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The use of deception and emotions in bargaining

The use of deception and emotions in bargaining. Eric van Dijk Moscow, September 1-3, 2010. How to bargain. Self-interest vs. fairness. Deception. Power. Emotions. Findings that inspired these studies. The use of emotions in bargaining The use of deception in bargaining. 1. emotions.

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The use of deception and emotions in bargaining

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  1. The use of deception and emotions in bargaining Eric van Dijk Moscow, September 1-3, 2010

  2. How to bargain Self-interest vs. fairness Deception Power Emotions

  3. Findings that inspired these studies • The use of emotions in bargaining • The use of deception in bargaining

  4. 1. emotions

  5. “Reciprocal emotions” Interpersonal effects of emotions in bargaining (Van Kleef et al., 2004) Opponent’s emotions Own emotions

  6. low demands Interpersonal effects of emotions in bargaining Opponent’s emotions Own behavior Reason: High limits of the angry opponent

  7. 2. deception

  8. Allocator Makes an offer Rejects or Accepts Recipient Ultimatum bargaining (Güth’s game) As offered Both 0

  9. Main findings after many many studies • Willingness to make high offers • Importance of fairness • Equality

  10. 25-75 50-50 Why do they act fair?(Kagel, Kim, & Moser, 1996) 100 chips 30 cts for allocator, 10 cts for recipient Common knowledge Only the allocator knows

  11. Allocator Makes an offer Rejects or Accepts Recipient The Delta Game (Suleiman, 1996) As offered Offer * delta 0 < delta < 1

  12. Findings delta game • Offers go down as delta increases • (but see e.g. Handgraaf, van Dijk, Wilke, Vermunt, & De Dreu, JPSP, 2008)

  13. So now on the use of emotions and deception...

  14. Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest (2008, JPSP) So you’re angry? Well, let me tell you something...

  15. Experiment 1 • Ultimatum game • Participants all allocator (N = 106) • 100 chips: 10 cents to allocator; 5 cents to recipient Manipulations • Info: Symmetric vs asymmetric • Emotion recipient: Happy vs. Angry (based on prior info) • Main dependent measures • Exchange of info: 5 cts (lie) or 10 cts (honest)? • Offers

  16. Table 1. Deception in the Asymmetric Info condition ________________________________________________ Emotion recipient Angry Happy ________________________________________________ Deceive 17 9 Not Deceive 9 17 ________________________________________________

  17. Table 2. Offers ________________________________________________ Emotion recipient Angry Happy ________________________________________________ Symmetric 62.04 57.57 Asymmetric 49.9656.50 _______________________________________________

  18. Table 3. Perceived recipient’s limits (How many chips needed to accept?) (= after info exchange) ________________________________________________ Emotion recipient Angry Happy ________________________________________________ Symmetric 63.71 53.96 Asymmetric 49.7353.08 ________________________________________________

  19. Deception Lower limits Less fear of rejection Lower offers So when anger meets deception...

  20. Experiment 2: Power and the consequences of rejection (Van Dijk et al., 2008, JPSP) So you’re angry, and you may reject? Big deal!

  21. Experiment 2 • Delta game • Participants all allocator (N = 103) • 100 chips Manipulations • Delta: 0 vs. 0.9 • Emotion recipient: happy vs. angry

  22. Table 4. Offers ________________________________________________ Emotion recipient Angry Happy ________________________________________________ Delta = 0 47.52 47.67 Delta = 0.9 32.5645.21 ________________________________________________

  23. Table 5. How likely that recipient will accept? ________________________________________________ Emotion recipient Angry Happy ________________________________________________ Delta = 0 5.26 5.81 Delta = 0.9 3.485.38 ________________________________________________

  24. So when anger meets power... Low consequences of rejection Less fear for rejection (why care about limits) Lower offers

  25. Anger vs disappointment (I) So you’re (not angry but) disappointed? Lelieveld, van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef (in prep.)

  26. Anger versus disappointment • Communicating anger is a risky strategy: • Potential for high benefits; risk of backfiring • What about disappointment?

  27. Experiment 3 • Delta game • Participants all allocator (N = 101) • 100 chips Manipulations • Delta: 0 vs. 0.9 • Emotion recipient: angry vs. disappointed

  28. Table 6. Offers ________________________________________________ Emotion recipient Angry Disappointed ________________________________________________ Delta = 0 47.35 47.47 Delta = 0.9 33.3344.38 ________________________________________________

  29. Perceived limits recipient (How many chips needed to accept?) Only main effect of emotion Angry: M = 43.31 Disappointed: M = 36.42

  30. Table 7. trying to help ________________________________________________ Emotion recipient Angry Disappointed ________________________________________________ Delta = 0 3.24 3.24 Delta = 0.9 2.444.63 ________________________________________________

  31. Anger vs disappointment (II) So you’re disappointed? Well, who do your represent? Lelieveld, van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef (2010a)

  32. Anger versus disappointment • Disappointment may elicit guilt • And to some extent weakness • So what if we are group representatives?

  33. Experiment 4 • Ultimatum game • Participants all allocator (N = 78) • 100 chips; 10 cents for allocator; 5 cents for recipient Manipulations • Representative: Representatives vs Individuals • Emotion recipient: Angry vs. Disappointed

  34. Table 6. Offers ________________________________________________ Emotion recipient Angry Disappointed ________________________________________________ Individuals 54.58 58.20 Representatives 55.8450.90 ________________________________________________

  35. Table 7. Guilt ________________________________________________ Emotion recipient Angry Disappointed ________________________________________________ Individuals 2.74 5.15 Representatives 2.633.00 ________________________________________________

  36. Table 8. Perceived weakness ________________________________________________ Emotion recipient Angry Disappointed ________________________________________________ Individuals 2.84 4.95 Representatives 3.264.80 ________________________________________________ = only main effect Emotion recipient

  37. Anger vs disappointment (III):lying about your emotions... I am ehhh… Van Dijk & Van Beest (2010, in prep.)

  38. Experiment 5 • Ultimatum game • Participants all recipient (N = 87) • 100 chips • All are offered a (tentative) 80-20 split

  39. Experiment 5 Dependent measures • How angry/disappointed are you? (0-100) _____________________________________

  40. Experiment 5 Dependent measures • How angry/disappointed are you? (0-100) _____________________________________

  41. Table 9. How angry/disappointed? ___________________________________________________ “real” communicated ____________________________________________________ Anger 39.72 37.61 Disappointment 59.6274.00 ________________________________________________

  42. Experiment 6:So what about power? • Lambda game • Participants all recipient (N = 87) • 100 chips • All are offered a (tentative) 80-20 split Manipulation • Lambda: 0.1 vs. 0.9

  43. Table 10. How angry? ___________________________________________________ “real anger” communicated anger ____________________________________________________ Lambda = 0.9 45.10 39.08 (weak position) Lambda = 0.1 51.9056.57 (strong position) ________________________________________________

  44. Table 11. How disappointed? ___________________________________________________ “real anger” communicated anger ____________________________________________________ Lambda = 0.9 56.20 69.25 (weak position) Lambda = 0.1 59.6568.40 (strong position) ________________________________________________

  45. General conclusions Self-interest vs. fairness Deception Power Emotions

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