Megaports Program Update

1. U.S. Department of Energy Bangkok, Thailand May 12-15, 2009 Megaports Program Update Asia Regional Technical Workshop on Megaports Initiative William Kilmartin, U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Agency

2. Contents • Second Line of Defense and Megaports Initiative Overview • Mission • History • Progress to Date • Program Scope • Equipment • Transshipment Challenge • Communications System • Training and Sustainment • Relationship with Container Security Initiative • Conclusion

3. DETER INTERDICT DETECT Second Line of Defense (SLD) MISSION: Strengthen the capabilities of partner countries to deter, detect,andinterdict illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other radioactive materials at international border crossings including airports, seaports, and other points of entry/exit. STRATEGY: Develop cooperative efforts to mitigate the risk of illicit trafficking through: • Search, detection, and identification of nuclear and other radioactive materials • Development of response procedures and capabilities • Deterrence of future trafficking in illicit nuclear and nuclear-related materials GOAL: Deliver an effective and sustainable global capability to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in special nuclear and other radioactive materials.

4. The Megaports Mission MISSION:To provide equipment, training, and technical support to international partners to enhance their ability to detect, interdict and deter illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other radioactive materials in the global maritime system. This mission is accomplished by: • Scanning containers at high volume ports • While gate traffic can easily be scanned (includes rail), transhipped containers present significant challenges • Scanning containers at ports along trade corridors that may attract illicit trafficking of nuclear/radioactive materials • Scans gate traffic in areas of concern • Increases likelihood that material will be detected before it is incorporated into an improvised nuclear device • Scanning containers in conjunction with NII scans on U.S.- bound containers under DHS’s Container Security Initiative and Secure Freight Initiative GOAL: Over 100 Megaports, scanning over 70% of global shipping traffic by 2015.

5. Megaports History • Program established in 2003 • Cooperated with IAEA to install equipment at Port of Piraeus for 2004 Athens Olympics • Pilot project in 2004 at Rotterdam, Netherlands • U.S. installed equipment replaced in 2007 with Dutch acquired system • Successful “proof of concept” which serves as a showcase site • Program continues to accelerate • 100 ports identified for partnership

6. Megaports Progress to Date Bahamas (Freeport) Belgium (Antwerp, Zeebrugge) Colombia (Cartagena) Dominican Republic (Caucedo) Greece (Piraeus) *Honduras (Cortes) – SFI Pilot Israel (Haifa) – Pilot Mexico (Veracruz) Netherlands (Rotterdam) *Oman (Salalah) – SFI Pilot *Pakistan (Qasim) – SFI Pilot Panama (Balboa, MIT) Philippines (Manila) Spain (Algeciras) Singapore (Singapore) – Pilot *South Korea (Pusan) – SFI Pilot Sri Lanka (Colombo) Thailand (Laem Chabang) *U.K. (Southampton) – SFI Pilot Japan (Yokohama) Qatar (Training Center) Operational Megaports(21) Bangladesh (Chittagong) China (Shanghai) *China (Hong Kong) – SFI Djibouti (Djibouti) Dubai, UAE (Jebel Ali) Egypt (Alexandria) Israel (Ashdod) Jamaica (Kingston) Jordan (Aqaba) Kenya (Mombasa) Lebanon (Beirut) Malaysia (Klang & TJP) Mexico ( Manzanillo, Altamira, Lazaro Cardenas) Oman (Sultan Qaboos) Panama (Colon & Cristobal) Portugal (Lisbon) Spain (Valencia & Barcelona) Taiwan (Kaohsiung & Keelung) Implementation Phase(23) MOU Signature Pending (0) Special Projects & Collaboration (2) Over 25 other major international seaports in several locations under negotiation *SFI Port

7. Megaports Project Scope • Equipment operated by partner country personnel • Typical Activities funded by DOE/NNSA: • Detection equipment and affiliated equipment and network systems • Technical Expertise • Training and sustainability efforts • Cost-Sharing approach pursued, where feasible • Partner country fund design, construction, and installation, and in some cases, maintenance Puerto Cortes, Honduras

8. Megaports Equipment • Types of equipment provided: • Detectors: • Fixed Radiation Portal Monitors • Mobile Radiation Detection Systems • Straddle Carrier • Spectroscopic Portal Monitors • Suite of Handheld Radiation Detection Equipment • Affiliated Systems: • Video Cameras • Network/Communications Systems

9. Transshipment Challenge • DOE/NNSA continues to evaluate new technologies and approaches • Radiation detection straddle carrier – Bahamas • Mobile detection platform – Oman • Upstream scanning at feeder ports – Belgium • Scanning on Quays/Bridges – Spain, Malaysia • Scanning containers from ship to stacks – Dominican Republic • CBP and DOE/NNSA evaluating crane based detection solutions at Tacoma, Washington • Scanning Transshipments have been limited due to lack of available and tested technologies that minimize impact to port operations

10. Communications Systems • All data from equipment integrated to a Central Alarm Station • Radiation alarms can be simultaneously transmitted to host country agencies responsible for reach-back and to CSI representatives in-country • Data transmitted includes container identification, alarm events, radiation data and system health • System does not transmit proprietary cargo or shipping data • Current efforts underway to standardize software for communications systems

11. Training and Sustainment • Classroom and field exercises at U.S. HAMMER Facility and on-site training provided for and tailored for: • Stakeholders • Officers & CAS operators Supervisors • Maintenance technicians • Total of 484 foreign students trained at HAMMER • Training management plan and sustainability plan development • Maintenance is provided by Megaports for 3 years after installation • Host nation to independently sustain Megaports system after three year period • Host nation to develop standard operating procedures – response capabilities

12. Relationship To CSI • Megaports Initiative complements Container Security Initiative (CSI) • CSI – Personnel focused • Megaports – Equipment focused • Alarms indicating radioactive cargo are typically sent to host country personnel and may be sent to CSI staff if the port agrees • CSI staff may request further inspection of a suspicious US-bound alarmed containers • Strong and close partnership with CSI • Joint agreements where possible - 7 joint agreements to date • Megaports is committed to install radiation portal monitor at all CSI ports

13. Summary • The Megaports Initiative enhances the ability to detect, interdict and deter illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other radioactive materials by providing equipment, training, and technical support to international partners • Radiation portal monitors, handheld identification equipment, a communication network and software allow partners to unobtrusively inspect cargo, as it transits through the port, for the presence and type of radiation • In our partner countries seaports, the Megaports Initiative implementation demonstrates that the system can be used effectively without a detrimental impact on commercial operations • The Megaports Initiative is a global program that continues to grow. At the same time, the Program is intensifying efforts to develop innovative methods of scanning transshipment cargo, the most difficult cargo to scan.

14. Megaports Points of Contact Tracy P. Mustin, Second Line of Defense, Director Tel: 202-586-2676 Fax: 202-586-7110 Email: tracy.mustin@nnsa.doe.gov William E. Kilmartin, Megaports Program Director Tel: 202-586-0513 Fax: 202-586-7110 Email: william.kilmartin@nnsa.doe.gov