Assessment of the MX 2013 S&T Review

1. Assessment of the MX 2013 S&T Review Prof. Kathryn Nixdorff Department ofMicrobiologyandGenetics Darmstadt University of Technology nixdorff@bio.tu-darmstadt.de Background fotoby Richard Guthrie

2. JuditKörömiSpecial Representative of the Hungarian Foreign Ministerfor Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferationMinistry of Foreign AffairsDepartment for Security Policy and Non-proliferation Fotos by Richard Guthrie

3. 7 Items on the S&T Review Agenda: Advancesin technologiesforsurveillance, detection, diagnosis and mitigation of infectious diseases… 1. Advances that have potential for uses contraryto the Convention 2. Advances that have potential benefits for the Convention, 3. Measuresfor strengthening national biological risk management 4. Voluntarycodesofconduct 5. Education andawareness-raising 6. Science- and technology-related developments relevant to the activities of multilateral organizations (WHO, OIE, FAO, IPPC, OPCW) 7. Any other science and technology developments of relevance

4. 7 Items on the S&T Review Agenda: Advancesin technologiesforsurveillance, detection, diagnosis and mitigation of infectious diseases… 1. Advances that have potential for uses contraryto the Convention 2. Advances that have potential benefits for the Convention,

5. S&T Review MX 2013 More voicesbrought in forthereview Chairtriedto bring in moreexperts in thehopethat theywouldtalkamongthemselves. Experts in manycases not focussed on implicationsfor BWC „Wearegetting a lotof material on thetable, but whatare wegoingto do aboutit?“ „What do wehavefrom all ofthis?: A morebalancedviewof S&T developments“

6. Simon Wain-Hobson: H5N1 controversy: The rightkindofpresentation: Noconsensusamongscientistsaboutusefulnessoftheexperiments Noconsensusaboutwhatto do (a) Freeze (b) need a public international conference with all the stakeholders (c) need independent risk and liability analysis (d) need a considered moral opinion

7. 7 Items on the S&T Review Agenda: Advancesin technologiesforsurveillance, detection, diagnosis and mitigation of infectious diseases… 3. Measuresfor strengthening national biological risk management

8. Risk Management US: Oversight of DURC should fundamentally be done at the national level. No one-size-fits-all solution is possible; SPs should work to exchange experiences and best practices and, where possible, to develop shared principles. Switzerland: Responsible conduct of research by life scientists sensitisedto potential dangers and the dual-use problem will continue to constitute both an important implementation measure of the BWC and a crucial element of any way forward to the issue at hand. Educationof Life Scientistsabout dual-useproblemsand BWC + OversightMeasures

9. 7 Items on the S&T Review Agenda: Advancesin technologiesforsurveillance, detection, diagnosis and mitigation of infectious diseases… 4. Voluntarycodesofconduct 6. Science- and technology-related developments relevant to the activities of multilateral organizations (WHO, OIE, FAO, IPPC, OPCW) 5. Education andawareness-raising

10. 6. Science- and technology-related developments relevant to the activities of multilateral organizations (WHO, OIE, FAO, IPPC, OPCW) OPCW: Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) lessons learned after 15 years It helps to establish an “official OPCW view” on S&T; States Parties do not attempt to politicize the Board Ukraine:Consider the establishment of an open-ended working group to consider the implications of advances in S&T…in the preparations for and at the next Review Conference Australia:A scientific advisory board is a very expensive process, in the BWC context we would benefit more from an open-ended working group. India: In run-upto 7 RC, Indiasuggested a panel on S&T: Perhaps the idea at that time was not mature enough. The topic could be discussed further and kept in mind for the preparation of the next Review Conference.

11. Whatto do? „Improvethestructure“ „Chairhadproposalsforwhatto do, but the NAM shotthem down“ On the national level: - Education - Basic oversight