Moral Theory Meets Cognitive Science How the Cognitive Sciences Can Transform Traditional Debates

1. Jean Nicod Lectures 2007 Moral Theory Meets Cognitive ScienceHow the Cognitive Sciences Can Transform Traditional Debates Stephen Stich Dept. of Philosophy & Center for Cognitive Science Rutgers University

2. Prologue • In recent years a number of researchers have urged that we can use the methods of cognitive science to make progress in traditional debates in moral theory • In these Lectures, I propose to support this contention by offering four case studies illustrating how traditional debates can indeed be advanced – and often transformed – by theories and findings in the cognitive sciences

3. Prologue • One of the many ways in which this work differs from traditional work in moral theory is that it is resolutely collaborative • So before I begin let me acknowledge some of the friends and colleagues who have contributed in important ways to these Lectures

4. John Doris Josh Greene Dan Kelly Joshua Knobe Edouard Machery Jesse Prinz Shaun Nichols Chandra Sripada Prologue

5. Jean Nicod Lectures 2007 Lecture 1 The Definition of Morality

6. Philosophical Background • In the first sentence of an article called “What Morality Is Not,” first published in 1957, Alasdair MacIntyre wrote: “The central task to which contemporary moral philo-sophers have addressed themselves is that of listing the distinctive characteristics of moral utterances.”

7. Philosophical Background • In 1970, MacIntyre’s article was reprinted in an anthology called The Definition of Moralitywhich also reprinted a dozen other papers by such leading figures as • Elizabeth Anscombe • Kurt Baier • Philippa Foot • William Frankena • Peter Strawson all of which, in one way or another, tackled the question of how ‘morality’ is best defined

8. Philosophical Background • As one might expect from this distinguished list of authors, many of the arguments to be found in this book are careful and sophisticated • And as one might expect in just about any group of 13 philosophers,... no consensus was reached

9. Philosophical Background • In addition to debate about how the notions of moral utterance, moral rule and moral norm are to be defined, many of the contributors to the volume also discuss a cluster of meta-philosophical questions: • What is a definition of morality supposed todo? • What counts as getting the definitionright? • And here again, there was no consensus reached

10. Philosophical Background • In 1978 the debate was still going strong • In that year the philosopher Paul Taylor published a long paper in Midwest Studies in Philosophy • Taylor’s goal was to elaborate and defend an account of what it is for a norm to be a moral norm for a group of people

11. Philosophical Background • For our purposes, Taylor’s article is particularly useful because it includes a helpful taxonomy of various positions one might take on the meta-philosophical issue • Whatare philosophers trying to do, Taylor asks, when they offer a definition of ‘morality’ or ‘moral rule’? • Here are some of the options he distinguishes

12. Philosophical Background 1. Linguistic analysis: Capture how the word ‘moral’ (or the phrase ‘moral rule’) is used by English speakers (or by some particular group of English speakers) 2. Conceptual analysis: Make explicit the concept of morality held by “(most?)” people in our society

13. Philosophical Background 3.Specify the essence of morality • Those who pursue this project believe that moral rules or norms constituteanatural kind all of whose members share some essential property (or most of some cluster of properties) • The goal of the project is to discover what the essential properties are • Taylor insists that this is a fool’s project, since he believes that “morality has no essence”

14. Philosophical Background • The Debate Continues • Philosophical discussion of the definition of morality did not, of course, come to an end with Taylor’s paper • In 2005, Bernard Gert published a long, feisty article on “The Definition of Morality” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy • In his challenging & important book, The Evolution of Morality(2006), Richard Joyce rightly takes the project of defining “moral judgment” to be of central importance for anyone who wants to ask whether and how the capacity to make moral judgments evolved – and devotes a long chapter to developing a definition

15. Philosophical Background • Enter Psychology • While the philosophical debate was raging, a group of developmental psychologists who had read and been influenced by some of the philosophical literature began developing defending their own definition of morality • On one reading, what these psychologists were claiming is that Taylor was wrong • Morality IS a natural kind • And they had determined what the essential properties of moral rules are

16. Philosophical Background • For about two decades, this psychological research tradition was all but unknown to philosophers • But in the last few years it has become increasingly well known and increasingly influential in the work of philosophers and psychologists, including

17. From Philosophy to Psychology: The Turiel Project • Turiel’s Definitions • The central figure in this research tradition is Elliot Turiel • In the mid-1970s he proposed a definition of “moral rule” • He also proposed adefinition of “conventional rule”– another notion on which philosophers, like David Lewis, had recently lavished a fair amount of attention

