynamic routing. • Local disruptions are possible – prepare redundancy into your organization. • Recent Internet history in disaster demonstrates it isreliable and indispensable in a crisis.

13. Questions?