A purposive sample of 5 projects

1. A purposive sample of 5 projects Ghana, the Village Infrastructure Project, VIP Mauritania, The Oases Development Project, ODP-2 Senegal, Project d’Organization et Gestion Villageoise, POGV-2 Mali, Fond de Development Sahelien, FODESA Cape Verde, Projecto de Lucha contra a Pobreza Rural, PLPR

2. Criteria for selecting the projects: • the project major thrust is to develop the rural communities, through a demand driven participatory approach • the projects represent different options for the organization and management of the service delivery system, and • the projects have been implemented for a sufficiently long time, or represent a second phase of an earlier project with a similar approach, to have accumulated experience that can be usefully shared.

3. Features of CDD used to compare design and implementation performance • Scope for initiative by the Community Based Organizations, CBOs • Targeting instruments applied • Contribution to improving the local system of governance

4. Scope for CBO initiative • Who determines the menu of project interventions? • What measures to ration demand? • Do CBOs implement their own micro-projects? • Do CBOs handle public resources in cash? • Do CBOs operate the rural financial services? • Do CBOs participate in project management? • How complex is the procedure to approve funding of CBOs initiatives?

5. Who determines the menu of project interventions? • VIP, POGV-2, and ODP-2 offer a limited menu: production and transport infrastructure, NRM, functional literacy; credit is envisaged only to groups engaged in productive activities • FODESA and PLPR are very liberal, a community can ask support for any priority initiative, except if it falls in a simple negative list (determined jointly with the communities in the case of the PLPR) • During implementation, eligible activities were increased in Mauritania and Ghana, to accommodate strong demand for basic “social needs”

6. Participation of the CBOs in the delivery system • The VIP does not envisage a role for the CBOs; CBOs are users of services produced and delivered by somebody else • ODP-2, POGV-2, and PLPR envisage a key role for the CBOs in the implementation phase of their priority projects (participation in design, contracting, supervision of deliveries, clearance of payments) • FODESA design included the above as well, but implementation has been rather different so far • In no case do CBOs handle project cash

7. Providing rural financial services • The VIP had a credit component, which did not envisage supporting community based MFIs • A matching grant mechanism was introduced after MTR • By the end of phase 1, FODESA had not managed to contract the component designed to develop the MFIs • The PLPR and the POGV did not have a MFI component • The MFI component of the ODP in Mauritania was quite successful, despite some problem with loan delinquencies

8. CBOs participation in project management • The PLPR and ODP-2 have established close partnerships between the project and the CBOs • In Cape Verde, the leaders of the CBOs are full right members of the CRP, which is the operating unit of the PLPR • In Mauritania, the ODAs (Oasis Development Associations) are the planning and executive agent of the project at community level • FODESA was also to establish partnerships with the CBOs but for a variety of reason did not manage so far • The VIP did not envisage a management role for any actor other than the local government

9. The FODESA experience highlights a problem with the CBOs participation in project management organizations • The partnership of project and CBOs established by FODESA at regional level was an impractical solution • Too many CBOs potentially members of the association • FODESA project re-orientation suggested to decentralize at district level • The ODP experience: project reorientation cut down the number of ODAs from 400 to 200 • The POGV deals with about 600 villages • The PLPR does not have the problem: there are only a few communities in each of the islands where there is a CRP

10. Complexity of processes and procedures Two extreme cases: • FODESA applied AGETYPE procedures designed for large public investment projects • The First Phase review counted over 20 bureaucratic steps to get a micro-project implemented • As a result, the project could not negotiate the large number of small contracts required to fulfill the participatory implementation policy envisaged • To manage its administration costs, the Project sidelined its community capability building objectives and concentrated delivery contracts in the hands of few private sector contractor foreign to the receiver community An interesting concrete instance of project induced elite capture of benefits that has little to do with elite dominance at the community level

11. ….more on procedures Quite opposite the case of the PLPR: • Government introduced special instruments to transfer public funds to the CRP, the associations of the civil society that implement the PLPR • These instruments embody two key concepts: • Government approves a 3-years indicative plan, and • The principle of ex post control on the AWP&B of the CRPs The result is a remarkable simplification of procedures, that enables the CBOs to participate in all the stages of their projectimplementation

12. Targeting instruments Four sets of instruments were introduced: • Ex ante selection of target community and related exclusion criteria • Exclusion vs. non-exclusion within the community • Specific measures to secure a role for women and the poor • Self-targeting mechanisms applied to the support of specific activities

13. Targeting communities • Four projects target the village (or the oasis) • The PLPR targets any CBO of poor people (as defined by the GoCV policy reduction policy paper) Criteria of community exclusion: • VIP and PLPR have none • ODP-2 excludes oases owned by absentee landlords • FODESA excludes non-vulnerable villages, based on food self-sufficiency indicators • PGOV-2 excludes villages that have badly performed under a predecessor project

14. Exclusion vs. non-exclusion within a target community No project discriminates specifically against wealthy or otherwise dominant members of the society within a community eligible for project support This greatly facilitates the mobilization of the community and avoids opposition to project intervention

15. Specific measures to facilitate “inclusiveness” i.e. how to secure a role to women and poor HHs • VIP initially did not address the question • ODP-2, POGV-2, FODESA require to have women member of all CBO institutions and operating bodies • PLPR relies on the consensus of the communities on the role of women and the poor, supported by the animation service of the CRPs • All projects record easy formal acceptance by the communities of a new role of women in the CBOs ODP-2 records considerable success in securing a pro-active role for women, in the ODAs and in the MFIs, enhanced by the impact of the functional literacy programme

