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Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur : The limited role of International Community

Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur : The limited role of International Community. Seong Gi, Kim. 日付. Sudan. Sudan is located in the North Africa. Capital City: Khartoum Now Sudan is divided into 2 countries: Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan

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Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur : The limited role of International Community

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  1. Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur : The limited role of International Community • Seong Gi, Kim 日付

  2. Sudan • Sudan is located in the North Africa. • Capital City: Khartoum • Now Sudan is divided into 2 countries: Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan • Northern Arabic: 39％, Indigenous-Sudanese: 52％, Beja: 6％ • North: Muslim, South:Animism, Christian

  3. Historical Background Ⅰ • 1899-1955: Sudan is under joint British-Egyptian rule. • 1956: Sudan becomes independent • 1958:General Abboud leads military coup against the civilian government elected earlier in the year. • 1962: First Sudanese Civil War begins, led by Anya nya movement. • 1964: Abbud regime was overthrown by Islamist group.Islamist-led government established. • 1969: Jaafar Numeiri comes to power in a coup. • 1972: The Addis Ababa peace agreement between the government and Anya nya (End of the First Sudanese Civil War). The southern part of Sudan achieves autonomy.

  4. Historical Background Ⅱ • 1983: Second Sudanese Civil War breaks out again in the South involving the government forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang. • 1983: Islamic law is imposed by President Numeiri. • 1989: National Salvation Revolution, mainly led by Omar al-Bashir, takes over in military coup. • 1993: Omar al-Bashir is appointed president. • 2002: Peace deal with SPLM begins. Ceasefire agreement was signed but war does not come to the end. • 2003: Rebels in the western region of Darfur rise up against the Khartoum, claiming the region is being neglected by Khartoum.(Darfur Conflict begins)

  5. Historical Background Ⅲ • 2004 March: UN official says pro-government militant Arab Janjaweed militias are carrying out systematic killings of non-Arab people in Darfur. • 2004, 8 April: Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in N’Djamena between the Khartoum and tow rebel groups, JEM and SLM. The African Union formed a Ceasefire Commission(CFC). • 2004, 3 July: UN Resolution 1556 adopted. It requires Khartoum to disarm its proxy militia, Janjaweed. • 2004 August: African Union Mission in Sudan(AMIS) is formed. AMIS was deployed to protect ceasefire monitor in Darfur. • 2004 September: UN says Khartoum has not met requirements for disarming Janjaweed and must accept outside help to protect civilians. US Secretary of State Colin Powell labelled Darfur killing as “genocide”. • 2005 January: Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, Naivasha Agreement) is signed between Khartoum and SPLM. The Second Sudanese Civil War ended. Democratic governance and sharing oil revenues are promised. The former leader of SPLM, John Garang is sworn in as first vice president. A new constitution which gives a large degree of autonomy to the south is signed. Conflict in Darfur still continues. • 2005, 24 March: UN Resolution 1590 adopted. UN Mission in Sudan is formed (UNMIS).

  6. Historical Background Ⅳ • 2005, 29 March: UN Resolution 1591 adopted. The resolution is to impose sanctions on Khartoum government. • 2005 August: John Garang is killed in a plane clash. His death caused the skirmish in the capital between southern Sudanese and northern Arabs. • 2005 October: Autonomous government is formed in the south. • 2006 May: Khartoum government and the main rebel faction in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Movement(SLM), sign a peace record (Darfur Peace Agreement, DPA). Other rebel groups(Justice and Equal Movement, Liberation and Justice Movement) reject the deal. War in Darfur continues. • 2006, 31 August: UN Resolution 1706 adopted. The mandate of UNMIS was expanded to include actual deployment of UNMIS to Darfur and increase its size by up to 20,600 peacekeepers. Khartoum rejects a UN Resolution calling for a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. AMIS mission was actually taken over by UNMIS. • 2006 November: AMIS extends mandate of its peacekeeping force in Darfur to the end of December.

  7. Historical Background Ⅴ • 2007 April: Khartoum accepts a partial UN troop deployment to reinforce the existing AMIS peacekeepers in Darfur. • 2007 May: International Criminal Court issues arrest warrants for a minister and a Janjaweed militia leader suspected of Darfur war crimes. • 2007, 31 July: UN Resolution 1769 adopted. This resolution authorized African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur(UNAMID) under ChapterⅦ of the UN Charter to implement DPA and to protect both civilians and its own personnel in Darfur.