18. From Philosophy to Psychology: The Turiel Project • Turiel did not defend his definitions using abstractphilosophical arguments • Nor did he make claims abouthow the words ‘moral’ and ‘conventional’ are used • Rather, he used his definitions todesign psychological experiments • And those experiments produced some veryextraordinary results

19. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • The core ideas in the definitions that Turiel & his followers have offered are as follows: • Moral rules are held to have an objective, prescriptive force; they are not dependent on the authority of any individual or institution • Moral rules are taken to hold generally, not just locally; they not only proscribe behavior here and now, they also proscribe behavior in other countries and at other times in history • Violations of moral rules involve a victim who has been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been victim of an injustice • Violations of moral rules are typically more serious than violations of conventional rules

20. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • The core features in the definition of conventional rules are these: • Conventional rules are taken to be arbitrary or situation-dependent; they do not have an objective, prescriptive force, and they can be suspended or changed by an appropriate authoritative individual or institution • Conventional rules are often geographically & temporally local; those applicable in one community often will not apply in other communities or at other times in history • Violations of conventional rules do not involve a victim who has been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been victim of an injustice. • Violations of conventional rules are typically less serious than violations of moral rule

21. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • Guided by these definitions, Turiel and his associates developed an experimental paradigm that has become known as “the moral / conventional task” • In the m/c task, participants are presented with examples of transgressions of prototypical moral rules & prototypical conventional rules, and are asked series of probe questions designed to determine

22. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition 1) Whether the participants consider the transgressive action to be wrong, and if so, how serious it is 2) Whether the participants think that the wrongness of the transgression is “authority dependent” • For example, a participant who has said that a specific rule-violating act is wrong might be asked: “What if the teacher said there is no rule in this school about [that sort of rule violating act], would it be right to do it then?

23. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition 3) Whether the participants think the rule is general in scope; is it applicable to everyone, everywhere, or just to a limited range of people, in a restricted set of circumstances? 4) How the participants would justify the rule • do they invoke harm, justice, or rights, or do they invoke other factors? • participants’ answers to these probe questions are often called “criterion judgments”

24. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • Early results suggested that the categories of moral and conventional rules, as defined by Turiel, are indeed psychologically significant

25. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • When asked about prototypical moral transgressions like • one child hitting another • one child pushing another child off a swing and prototypical conventional transgressions like • a child talking in class when she has not been called on by the teacher • a boy wearing a dress to school participants’ responses differed systematically, and in just the way suggested by the Turiel’s definitions

26. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • Transgressions of prototypical moral rules (almost always involving a victim who has clearly been harmed) were judged to be • wrong and to be more serious than transgressions of prototypical conventional rules • the wrongness of the transgression was judged not“authority dependent” • the violated rule was judged to be general in scope • judgments were justified by appeal toharm

27. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • Transgressions of prototypicalconventional rules were judged to be: • wrong but usually less serious • the rules were judged to be authority dependent • & not general in scope • judgments were not justified by appeal to harm

28. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • During the last 30 years this pattern of results has been found in an impressively diverse range of participants

29. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • participants of different ages • young children -- 3½ years, perhaps earlier • grade school children • high school students • university students • adults

30. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • participants of different nationalities & cultures, including • Chinese preschoolers • Korean children • Ijo children in Nigeria • Urban & kibbutz children in Israel • Virgin Islanders -- children, teen-agers & adults • Children in India • Brazilian adults

31. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition

32. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • participants of different religions, including • Roman Catholic high school & university students • Amish & Mennonite children & teenagers • Dutch Reformed children & teenagers • Conservative Jewish children & teenagers

33. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • What conclusions have been drawn from these results? • The answer is not straightforward, since Turiel & his followers are heavily influenced by the work of Piaget & Kohlberg, and are partial to the obscure terminology and philosophically tendentious concepts that prevail in that intellectual tradition

34. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • Rather than getting bogged down in textual exegesis, I’ll offer some conclusions which • are plausible to draw from these findings • philosophers who are impressed by the m/c task results apparently accept

35. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • (C1) The first set of conclusions generalize the results • I.e. they maintain that the results are specific instances of more general patterns • (C2)The second conclusion maintains that these generalizations support an important claim about the nature (or definition) of morality

36. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • (C1) The first set of conclusions generalize the results • I.e. they maintain that the results are specific instances of more general patterns • (C2)The second conclusion maintains that the generalizations support conclusions about the nature (or definition) of morality

37. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • (C1-i)The Clustering of “Criterion Judgments”: In m/c task experiments participants will typically exhibit one of two signature response patterns • The signature moral pattern: Rules are judged to be • authority independent • general in scope • violations are wrong and typically judged to be serious • judgments are justified by appeal to harm, justice and rights

38. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • The signature conventional pattern: Rules are judged to be • authority dependent • and not general in scope • violations are wrong but usually less serious • and judgments are not justified by appeal to harm, justice, or rights

39. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • These signature response patterns are “nomological clusters” or “homeostatic clusters” – there is a strong (“lawlike”) tendency for the members of the cluster to occur together

40. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • (C1-ii) Response Patterns and Transgression Types: Not only will criterion judgments cluster into two distinct response patterns, but each pattern is reliably evoked by a certain type of transgression • (C1-ii)(a) transgressions involving harm, justice, or rights (HJR) evoke the signature moral pattern • (C1-ii)(b) transgressions that do notinvolve harm, justice, or rights evoke the signature conventional pattern

41. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • (C1-iii) Universality: • The regularities described in (C-1) and (C-2) are pan-cultural, and they emerge quite early in development

42. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • The first set of conclusions generalize the results • I.e. they maintain that the results are specific instances of more general patterns • (C2)The second conclusion maintains that the generalizations support conclusions about the nature (or definition) of morality

43. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • (C2)Moral Rules and Conventional Rules are Natural Kinds • The essential properties of the kind are those specified in Turiel’s definitions • Moral rules • have objective, prescriptive force; they are not authority dependent* • hold generally, not just locally* • violations of moral rules involve a victim who has been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been participant to an injustice • violations of moral rules are typically more serious than violations of conventional rules

44. Metaphysical Footnote: • It might be better to say that moral rules are judged to have objective prescriptive force, be authority dependent, etc. (or judged to have them under ideal circumstances. • (Researchers in the Piaget-Kohlberg-Turiel tradition are not careful about metaphysical distinctions that loom large in philosophy.) An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • (C2)Moral Rules and Conventional Rules are Natural Kinds • The essential properties of the kind are those specified in Turiel’s definitions • Moral rules • have objective, prescriptive force; they are not authority dependent* • hold generally, not just locally* • violations of moral rules involve a victim who has been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been participant to an injustice • violations of moral rules are typically more serious than violations of conventional rules

45. Fine Tuning Footnote: • It might be better to say that only these three features are essential properties of moral rules • and to treat the fourth point as a nomological generalization which specifies a lawlike connection between moral rules and types of transgressions. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • (C2)Moral Rules and Conventional Rules are Natural Kinds • The essential properties of the kind are those specified in Turiel’s definitions • Moral rules • have objective, prescriptive force; they are not authority dependent* • hold generally, not just locally* • violations of moral rules involve a victim who has been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been participant to an injustice • violations of moral rules are typically more serious than violations of conventional rules

46. Fine Tuning Footnote: • It might be better to say that only these three features are essential properties of moral rules • and to treat the fourth point as a nomological generalization which specifies a lawlike connection between moral rules and types of transgressions. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • (C2)Moral Rules and Conventional Rules are Natural Kinds • The essential properties of the kind are those specified in Turiel’s definitions • Moral rules • have objective, prescriptive force; they are not authority dependent* • hold generally, not just locally* • violations of moral rules involve a victim who has been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been participant to an injustice • violations of moral rules are typically more serious than violations of conventional rules

47. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • The conclusion that Moral Rules are a Natural Kind plausibly follows from the facts that • They are a class of rules which exhibit a homeostatic cluster of properties • There is an important nomological generalization about members of the class • Viz. all members of the class involve harm (or rights or justice)

48. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • An entirely parallel argument leads to the conclusion that Conventional Rules are a Natural Kind

49. An Overview of Research in the M/C Tradition • It is not surprising that work in the M/C tradition has had a profound influence on many naturalistic-ally inclined philosophers and also on many psychologists not trained in the Paiget-Kohlberg-Turiel tradition • The conclusion that Moral Rules and Conventional Rules are Natural Kinds is profoundly important • But, alas It just ain’t true!

50. The Theories Confront the Data • Despite the wealth of evidence gathered by researchers in the M/C tradition, not everyone has been convinced of (C1) – the conclusions that generalize the results of M/C task experiments • Dissenters have focused on (C1-ii)(b)