Sabine Glock Florian Klapproth Sabine Krolak-Schwerdt Matthias Böhmer University of Luxembourg

1. Testing the role of accountability in teachers’ school placement decisions: Findings from an experimental study Sabine Glock Florian Klapproth Sabine Krolak-Schwerdt Matthias Böhmer University of Luxembourg This research was funded by Grant C08/LM/02 from the Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg (FNR).

2. countries with tracking tracking is not solely based on achievement levels students with low socioecomic status and immigration background are disadvantaged (e.g. Bos et al., 2007; Burton et al., 2004) Background

3. school types in Luxembourg Enseignement secondaire – university entrance Enseignement secondaire technique – vocational qualification Régime preparatoire – limited vocational qualification Luxembourgish school system

4. council makes the tracking decision primary school teacher (has two votes) one teacher from each secondary school type responsible school inspector parents have to follow the decision Tracking procedure

5. tracking should be based on performance related cues school grades scores in standardized achievement tests working and learning habits Thill, 2001 Tracking procedure

6. dual process models of impression and judgment formation (e.g. Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) heuristic judgment formation rule-based judgment formation Theoretical background

7. motivation determines the use of the different strategies high motivation  rule-based low motivation  heuristic accountability moderates motivation (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992; Tetlock & Kim, 1987) Theoretical Background

8. teachers with high accountability  performance related cues teachers with low accountability  non-performance related cues teachers as a member of the council?  non-performance related cues Hypotheses

9. three different experimental conditions high accountability low accountability council condition Accountability manipulation

10. seven cues below or above average school grades below or above average scores of standardized achievement tests positive or negative working and learning habits positive or negative social behaviour high or low SES with or without immigration background - nationality female or male - gender material

11. procedure instruction reading and judging each student tracking decisions highest middle lowest school track participants 54 primary school teachers 38 years old 14 years of teaching experience 31 teachers gave instructions in the sixth grade Procedure and participants

12. Manipulation check F(2,49) = 3.45, p2 = 0.12, p < .05

13. Results: school placement decisions *p < .10; **p < .05; odds ratios

14. teachers with low accountability  non-performance related cues teachers as a member of the council  non-performance related cues teachers with high accountability only performance related cues  accountability improved tracking decisions Discussion

15. high accountability induced rule-based judgment formation making teachers aware of the importance of the decision introducing the need to justify tracking decisions General Discussion

16. Thank you for your attention!!!

17. We conducted an experimental study providing minimal information about each student. Thus, our results are limited in their ecological validity. How could validity be improved in experimental settings?

18. We provided text information about our students. However, teachers see, hear, and communicate with their students. Do you think that providing information about students in another modality (i.e. video tapes or pictures) would have influenced the results of our study?

19. If accountability truly is as a factor that improves school placement decisions how might it be increased in the Luxembourgish school placement procedure?