THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT: WHAT?

1. THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT: WHAT?

2. READING • Smith, Democracy, ch. 12 • Cleary, “The Rise of the Left” (Course Reader #4) • Modern Latin America, ch. 8 (Venezuela)

3. FINAL EXAM • Friday, June 10 7-10 p.m. (sorry!) • Cumulative: entire quarter • Study Guide next week

4. THE PULSE OF POLITICAL CHANGE • The Nineties: • Elected governments • Washington Consensus, free trade, and FTAs with U.S. • Weak states • Illiberal regimes • Result: timid democracies • The New Century: • Popular disenchantment, especially over inequality • Rejection of Washington Consensus • Restoration of state role • Inclusive politics (in part) • Result: the new left (aka “pink tide”)

5. RECENT TRENDSIN LATIN AMERICA • Surge of leftist movements • Left = social justice, Right = individual freedom • Electoral victories, despite institutional obstacles • Result: democracy as a protective shield

6. 9/11, THE WAR ON TERROR, AND RULES OF THE GAME • Nations can respond however they choose—including the use of indiscriminate force. • Preventive action is appropriate and acceptable. • There is no need to adhere to international treaties or conventions. • Alliances are formed around one central issue—the anti-terror campaign. Democracy and human rights are secondary issues. • Spectator nations must tread cautiously.

8. THE PINK TIDE: ORIGINS • Economic—lack of growth (through 2003), poverty and inequality, frustration with Washington Consensus • Political—weakness of representative institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of corruption • International—war in Iraq, opposition to Bush policies and growing distaste for American society

9. THE PINK TIDE: MEMBERSHIP • Venezuela: Hugo Chávez (1998, 2004, 2006) • Brazil: Lula (2002, 2006), Dilma Rousseff (2010) • Argentina: Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández (2003, 2007) • Bolivia: Evo Morales (2005, 2009) • Nicaragua: Daniel Ortega (2006) • Ecuador: Rafael Correa (2006, 2010) • Paraguay: Fernando Lugo (2008) • El Salvador: Mauricio Funes (2009) • Uruguay: José Mújica (2009) Near-Misses: • Peru: Ollanta Humala (2006) • Mexico: Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2006)

10. CLARIFICATIONS #1 • Differentiation: right/center/left • Contending leaders in/for Latin America: • Mexico (Vicente Fox, Felipe Calderón?) • Brazil (Lula, Dilma Rousseff?) • Venezuela (Hugo Chávez)

11. CLARIFICATIONS #2 • Disenchanted masses in Latin America ≠ • Voters for pink tide candidates ≠ • Leftist candidates for office ≠ • Leftist winners of presidential elections ≠ • Pro-Chávez chief executives ≠ • Hugo Chávez • Notes: • Tidal swell is spontaneous, not organized • Rivalries and defections

12. THE PINK TIDE: GOALS • Domestic—winning power, rearranging electoral alignments; overturning status quo, possibly through institutional reform; changing policy direction • Hemispheric—gaining support throughout Latin America (invoking “Bolivarian dream”), reducing U.S. hegemony • Global—challenging international order, forging alliances with developing world and non-aligned nations

14. RISE OF HUGO CHÁVEZ • 1989: Caracazo • 1992: Failed military coup (amnesty 1994) • 1998: Wins presidential election • 1999: Installs new constitution • 2002: Survives attempted coup • 2004: Attains support in referendum • 2006: Wins second presidential term • 2007: Declines renewal of RCTV license • 2007: Constitutional referendum fails • 2008: Oil climbs to >$100 per barrel • 2008: Referendum succeeds

15. GWB AND LATIN AMERICA • Lack of high-level attention • Abandonment of negotiations with Mexico for immigration reform • Overriding concern with support for anti-terrorist campaign (not democracy) • Politicization of drug war • Awaiting Fidel’s demise • Opposition to Chávez and the Pink Tide

16. THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO • Uses language of the street (including the Arab street)—e.g., the “devil” speech • Sits atop petroleum (now >$100 per barrel) • Puts money where his mouth is • Breaks established rules of the game • Plays off resentment of Bush, U.S. power • Challenges Washington Consensus and FTAA • Goes for high stakes • Seeks rearrangement of prevailing world order

18. JORGE AND HUGO: THE ODD COUPLE George’s “gifts” to Hugo: • discourse on democracy (e.g., Second Inaugural) • caricature of “ugly American” • unpopularity of foreign policies • inattention to Latin America And Hugo’s reciprocation: • exaggerated rhetoric • potential threats to neighboring countries • authoritarian tendencies Q1: What does Hugo do without George? Q2: What about the price of oil?

19. CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS • The Cherished Assumption—freely elected leaders will support U.S. policy • The Western Hemisphere idea—the new world is distinct from old, will forge common front in international arena • Democracy rationale for “regime change”—free elections as protective shield • The hegemonic presumption—the United States can dictate political life in Latin America

20. VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA:GWB AND USA • Democratic—with tilt to right or center-right • Prosperous—with commitment to free-market policies and ties to United States • Unified—under U.S. leadership • Peaceful—in view of unanimity • Deferential—following U.S. lead in global arena

21. REALITY CHECK • Democracy = broad ideological spectrum, from “left” to “right” • Prosperity = mixed economies; rejection of Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA • Ideology = diversity rather than unity • Outlooks = anti-U.S. attitudes strong and growing among large share of population • Alliances = rejection of U.S. leadership and rules of the game