Pragmatism and the Ethical Grounds of Metaphysics

1. Pragmatism and the Ethical Grounds of Metaphysics Sami Pihlström Professor of Practical Philosophy University of Jyväskylä, Finland E-mail: sajopihl@cc.jyu.fi, sami.pihlstrom@helsinki.fi

2. Introduction • Pragmatism: between metaphysics and anti-metaphysics. • Pragmatists have been both metaphysicians (e.g., Peirce) and critics of traditional metaphysics. • Anti-metaphysical interpretations of classical and contemporary pragmatism: • Pragmatism as a mere precursor to logical positivism and verificationism? • Rorty’s neopragmatism: beyond traditional epistemology and metaphysics?

3. Metaphysics: Aristotelian vs. Kantian • The conception of pragmatism as essentially anti-metaphysical presupposes a traditional Aristotelian, metaphysically realistic conception of metaphysics as an inquiry into the world’s ”own” fundamental categorial structure (as seen from an imagined ”God’s-Eye View”). • An alternative conception of metaphysics (Kantian instead of Aristotelian): an inquiry into how we (necessarily) structure the world within our conceptual schemes, frameworks, practices, etc. – into our categories instead of the world’s ”own”. • Pragmatists can be sharply critical of metaphysical realism while maintaining the possibility of metaphysical inquiry in a (historicized, naturalized) Kantian sense.

4. Metaphysics and ethics • Traditionally, metaphysics and ethics are regarded as distinct philosophical sub-disciplines. • However, if we cannot separate the ”human contribution” (cf. James) from the way(s) the world (for us) is – that is, if we can engage in metaphysical inquiry only in a Kantian instead of an Aristotelian sense – the question arises whether our ”human reality” is inevitably value-laden, not just conceptually but morally and valuationally structured by us. • Pragmatism leads to an entanglement of metaphysics with ethics. (Cf. Putnam’s neopragmatism: the fact/value entanglement.)

5. Metaphysics and ethics (continued) • The criticism of metaphysical realism (in pragmatism and more generally, e.g., in Kant) naturally leads to the blurring of the boundary not only between metaphysics and epistemology but also between metaphysics and ethics: since the world is always interpreted in terms of our human categories, based on our practices, it is not ethically irrelevant how we ”structure” it, or which categories we employ. • Some metaphysical problems are more obviously ethically relevant than others (e.g., the metaphysics of the self, personal identity, etc., vs. the problems of universals and modalities), but in principle the core of every genuine metaphysical dispute is ”practical” – i.e., moral (James, Pragmatism, 1975 [1907], ch. 2).

6. Metaphysics and ethics (continued) • Modest (weak) hypothesis: metaphysics and ethics are (deeply, inextricably) entangled, assuming a Kantian-cum-pragmatist conception of metaphysics. • Radical (strong) hypothesis: metaphysics and ethics are (deeply, inextricably) entangled, assuming any conception of metaphysics (including even metaphysical realism). • Only the modest hypothesis is examined here. • It is crucial to understand ”entanglement” in a sufficiently deep sense: the claim is not the uncontroversial one that different metaphysical views may have different ethical implications but that metaphysics is impossible without ethics (and vice versa), i.e., that there can be no inquiry into the structure of reality in abstraction of moral values.

7. Historical examples • James on ”some metaphysical problems pragmatically considered” (Pragmatism, 1975 [1907], chs. 3-4). • Substance (material & spiritual)? • Materialism vs. theism (spiritualism)? • Design in nature? • Free will vs. determinism? • Monism vs. pluralism? • Peirce vs. James on realism, nominalism, and the reality of ”generals” – ethical (not just epistemological or metaphysical) relevance!

8. Contemporary examples • Putnam: against the fact/value dichotomy – the entanglement of facts and values. • What is the specific nature of this entanglement (and of the analogous entanglement of metaphysics and ethics)? • Metaphysical, epistemic, conceptual? (Timmons) • Transcendental? • These different entanglements may themselves be entangled in a pragmatist construal of the ”entanglement thesis”. • Pragmatists (early and late) on hope – a paradigmatic metaphysico-ethical concept. • Rorty’s deflationist vs. James’s more metaphysical (yet ethically grounded) treatment of hope.

9. Further reading • James, W. (1907/1975), Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. • Pihlström, S. (2005), Pragmatic Moral Realism, Amsterdam: Rodopi. • Pihlström, S. (2008), ”The Trail of the Human Serpent Is over Everything”: Jamesian Perspectives on Mind, World, and Religion, Lanham, MD: UP of America. • Peirce, C.S. (1992-98), The Essential Peirce 1-2, The Peirce Edition Project, Bloomington: Indiana UP. • Putnam, H. (1990), Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. • Putnam, H. (2002), The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. • Putnam, H. (2004), Ethics without Ontology, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. • Rorty, R. (1999), Philosophy and Social Hope, London: Penguin.