  8. Major military groups in Darfur • JanJaweed : Sudanese government’s proxy paramilitary group, which is predominantly consist of Arabic. The group is responsible for systematic killing in Darfur. • Justice and Equality Movement(JEM): led by Khalil Ibrahim. One of the paramilitary groups fighting against Janjaweed. The group was accused by the Sudanese government of supporting the South Sudanese forces during the 2012 Sudan-South Sudan border conflict. • Sudan Liberation Movement/Army(SLM/A): Minnawi faction and al-Nur faction. Minnawi faction led by Minni Minnawi signed DPA in May 2006. After DPA, Minnawi faction started to cooperate with Khartoum but withdrew from DPA in 2010. On the other hand, al-Nur faction rejected DPA. • Liberation and Justice Movement(LJM): led by Tijani Sese. One of the paramilitary groups fighting against Janjaweed. This group is an alliance of ten small rebel groups.

  9. April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in N’Djamena • Chad brokered negotiation in N’Djamena in 2004. Sudanese government and other two rebel groups, JEM and SLM/A agreed to sign this ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire was to come into effect on April 11, 2004. • However, the rebel group splintered from JEM did not sign this agreement. Janjaweed and other rebel groups continued to fight since the ceasefire agreement. • African Union “deliberately” formed a Ceasefire Commission(CFC) to monitor the ceasefire in Darfur.

  10. UN Resolution 1556 • Adopted on 30 July 2004 • Passed by 13 council members (China and Pakistan abstained) • Resolution passed under ChapterⅦ of the UN Charter • “2. Endorses the deployment of international monitors, including the protection force envisionedby the African Union, to the Darfur region of Sudan under the leadership of the African Union and urges the international community to continue to support these efforts...” • “5. Urges the parties to theN’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004to conclude a political agreement without delay...” • “6. Demands that the Government of Sudan fulfil its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities”

  11. AMIS Deployment • In August 2004, the African Union deployed 150 Rwandan troops to protect the ceasefire monitors. • It became apparent that the number of troops is not enough to protect ceasefire observers, so that AMIS was reinforced by 150 troops. • In October 2004, AMIS was expanded to a larger peace operation of 2,200 personnel. • AMIS was the AU’s first large-scale military intervention in an internal conflict within one of its member states.

  12. UN Resolution 1590 • adopted on 24 March 2005. • Unanimously passed by council members. • Resolution passed under ChapterⅦ of the UN Charter. • “Condemning the continued violations of the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004 and the Abuja Protocols of 9 November 2004 by all sides in Darfur and the deterioration of the security situation and the negative impact this has had on humanitarian assistance efforts,” • “1. Decides to establish the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) for an initial period of 6 months and further decides that UNMIS will consist of up to 10,000 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component including up to 715 civilian police personnel;

  13. UNMIS Cooperation • It became obvious that AMIS has lack of the troops, equipment and mandate to provide adequate civilian protection or enforce ceasefire agreement that all sides violated. • This results in forming UNMIS.

  14. Darfur Peace Agreement(DPA) • Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006 was signed between the Sudanese government and Minni Minawi faction of the SLM, while JEM and al-Nur faction of SLA rejected. • As a result of this agreement, Minni Minawi faction started to cooperate with Khartoum. • President al-Bashir called to destroy those who rejected this agreement. Khartoum initiated new offensives to crush those rebellions.

  15. UN Resolution 1706 • adopted on 31 August 2006. • Passed by 12 council members (Russia, China, and Qatar abstained) • Resolution passed under ChapterⅦ of the UN Charter • “1. Decides, without prejudice to its existing mandate and operations as provided for in resolution 1590 (2005) and in order to support the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, that UNMIS’ mandate shall be expanded as specified in paragraphs 8, 9 and 12 below, that it shall deploy to Darfur, and therefore invites the consent of the Government of National Unity for this deployment, and urges Member States to provide the capability for an expeditious deployment; “ • “3. Decides that UNMIS shall be strengthened by up to 17,300 military personnel and by an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,300 civilian police personnel and up to 16 Formed Police Units,

  16. Reaction to Resolution 1706 • ‘inviting’ Khartoum to consent to a UN intervention • President al-Bashir has continuously rejected a UN intervention. • “Iraq-style occupation”, “Neo-imperialism or colonialism rhetoric” used by the Sudanese regime.