16. Important self-targeting instruments • Ceilings on the amount of project funding of community initiatives (per micro-project, per HH of partner involved), automatically excludes wealthy members of the community (Cape Verde) • Access to credit is more important to the poor than the cost of credit, MFIs set interest rates higher than commercial banks, which excludes borrowers that have access to formal credit, while attracting deposits from them • Refusal to pay the labor required to construct irrigation infrastructure activates the traditional rule that entitles those who supply the labor the right to share the land they helped to develop (Guinea)

17. CDD contribution to improving local governance Three key point: • Establishing sustainable CBO within and beyond the individual community to create the conditions for effective participation and empowerment • Support of project policy by the political environment and the public administration • Controlling the impact of local elite dominance

18. Creating sustainable CBOs The VIP experience: • The VIP tried to reach the communities through the decentralized public administration • At the level of the the District Assemblies it did not work, priorities are different, level too far away from the village • At Area Council level, the activation of public delivery mechanisms was much more effective • In Ghana, Area Councils are much nearer to the village, and the gap with the District is quite wide

19. The Mauritania and Cape Verde experience • In Mauritania and Cape Verde the governments enacted legislation that recognizes the public utility of private associations of the civil society engaged in poverty alleviation and/or community development, • such as the ODAs and the CRPs, • In both countries, the respective roles of the associations and of the decentralized public administration have not yet been clearly defined • Representative vs. participatory democracy

20. On the capture of project benefits by the elites dominant in the communities • There is little objective evidence collected on this issue • An insight can be gained by analyzing the emerging pattern of effective community demand This signals that communities attach priority to investing their own resources to match project intervention: • first in basic “social needs” (water, house improvement, functional literacy, health care), • followed by income generation activities, when the minimum social needs are satisfied, • and attach low priority to NRM

21. The projects experience suggests that: So far at least… • The CDD approach has not resulted in serious cases of capture of project benefits by the local dominant elites • On the contrary there are clear signals of the influence of women in the decision about common preferences! Whereas the risk may increase as community demand to support income generation activities increases, • capture of project benefits by agents external to the communities (administrators, contractors) induced by inappropriate implementation procedures is a higher risk at the moment.

22. Impact of the projects on the local economy • A completion evaluation is available only for ODA-2, which incorporates advanced CDD features • It suggests a very positive impact, through increased agricultural production and activation of many other income generation activities (mostly women led) • The emerging pattern of demand in Mali, Cape Verde, and Senegal suggests that the impact depends of existing economic opportunities, and may well be slow to start but growing with the passing of time • The impact of the project direct investment expenditure has been below the potential of the amount of resources used

23. Cost of the CDD approach How much does the CDD approach cost? At appraisal, the estimated cost of project management was: • 14% of total project cost in the case of FODESA • 10% and 15% respectively in the case of the POGV-2 and the PLPR • and 24% in the case of the ODP-2 The cost of training included in the other components was: • 6% of total project cost in the case of FODESA • 16% and 12% respectively in the case of the POGV-2 and the PLPR • And 19% in the case of the ODP-2

24. A clear concept of CDD emerges from the review • CDD is a way to unleash the potential for change of the rural communities • Rural communities have institutions that can be used (and improved) to achieve IFAD corporate objectives • CDD means empowering the communities to shape their own institutional and socio-economic development • CDD addresses contextually the institutional system within and around the communities • CDD focuses on organizations of members of a Community (the CBOs) as the building blocks of socio-economic transformation that enhance opportunities for individual HHs • CDD encourages the establishment of linkages that empower the CBOs to offset the negative impact of government and market failures

25. Lessons learned on the projects institutional setting The projects faced two options to reach the communities • Through the public administration • Through civil society organizations and the private sector

26. Lessons learned on the first option: Need to find the right level to reach the communities: • The district is far too remote (insufficient subsidiarity) • Districts have no specific capacity to deal with village problems (insufficient specialization) • Clear risk that, without corrective measures, district administrations replicate at their level the centralized approach that prompted administration reform in the first place

27. …. more Sub-district units of the public administration are more effective activators of delivery mechanisms for the communities But still view the communities: • only as users of services • not as subjects of change in their own right The gap between district and sub-district level of the local government is often very wide The respective mandates are not defined Need to balance the hierarchical relations with the higher levels of the local government Need to establish separate funding channels to support district and community initiatives

28. Advantages of the second option: Partnerships that join together the CBOs, the civil society, and the private sector, besides the government: • Provide access to a wider horizon and more sources of support than just the government • Facilitate transparency of operations and accountability to their members • Ensure the single allegiance of CBO leaders to the membership • Can adopt community-friendly procedures • Force the CBOs to devise the instruments of their own sustainability and growth • Establish centers of pluralistic governance and promote autonomous advocacy of community interests

29. Lessons learned on the second option: Governments may not agree with a policy aimed at pluralistic governance If instead there is agreement in principle: • Need to define the role, functions, and responsibilities of the partnerships • And their relationships with the local government with respect to the five components of service provision (regulation, planning, production, delivery and financing)

30. The two options: Are not mutually exclusive, and in the course of time may well complement one another In either case, the CDD approach involves changes in the institutions and this requires effective and continuous policy dialogue

31. Police dialogue is essential to: • reach understanding and agreement with government on the project CDD approach before projects start • keep projects on the right track during implementation The right venue for policy dialogue is important

32. There are many other lessons learned…. Let us leave more to tomorrow session

33. End of Presentation Thank You