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POMI 2020. Security for Mobile Devices. Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres , John Mitchell, and many students. . NSF Site Visit, June 2010. POMI Research Agenda. Infrastructure. Applications. Handheld. Data & Computing Substrate
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POMI 2020 Security for Mobile Devices Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. NSF Site Visit, June 2010
POMI Research Agenda Infrastructure Applications Handheld Data & Computing Substrate PrPl, Junction and Concierge UI secure apps Economics Network Substrate Software Defined Network & OpenFlow Cinder: Energy aware, secure OS HW Platform Radio technology
POMI mobile security work secure apps • Snap2Pass and Snap2Pay [DSBL’10] • A password manager for mobile devices [BBBB’09] • Android security: ASLR on Android [BB’10] • Unlocking phones using cheap tokens [BB’10] • Preventing tap-Jacking attacks onmobile web sites [RBB’10] platformsecurity
Location services without big brother Joint work with Arvind Narayanan, NarendranThiagarajan, and MugdhaLakhani
Location-based social networking • Finally taking off?
Proximity Alerts Detect when friends are nearby (e.g. Loopt) • Today: 24/7 user tracking by server Our privacy goals: • When not nearby, friends don’t see your location • Server never sees your location Building block for more complex functionality
Proximity alerts: applications Granularity must be user-configurable
How we arrived at this problem • POMI barrier #1: reliance on big brother • PrPl effort: social networks with privacy • Many discussions with PrPl participants: • Can we make location-based services private? • Similarly, can we do private targeted advertising? (NDSS’10) • Other results from the interaction: • QR codes for better user authentication [DSBL’10] • Unlocking a phone using cheap tokens [BB’10]
Equality testing Space of possible locations is small! (32 bits) Method 1: protocol based on public-key encryption (Lipmaa) • Heavy computation: impractical for proximity of all friends ? x = y Requires shared secret keys between pairs of friends
Our approach An efficient protocol with server participation Trust assumption: server does not collude with your friends y x ?? r ( x – y ) ?? no one knows r Total traffic: 24 bytes, easy computation
Problem: online brute-force attack If only there were a way to verify that a user really is where they claim to be… Solution: location tags (for small granularity)
Properties of location tags Location tag = vector + matching function i.e., space-time fingerprint Unpredictability cannot produce matching tag unless nearby Reproducibility two devices at same place & time produce matching tags (not necessarily identical)
Location tags using WiFi packets Discard packets like TCP that may originate outside local network • DHCP, ARP, Samba etc. are local • 15 packets/sec on CS/EE VLAN Two different devices see about 90% of packets in common Comparing location tags: privately test if intersection > 90%
Future work Many location privacy questions: • Private location based advertising • Private location based search • Private location statistics