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Perspectives and Recommendations for the Natural Gas Industry

Perspectives and Recommendations for the Natural Gas Industry. John B. Vorderbrueggen, PE Chief, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations WRGC August 19, 2014. A Short Quiz. The NTSB “10 Most Wanted List” is Candidates for the next NTSB Chairman Best restaurants in DC

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Perspectives and Recommendations for the Natural Gas Industry

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  1. Perspectives and Recommendations for the Natural Gas Industry • John B. Vorderbrueggen, PE • Chief, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations • WRGC August 19, 2014

  2. A Short Quiz The NTSB “10 Most Wanted List” is • Candidates for the next NTSB Chairman • Best restaurants in DC • Board Advocacy Priorities

  3. A Short Quiz The NTSB 2014 budget is • $55 Million • $87.5 Million • $103 Million • $137 Million

  4. A Short Quiz The PHMSA 2014 budget is • $45 Million • $118.6 Million • $210 Million • $260.5 Million Hazmat Division Pipeline Division 2014 budget Administration’s 2015 proposal

  5. The NTSB Board MembersAugust 2014 Hon. Christopher A. Hart Acting Chairman Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt Hon. Mark R. Rosekind Hon. Earl F. Weener

  6. Natural Gas Pipeline Accidents Cleburne, Texas Sissonville, West Virginia Birmingham, Alabama Manhattan, New York

  7. Enterprise Products Operating, LtdNatural Gas Transmission Pipeline Rupture and Fire Cleburne, TexasJune 7, 2010

  8. Accident Summary • 36-inch diameter carbon steel • 1050 psig MAOP • 950 psig Operating pressure • 3rd Party damage • 1 Fatality • 6 Injuries

  9. Improper pipeline locate work • Two parallel pipelines – 30 feet apart • November 2009 locate tickets for electric utility design phase • Energy Transfer pipeline marked • Enterprise pipeline not marked • Only one pipeline on survey map

  10. Improper pipeline locate work • June 2010 locate tickets for construction • Energy Transfer pipeline marked • Enterprise pipeline not marked on three attempts to find the construction site • Ticket closed – “all clear”

  11. Improper pipeline locate work • Second ticket issued three days later • Locator and contractor presumed it was a duplicate of first • Ticket closed – “all clear” Locator never surveyed the right-of-way on four visits

  12. Improper pipeline locate work Accident date • Marked Energy Transfer pipeline • Mowed right-of-way • Contractor moved dig marker to increase distance from the marked pipeline…

  13. Improper pipeline locate work DIRECTLY ABOVE THE UNMARKED ENTERPRISE PIPELINE

  14. The NTSB Probable Cause • Contractor power auger punctured the unmarked buried pipeline • Contributing factors • No permanent pipeline markers • Pipeline locator did not mark pipeline before excavation work

  15. Closeout Actions • Enterprise Products Ltd. improved the locate ticket procedure and technician training • Final Accident Brief issued September 9, 2013 • No recommendations issued

  16. Columbia Gas TransmissionPipeline RuptureSissonville, West VirginiaDecember 11, 2012 12:41 pm

  17. Accident Summary • 20-inch diameter carbon steel, 0.281 inch wall thickness • 1,000 psig MAOP • 929 psig Operating pressure • Installed 1967 • “Not piggable”

  18. Pipeline Integrity Management • Three parallel, interconnected lines • 30-inch diameter in HCA • 26-inch diameter in HCA • 20-inch diameter (not in HCA) • Interstate highway does not count

  19. The NTSB Probable Cause • External corrosion of the pipe wall • deteriorated coating • ineffective cathodic protection • Corrosion not detected • Not inspected or tested since 1988

  20. Contributing Cause • Rocky backfill degraded corrosion protection • Shutdown delay • SCADA alarms and alerts configuration delayed controller response • No automatic shutoff or remote control valves

  21. Key Findings • Automatic SCADA trend data alerts would improve recognition of system problems • Line would have required integrity management had highway proximity to pipeline been included in HCA decisions

  22. NTSB Recommendations • Columbia Gas Transmission • Implement a process for determining alarm and alert setpoints and response actions • Provide system trend data and assign alarm function to critical trend variations

  23. NTSB Recommendations • PHMSA • Add principal arterial roadways such as interstate highways to “identified sites” for HCA determination

  24. Columbia Gas Corrective Actions • Conducted inline inspections on the non-HCA 20-inch pipeline • Performed close interval survey • Reassessed the pipeline coating using AC and DC voltage gradient testing • SCADA instrument upgrades on looped systems

  25. Ongoing InvestigationsBirmingham, Alabama Manhattan, New York

  26. Birmingham, Alabama • Alagasco • December 17, 2013 2:30 am • Cast iron distribution line (1951) • 25 psig MAOP • 19 psig operating • 1 Fatality • 4 injuries

  27. Manhattan, New York (Harlem) • Consolidated Edison • March 12, 2014 9:30 am • 8-inch cast iron/plastic distribution line (1890 / 2011) • 8 in wc MAOP, 6 in wc operating • 8 Fatalities • 48 injuries

  28. Test Your Alertness - Just Before Lunch! My closing comment on the NTSB annual budget quiz was: It is Not Enough!

  29. John B. Vorderbrueggen, PE Chief, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations 202-314-6467 John.vorderbrueggen@ntsb.gov

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