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F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL

CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects. F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL. Topics. Terrorism Threat CBRN Mitigation. 1. Terrorism Threat. Threat Development. Suicide terrorism Sequential truck bombs State sponsored terrorism Swarm attacks Remote-control of terrorist operations

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F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL

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  1. CBRN Terrorism Mitigation:New Aspects F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL

  2. Topics Terrorism Threat CBRN Mitigation

  3. 1. Terrorism Threat

  4. Threat Development • Suicide terrorism • Sequential truck bombs • State sponsored terrorism • Swarm attacks • Remote-control of terrorist operations • Dual-use-technology terrorism

  5. Threat Outlook • Attacks on chemical facilities, other critical infrastructure • Decoding of individual genomes,metabolomes • Communicable disease • Physical protection of nuclear weapons

  6. Terrorist Profile & Society Response • Motivation • Psychology of groups and self-organization • Radicalization • Sacred values • Mindset of terrorist • Bonding of victims • Complacency towards security risks • Extent of panic • Self-reliance of public • Resilience of society • Education of the next-generation of scientists

  7. 2. CBRN Mitigation

  8. Mitigation and Threat CBRN weapons are likely to be deployed against: • High concentration of civilians present at high value or symbolic targets • Critical infrastructure (e.g., petrochemical facilities, power plants, pipelines, nuclear sites)‏ • Security forces • Psychology and political will

  9. Mitigation and Probability CBRN deployment has widely differing probability: • High p: Low-cost Easy to make R-device Easy to access and dual-use • Medium p: Low-cost Crude B-, C-device • Low p: Material acquisition complex Improvised N-device; weaponize (HEU-based device only)‏

  10. Examples in Countries with Large Populations: Russia and India • Russia: Critique on politicizing Nuclear Terrorism and overestimating risk Need for increased realism in CBRN mitigation • India: Predominant weighing different threats to society and ideologies Ranking of CBRN within the scope of conventional terrorism Low key efforts to mitigate CBRN in large populations

  11. Information Needs CBRN Mitigation requires information on: Equipment/processes necessary for the evaluation of a CBRN incident Minimum capability for a nation, local government or individual to adequately identify and mitigate the consequences Adequacy of international, national, regional or local communication systems and standards available

  12. Innovative Emergency Response Management: Cellular Phone System • Information relayed to individuals in emergency zone PLUS: Data/science-driven management of overall emergency response OPEN ISSUE: Technical implementation

  13. CBRN Scenario Testing • Nuclear Attack: • Large city under N-attack by boat • Important role of fallout mapping PLUS: Multidimensional information infrastructure in place OPEN ISSUE: Feasibility of scenario design • White Powder Attack: • Small city facing unknown threat • Important role of decision forming process/immediate steps PLUS: Logical deduction by exclusion & confirmation OPEN ISSUE: First Responder capability

  14. Post-Attack 100 Days • Chemical: • Thousand of victims • Present emergency management feasible, if adequate Public Health System in place OPEN ISSUE: Questionable surge capacity and sustainability • Biological: • Tens of thousands of victims • Adequacy of current emergency management questionable in case of epidemic due to overburdening of Public Health System OPEN ISSUE: Logistical problems with quarantine and baseline assessment of endemic disease

  15. Post-Attack 100 Days (continued)‏ • Radiological: • Dozens of victims • Current emergency management adequate • Sound clean-up procedures and targeted communication-strategy are key OPEN ISSUE: Stigmatization of victims; property devaluation • Nuclear: • Tens of thousands of victims, depending on yield, population density, mode of deployment and metrological conditions • Successful emergency management dependent on timely arrival of adequate outside assistance • Long-term problems likely OPEN ISSUE: Uncertain resilience of survivors until arrival of external assistance; genetics and impact on health issues of future generations

  16. Summary • A simplified one-science approach is recommended for CBRN operations • Many domains have yet to be explored to include the complex systems impacting CBRN operations • Psychological and political realms • Adaptive and self-organizing networks • Autonomous systems • Understanding of human factors

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