1 / 14

Monitoring of Radiologically Contaminated Scrap Metal Czech experience

This presentation discusses the Czech Republic's experience in monitoring radiologically contaminated scrap metal, including their regulatory infrastructure, monitoring methods, response procedures, and reporting of incidents. The challenges of radioactive source identification and handling are also highlighted.

pfeifer
Download Presentation

Monitoring of Radiologically Contaminated Scrap Metal Czech experience

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Monitoring of Radiologically Contaminated Scrap Metal Czech experience Milan Hort State Office for Nuclear Safety Czech republic UNECE Group of Experts on Monitoring of Radiologically Contaminated Scrap Metal Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  2. Regulatory infrastructure State Office for Nuclear Safety (SÚJB) The authority and responsibilities of the SÚJB include state supervision of : • nuclear safety • nuclear items, physical protection of nuclear facilities • radiation protection and emergency preparedness of nuclear facilities and workplaces handling ionizing radiation sources Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  3. Regulatory infrastructure (2) • Act No.18/1997 (Atomic Act), revised by Act No. 13/2002 and implementing decrees: • No. 307/2002 on radiation protection • No. 146/1997 on special professional competency • No. 317/2002 on type approval and transport • No. 319/2002 on radiation monitoring network • www.sujb.cz Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  4. Regulatory infrastructure (3) Czech legislation • based on ICRP, IAEA recommendations • fully harmonized with relevant EU legislation and IAEA standards (TS -R-1, ...) • implements all relevant international agreements Czech Republic participates in IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database Programme SÚJB represents the governmental “Point of Contact” Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  5. Regulatory infrastructure (4) • Legal system of authorization, notification, registration, licensing of practices and sources • Legal system of supervision, inspections, enforcement • National system of accounting for nuclear materials, national register of radiation sources • National register of licensees and registrants Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  6. Monitoring (1) Customs • on border crossing:portal monitors, hand held instruments, rad. pagers, electronic personal dosimeters • in territory: “mobile groups” in each of local directorates (8) hand held instruments, spectrometers Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  7. Monitoring (2) • Metal processing facilities: portal monitors, hand held instruments,final product measurement - spectrometers • Communal waste processors: portal monitors (2 incinerators, 1 waste dump) Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  8. Monitoring (3) Role of SÚJB: • Methodological support • Support in training of Customs staff • Supervision in detection and following processes, especially in more complicated cases • Unusual events database • Decision process Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  9. Response • Procedure for radioactive material seizure - Recommendation issued by SÚJB • Co-operation with the Czech Police, Fire Brigades, Customs Service • Licensed organizations participate on the detection and analyses of captured materials • Seized material disposed or safely stored • Disposal via licensed organizations on state repositories Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  10. Alarm y False alarm? Release the vehicle n Set the vehicle away and perform detailed measurement n y n Significant maximum ? Response scheme (1) Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  11. Response scheme (2) y n Significant maximum? Non-metal NORM, small bg increase? Legal RM transport complies the rules? n n Intern the vehicle y Set protecting zone y Record the event Release the vehicle Release the vehicle Notify immediately SÚJB, Police Record the event Record the event Inform SÚJB in monthly report Inform SÚJB in monthly report Follow the SÚJB instructions Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  12. Reporting (1) • 2003: 86 seizures: 3 – border crossing 37 – steelworks 46 – incinerators and waste dumps • Border crossing with portal monitor:60 - 280 events monthlyonly 3 seizures: 1 metal part contaminated with Co-60 2 NORM • 1 missing source reported (Cs-137) Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  13. Reporting (2) - steelworks / waste processors • 1 / 1 radionuclide sources (Cs-137) • 7 / 0 metal parts contaminated with Co-60 • 18 / 1 metal parts (tubes with NORM) • 3 / 18 small metal parts with natural radionuclides (watch, compass, ...) • 0 / 9 NORM, chemical agents (Ra-226), raw materials • 0 / 14 hygienic material from medical treatment • 8 / - returned without investigation • 0 / 3 false alarms, driver after medical treatment Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

  14. Experience • Threat of financial loses push steelworks to monitor scrap metal and their production. • Secondary, it causes pressure to scrap metal collectors to monitor scrap metal. • Not enough licensed person for performing the radioactive material (source) localisation, unloading, separation from the load, identification and analysis • Problem of radioactive source from military and defence programs Group of experts, Geneva, 5-7 April 2004

More Related