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Persistent OSPF Attacks Gabi Nakibly , Alex Kirshon and Dima Gonikman , Dan Boneh

Persistent OSPF Attacks Gabi Nakibly , Alex Kirshon and Dima Gonikman , Dan Boneh 19th Annual Network & Distributed System Security Conference ( NDSS  2012). Outline. Introduction (OSPF v2) OSPF Security Strengths Attack Impact and Analysis Mitigation Measures.

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Persistent OSPF Attacks Gabi Nakibly , Alex Kirshon and Dima Gonikman , Dan Boneh

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  1. Persistent OSPF Attacks Gabi Nakibly, Alex Kirshon and DimaGonikman, Dan Boneh 19th Annual Network & Distributed System Security Conference (NDSS 2012)

  2. Outline • Introduction (OSPF v2) • OSPF Security Strengths • Attack • Impact and Analysis • Mitigation Measures

  3. Introduction (OSPF v2) • Most used protocol in Autonomous System • Link State Routing Protocol • LSA is flooded throughout the AS • Designated Router • Database Description (DBD) Messages

  4. Routingtable

  5. Adjacency set up

  6. Security Strengths • Per Link Authentication • Flooding • Fight Back • LSA Content

  7. Remote False Adjacency Attack • To fool a remote router • Persistent control over routing table • Denial of Service -Link overload -Routing loops -Delivery Failure • Eavesdropping

  8. Mechanism

  9. Consequences • Attack can be exploited to black hole traffic • Black-holing most AS traffic with single phantom router

  10. Real World ImpactList of AS topologies used

  11. Percentage of black-holed routers pairs when multiple phantom routers are used

  12. Mitigation Measures • Protocol Weakness • Same secret key • Master cannot see message content • Anti source-IP spoofing • Master must prove to slave that it has seen at least one message from slave

  13. THANKYOUANDANYQuestions?

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