No population-related policy please; we’re British.

2. No population-related policy please; we’re British. ‘Population-related’ could embrace most government policy. Modern governments spend about 50% of GDP –affects rationality of union formation, reproduction, death rate and migration incentives. Many (most?) effects of policy are unintended. Some examples of policies not intended to affect population. Free state education Free medical care Subsidised / free housing Welfare incentives for lone parents. Anti-poverty welfare programmes. Foreign policy – e.g. support for EU expansion (migration) So can be difficult to decide which policies are ‘population-related’. Certainly no ‘pronatalist’ policy in UK.

3. Population ageing Older population structures here to stay – an irrevocable, feature of demographically mature society. A consequence of the demographic transition caused by beneficial reductions in death and birth rates. A sustainable youthful population would require a return to high birth and death rates: back to the risk environment of the 18th century and earlier times. Population age-structures will eventually stabilize, given constant vital rates (i.e. ageing does not get worse and worse). However longer life does mean even older populations, but changes meaning of ‘old age’. Given reasonable fertility levels, non-demographic responses should protect the economy and welfare

4. Earlier history of official policy in UK relating to fertility and population size (a very short story) National Birth-Rate Commission report 1916 (semi-official) – response to fall in birth rate after 1880s. Royal Commission on Population 1944 – 1949 Cmd 7695 (low 1930s birth rate and fear of decline) Select Committee on Science and Technology 1971 (overpopulation following 1960s baby boom) Overseas Settlement Department 1925 Cmd 4689 1934 and Overseas Migration Board 1936, 1953 – (promoting emigration). Immigration Acts 1905, 1919, 1962, 1971 and 2010 etc restricting immigration. Immigration measures 1997 – 2009 facilitating immigration (an innovation with lasting consequences).

5. Population-related problems in the UK Fertility and ageing Total fertility 1.95 – no action required or contemplated. Teenage fertility too high – 1998 policy to reduce by 50%. FP, hostels, Births to immigrant parents – now 30% of total. No policy. Population ageing - a concern, but less severe than in many countries. Health Overall mortality and under-five mortality ‘too high’. Obesity and Type-2 diabetes (a special UK problem) Excessive alcohol consumption, liver disease Poor cancer survival rates (especially breast cancer) Old-age disability (common to all developed counties) Immigration / population Reduce net immigration ‘from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands’ as of 2010. Election promise –strong popular support. Population growth and population density ‘70 million limit’ a focal point but no specific target. Some popular concern about ‘ethnic replacement’ but no (direct) policy.

6. Fertility rates – the basic driver of population ageing and its international divergence.

7. TFR trends France, United Kingdom 1945 – 2010. an incomprehensible similarity?

8. Total fertility trends 1945 - 2010: Czech Republic. France, Poland, UK. Source: Eurostat

9. Population ageing – an inevitable consequence of demographic transition but less severe in UK than in many others.

10. The British teenage underclassAlfie Patten, father at 13. Samantha aged 15 and Daniel age 16, parent of twins.

11. Age-specific fertility rate, ages 15-19, in France, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, UK and EU27, 1960 – 2010. Source: Eurostat

12. Teenage Pregnancy and Parenthood Strategy and Action Plan 2002-7 Reduce birth-rate to teenage mothers by 20% by 2007. Reduce birth-rate of teenage mothers under 17 by 40% 75% of teenagers should not have had sexual intercourse by age 16 100% teenage mothers complete formal education 50% teenage mothers in post-16 education.

13. The development of UK ‘family policy’ No coherent explicit family policy even today. Term little used. (no explicit co-ordinated public programme with clear ‘family’ aims, despite ‘Minister for the Family’ in 1994, ‘Minister of State for Children’ 2003). Balancing work and family a private matter. Objectives of social policy affect family but not directed at it. Aimed at vulnerable, alleviation of poverty. Originally based on ‘breadwinner’ model of family and welfare state, entitlement to welfare and security, employment central. A ‘liberal welfare regime’ Policy responds to changes in family patterns: one-parent families, more welfare (and v-v?) Policies against ‘dependency culture’ created by welfare: Child Support Agency 1993 making absent fathers responsible. ‘obligations more than rights’ Treasury function. Implicit family policy from ‘New Labour’ 1997. Employment for all including single mothers. Work/family balance : more childcare services, childcare leave, right to request flexible work time. Redress paid / unpaid work balance. Target (1999) to abolish child poverty by 2020. Home Office Family Policy Unit 1999, now DES sure Start etc., Baby Bonds, Education Maintenance Allowances. Early Years Education, parental leave and flexible working. 12 months paid maternity leave 2010 Child Tax credit designed to promote employment and reduce poverty New Tory policy post 2010

14. Have recent family policy measures affected the birth rate?(Brewer, Ratcliffe and Smith 2007) Post-1999 policies focused on benefits for poor families. Working Families Tax Credit (wage supplement for poor). Means-tested Income Support for workless households with children. 50% increase in expenditure on children 1999-2003, unprecedented in 30 years. increased net income of bottom quintile 10-12% 10% increased probability of birth among couples (especially first births). Increased employment of lone mothers, fertility effect unclear but may have depressed it (opportunity cost). No ‘pro-natalist’ intention.

15. Male expectation of life at birth, selected European countries, 1945- 2010.Source: Eurostat, Council of Europe, national statistical offices.

16. Obesity rates in UK and selected European countries, and projection to 2050.Sources OECD. Foresight Tackling Obesity Future Choices Future forecast of the proportion of adults and children overweight and obese, UK to 2050.

