Transportation Engineering In Iraq

1. Transportation Engineering In Iraq Presented by: James E. Koch, Ph.D., P.E. Wisconsin Road Builders’ Association January 21, 2009

2. Agenda • Overview of SBH • Contract Information • Operating Environment • Iraq Reconstruction Projects to Date • Overview of Fund Types • Evolution of the Reconstruction Program • Project Lifecycle • Building the Program • Contracting in Iraq • Program Execution • Operating and Maintaining • Future Considerations • Project Profiles

3. Reconstruction in Iraq

4. Overview of SBH • Joint Venture with: • Stanley Consultants • Michael Baker Corporation • Hill International • Augmented with multiple subcontractors

5. General Contract Information

6. Operating Environment

7. Transportation Projects As of 09 Jan 2009

8. Overview of Primary Fund Types

9. Evolution of the Reconstruction Program US Mission Iraq US Mission Iraq US Mission Iraq US Mission Iraq US Mission Iraq ORHA CPA IRMO IRMO IRMO ITAO IRMO JTF4 C7 PMO TF FAJR Jun 04 Oct 03 PCO TF RIE Electricity PCO TF RIO Oil GRD GRD GRD GRD/ PCO GRD GRD 2003 4 Dec 05 Apr 05 Aug 05 1 Oct 06 8 May 07 25 Jan 04 Iraq Provisional Command The Gulf Region Division (GRD), United States Army Corps of Engineers, provides quality, responsive, and full spectrum engineering services to Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) in support of military and civil construction, in order to progressively prepare the Iraqi Government to assume full responsibility for national reconstruction. The Gulf Region Division (GRD), United States Army Corps of Engineers provides quality, responsive, and full spectrum engineering services to MNF-I and Iraqi Government with planning, design, and construction management support for military and civil infrastructure construction. The Gulf Region Division (GRD), provides quality, responsive, full spectrum engineering services in Iraq in support of military and civil construction, and logisticalservices, and aggressively assists the Iraqi Government to assume full responsibility for national reconstruction The Gulf Region Division provides quality, sustainable, responsive, full spectrum engineering and logistical services in support of civil / military construction in Iraq. Committed to assisting the Iraqi Government to assume full responsibility for national infrastructure. The Gulf Region Division (GRD) provides quality, responsive engineering services to MNF-I and CPA with planning, design, and construction management support for military and civil infrastructure construction. FEST A North FEST A Center JCCI/A FEST A South Jan 05

10. Project Lifecycle • GRD, with program support from SBH, manages a significant part of the transportation reconstruction program in Iraq from “cradle to grave” • Identification of requirement from customer • Development of scope and cost estimate • Solicitation • Award • Design • Construction • Beneficial Occupancy • Closeout of the project • Turnover of the asset to the Iraqi Government (ARTOG)

11. Building the Transportation Program In Iraq • Determining and Tracking the Requirements • Projects identified by: • United Nations Development Group and the World Bank in 2003 • Coalition Provisional Authority • Iraqi Ministries • US Military Civil Affairs Units, USAID, DOS, MNC-I, MNSTC-I, INL, US Marshals, and other various Coalition partners • Projects were identified to restore the Iraqi civil aviation program, the railroad infrastructure, port facilities, and reliable internal roadway network and bridges • Data management through the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS)

12. Contracting in Iraq • Translating the Requirements to Projects • Contracting efforts • Various agencies provide contracting support, no one lead agency • Initial push for obligation was in an unknown contracting environment • Cost-Plus Contracts shifted the burden from the Government • Policy changes and anticipated cost savings allowed the Government to convert to firm fixed price contracts • Use of Project Partnering Agreements (PPAs) to partner with the Ministries

13. Program Execution • Supporting, Managing, and Overseeing Construction • Design and construction • Majority of project awarded as design build contracts • US Government provides review of submitted designs and schedules; Iraqi Ministries participate in review • Construction oversight via local engineers and quality assurance officers, reports received daily • Participation from Ministries at final inspections, their approval is required • Turnover by the Contractor and US Government

14. Operating and Maintaining • Continuing After Construction • Lack of skilled personnel due to an exodus of Iraq’s highly educated and skilled population has caused many completed facilities to lie unused (e.g. radar facilities and national railway monitoring systems) • Training and maintenance plans must be developed and provided in the area’s primary language • For an extended period of six months to one year, aid must be given in the execution of the plans to ensure future usability of the facility

15. Areas for Future Consideration • Differences in typical US designs versus locally used can cause significant construction problems and increased costs through excessive designs • Differing work standards and available capabilities • Availability and quality of locally available resources • Multiple layers of management and oversight create a lack of a clear chain of command • Personnel turnover drains historic knowledge • Determine and plan for essential utility connections • Security (travel restrictions)

16. Areas for Future Consideration • Corruption must be considered • Bribes and payoffs increase project costs • Regional Culture and Prejudices • Holiday delays • Concept of “Inshallah”; time management • Sectarian differences can cause labor problems • Women owned businesses may have significant problems with officials • Security caused damages increase cost, significantly delay schedule, and may cause the termination of the requirement (War Clause)