17. Recent UK migration situation Uneasy consensus on restriction since 1960s broken in 1997. Public dislike of large inflows contributed to Labour election defeat in 2010. Labour government policy 1997-2010: easier entry for labour and non-labour migration, family, students. New government 2010 promised to reduce net inflow to ‘tens of thousands’. Net inflow 2009 198,000; foreign +242k net, UK -44k. Net inflow since late 1990s historically high. Most net immigration not work related. Consequent inflow of 3 million immigrants since 1997; 2 million additional immigrant population. Fastest population growth since 1962. 16 million additional population projected up to 2051.

18. Claims made in favour of more immigration Demographic benefits - workforce, ageing. ‘Essential for economic growth’. Entrepreneurial benefits. Fiscal benefits. Fill skills shortages, keeps NHS going, IT needs. Perform ‘dirty jobs’. ‘London / UK / NHS would collapse without them’. Cultural, social benefits of ‘diversity’. All with no damage to ‘native’ interests. And England always a ‘country of immigration’.

19. Three related demographic problems behind argument for more immigrants. End of growth of population, possible decline. End of growth and possible decline in labour force and of young labour force entrants; failure of economic growth. Population ageing leads to crises in pensions and old-age care. Made salient by UN Report of 2000 on ‘Replacement migration’.

20. UK net immigration trends 1962 – 2010 (thousands)

21. more

22. UK net immigration by citizenship 1967 – 2010.

23. Projection of UK population, 2011 – 2061. Sources: ONS and OXPOP.

24. Polish-born population UK 2001-2010 (thousands). Source: ONS Annual Population Survey.

25. Projection of UK population 2006 – 2056, three major ethnic categories. Assumptions: overall population total, net immigration and mortality trends as in ONS 2008-based Principal Projection

26. Obstacles to achieving aim of reducing net immigration to the UK Hostility of Liberal Democrat coalition partners to basic policy of reduction of immigration. Hostility of Liberal Democrat partners to reform of Human Rights legislation, EU arrangements. Incompatibility with other strands of government policy: cutting expenditure on police and border controls, enthusiasm for EU membership of Balkan countries, Turkey, increase in foreign aid. EU immigration (Eastern Europe) cannot be stopped. Economic dependency and distortion from 13 years of high immigration. Opposition from business interests – ‘risking the recovery’. Opposition from universities made dependent upon non-EU students. Strength of well-funded immigrant pressure groups. Electoral pressure from immigrants, including non-UK citizens. Likely long-term increase of asylum claims, forced climate migration. Instability of ‘net’ migration (little control over emigration element).

27. New policies to reduce immigration Restriction on labour migration - temporary quota, raising of points requirements, abolition of unskilled non-EU labour migration Raising minimum age of spouses to 21 Enhanced English-language requirement More rigorous checking of colleges taking overseas students, and tight visa requirements Enforcement of evidence of entitlement to work in UK (No effect on EU migration)

28. Current explicit population-related policies Reduction of teenage childbearing by 50% by 2010 (only fertility target ever proposed - 1998) Reduction of net immigration from ‘hundreds of thousands’ to ‘tens of thousands’ 2010 Population distribution (?) NO POLICY on overall birth-rate

29. England and Wales 1990 – 2009, percent of births to immigrant parents. Source: ONS.

30. Social Justice Strategy White Paper ‘Social Justice: Transforming Lives’ (CM 8314). 13 March 2012 The government says it wants to see "more stable families - an increase in the number of families staying together, and conversely a reduction in divorce and separation rates, especially where children are involved". • 28% of children in lone-parent families live in relative poverty, compared with 17% for those for "couple families". • It adds: "The government believes that investing in support to stabilise vulnerable families is the best starting point for tackling disadvantage and poverty. • "It has cloaked neglect of the family under the veil of neutrality, failing to invest in the prevention of breakdown and introducing rules and institutions - such as the couple penalty in the tax credit system - that made it more worthwhile for couples to live apart than to stay together. • research consistently shows that, wherever possible, it is better for children to be raised within the context of a loving family with two parents who are married to one another." Mark molden I.D. Smith: Work and Pensions Secretary

31. Results of policy? Overall fertility –increased through immigration and welfare changes and ‘recuperation’ Teenage fertility only slight reduction, Young People’s Development Programme no results Obesity – contradictory evidence 3 programmes aimed at diet and exercise in children, increase in knowledge and activity, no change in overweight prevalence.(WHO 2007). School Food, Child Measurement, Healthy Towns, Food labelling and diet change. recent flat-lining in prevalence in adults and children. Immigration – net immigration substantially increased

32. An example: Potential Support Ratio (a measure of population ageing), UK 1980-2100 GAD Principal Projection 1998-based. Population Trends 103

33. How to restore UK PSR to about 4 by 2056 (i) TFR of 5.5

34. How to restore UK PSR to 4 by 2056. (ii) increase net annual immigration to 800,000.

35. UK 2056. Projected population according to age, sex and minority status. Assumptions: overall fertility, net migration and mortality as for ONS 2008 Principal Projection. Ethnic distribution of TFR and immigration according to Coleman (2010).

36. Managing population ageing – non-demographic approaches. Improve the actual support ratio. (a) increase the average age of retirement increase pension entitlement age remove tax and other disincentives for working pensioners end of ‘cliff-edge’ retirement. (b) increase workforce participation retraining unemployed, discouraging early retirement and perpetual students, more flexible labour market arrangements family policy to help women to combine work with childcare Moderate the financial burden improvements to pension systems. Increase labour productivity

37. Keeping retirement in line with longer life. The effect of expanding nominal working age limits from ages 20-64 to ages 20-69: potential support ratios in 2060 by comparison with potential support ratios in 2010.Source: calculated from UN 2010.

38. Effects on UK PSR of higher retirement ages Shaw 2001, Population Trends 103