17. Transportation Projects

18. Baghdad Bypass Pedestrians, Cars, Trucks and Busses

19. Baghdad Bypass • Purpose • Create a route bypassing urban areas for military and civilian purposes • Improve safety for military convoys and personnel • Creation of alternate supply routes bypassing Baghdad • Scope • 30 km of roadway and 0.8 km of bridge and interchange • Construction of new roadway at least 5 km from Baghdad • Widening and improvement of existing roads • Implementation of check points and fencing to maintain security • Validation of survey data

20. Phase I Started 24 Feb 07 Completed 23 Oct 07 Funding: $6.6M MILCON Phase II and III Started 22 Jul 07 Completed Aug 08 Funding: $25.7 MILCON Baghdad Bypass • Route selection based on land ownership • Avoidance of water due to bridges’ vulnerability to IED • Private security for surveyors due to violence in area

21. Baghdad Bypass

22. Baghdad Bypass Problems • Existing routes in Iraq travel through highly populated areas • Convoys that service the logistics hubs throughout Iraq are subject to IED attack while traveling along these routes • ASR/MSR supporting final consolidation bases and logistics hubs pass through numerous IED Hotspots • The majority of IED activity occurs within 5 km of built-up areas (past 1,000 events) • Nearly all IED activity is concentrated in the areas identified above with the majority in Baghdad • Geospatial analysis shows significant density of IEDs along urban routes • Suspicious activity is difficult to detect in populated areas • Heavily populated areas can more easily support enemy attacks Large convoys present dangers and inconvenience to residents of urban areas • Hard to defend against/identify threat in urban areas • More collateral damage to noncombatants in more densely populated areas • Likely to get “tied up” in city traffic

23. Baghdad Bypass Solutions • Route Construction • improves both IED device and IED Emplacer detection, allows for increased traffic ability and supports all military transport load classes • Locate routes away from urban areas • access to the roadway is made much more difficult by the large distances IED Emplacers will have to travel and thereby increasing their probability of detection • Road design and clear zone • inherent design to the road surface and to the surrounding area improves safety of route by increasing the difficulty and complexity of IED device emplacement • Reinforce with route security operations • Cameras, lighting, checkpoints, fencing, patrols, clear zones, and access denial to bridges and culverts substructures

24. Baghdad Bypass Reducing Construction Costs • Two Lane verses four lane • significant cost reduction • Widening of existing roadway • less expensive than building new roadway • Culverts • using of simple box culverts where possible reduces overall cost of project • Overpass • the one overpass spans a single railroad track. The design of this overpass was simplified by the Iraqi railroad clearance requirements • Security Engineering requirements • simple checkpoints, cameras, lighting, culvert and bridge security grates are built in defense features that were installed at minimal costs • Land acquisition is an unknown factor which will raise costs per kilometer • Iraqi Government has rights to all public deeded lands for public projects. Private property acquisition experience is limited but did not add significant amounts compared to the overall project costs Route improvement costs vary greatly while Urban Bypasses can expect to cost an average of $600K to $1M per Kilometer to construct:

25. Aspen Road • Started: August 20, 2005 • Completed: May 14, 2007 • Total Cost: $33 Million + • Basic Scope: • Connects Southern Iraq to Kuwait • 180 Kilometers, 2-lane asphalt road through Iraq’s southern desert • 85 Kilometers of existing road repaved, widened • Ease military transports and free up civilian traffic

26. Baghdad-Kirkuk Carriageway • Started: March 1, 2005 • Est. Completion: March 2009 • Cost: $28 Million + • Basic Scope: • Connects Baghdad to Kirkuk • Total length 2,186m • Two (2) major structures: (1) .6Km and (1) 1Km bridge over Tigris River • Build one more lane each way on the 90km highway between Baqubah and Baghdad • Work to include proper drainage, culverts where necessary, signage, road markings • Allows safe and efficient movement of people, goods and traffic 26

27. Al-Sharqat Bridge • Started: June 16, 2005 • Est. Completion: March 31, 2009 • % Complete: 75% • Cost: 7 Million+ • Basic Scope: • Construction of a 400m pre-cast concrete bridge • Reinforcement work for returning wall in right side of bridge • Install wooden form for cross beams

28. Al-Sharqat Bridge • Issues: • Delayed due to site security • Checkpoints delay materials delivery • Threats and intimidation • Unreliable Bedouin workforce • Hired crane was not capable of rising girders to required level

29. Al Khidr – Al Warkaa Ruins Rd. • Started: July 2006 • Est. Completion: June 2009 • % Completed: 72% • Cost $1.6 Million • Basic Scope: • Pave road from Al Khidr through to Al Warkaa Ruins with asphalt • Road is 6 meters wide and runs 11Km Project Status: Current: Paving and Spreading sub-base layer Issues: Materials issues, long delays while contractor awaited the delivery of bitumin.

30. Questions?