  17. UN Resolution 1769 • adopted on 31 July 2007. • Unanimously passed by council members. • Resolution passed under ChapterⅦ of the UN Charter • “Commending in this regard the agreement of Sudan that the Hybrid operation shall be deployed in Darfur, as detailed in the conclusions of the high-level AU/UN consultations with the Government of Sudan in Addis Ababa on 12 June 2007 and confirmed in full during the Council’s meeting with the President of Sudan on 17 June in Khartoum, “ • “1. Decides, in support of the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the outcome of the negotiations foreseen in paragraph 18, to authorise and mandate the establishment, for an initial period of 12 months, of an AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) as set out in this resolution...”

  18. UNAMID Deployment • In order to implement the DPA and protect civilians in Darfur and its own personnel, UNAMID was deployed to Darfur under the consent of Khartoum. • Primary tasks of AMIS such as night patrols, firewood patrols and deployment to high-tension area were taken over by UNAMID. • By 30 November 2008, the total strength of UNAMID had reached 15,444.

  19. Failures of the International Community 日付

  20. AMIS’s weakness • AMIS was deliberately formed and deployed to conduct humanitarian mission in Darfur. The AU was the only multilateral organization willing to risk its soldiers’s lives in Darfur. • However, AMIS did not have an adequate capability to play its role in Darfur. The mission heavily relies on external donor’s funds and technical advice. Moreover, AMIS has lack of experience, human resources, financial capability, supply network(often crippled by Janjaweed), and effective military equipments. • ⇒creating the “free-for-all” situation for Khartoum government. Khartoum ostensibly complied with international demands, while pursuing its primary objective in Darfur: to defeat the rebel groups through divide and rule tactics. • AMIS’s weakness allowed plenty of scope for Khartoum to conceal its original strategy and objective. AU scheme backfired.

  21. Lack of finesseIneffectiveness of DPA • DPA was supposed to have provided a stability to Darfur but its political process and method was flawed. • DPA only covered Minni Minawi’s SLM and Khartoum government, marginalizing other military groups in Darfur. • The situation was complex. Non-signatories of DPA sometimes split and regrouped. • International community had some possible solutions: sending envoys to each military factions and encouraging them to unify in order to facilitate a broader negotiation. All-inclusive peace agreement was impractical.

  22. Failure of UNAMID • As mentioned previously, AMIS has lack of resources and several types of capabilities. UNAMID was also not exceptional. • Although the total number of UNAMIDs’ troops had reached 15,444, it was still far from the actual authorized deployment of 26,000 troops. • P-5 members of Security Council authorized the deployment of UNAMID but were reluctant to support it. UNAMID was not provided tactical and transport helicopters and ground transportation capacities by the P-5, which was essential for fulfillment of humanitarian mission. • According to UNAMID Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai, the peacekeepers would not stand between rival armies and militias which engaged in full-scale combat, even if the mission were at full deployment.

  23. Vague mandate and strategic goal • AMIS and UNAMID were both deployed with vague mandates and had no strategic goal, resulting the failure of humanitarian mission. • International actors were reluctant to challenge the dominant norm of ‘non-intervention’ and ‘state sovereignty’. Top priority was not ‘protection of civilian in armed conflict’ but ‘state sovereignty’. • Rhetoric of ‘no commitment to the area where vital national interests are involved’. For instance, China was a major supporter of Sudan because of Sudan’s plenty oil. For instance, Chinese state-run oil company controls 70％ of Sudan’s oil. China also supplied military equipments to Sudan. ⇒disagreement among international actors. • Lack of concentration of political power caused by these two points hindered humanitarian operations in Darfur in several ways: inadequate support, inflexible operation, no comprehensive field assessment.

  24. No exploration of measures • It is said that more non-military options and measures could have been explored to exert pressure on Khartoum government, facilitating the conduct of humanitarian intervention. • Many possible solutions can be represented. • Asset-freeze, sanction on petroleum sector, reviving the political process, supporting ICC investigation...

  25. The Adverse Effect of the “War on Terror” and the Invasion of Iraq War • The credibility of the United States and the United Kingdom as a norm carrier of humanitarian intervention has been diminished since the Allied force is obsessed with Afghanistan and Iraq. • The military overstretch of US makes the West-led humanitarian intervention unlikely. • The unauthorized military intervention in Iraq invoked Khartoum’s strong skepticism and allowed it to use the “Neo-imperialism or colonialism” rhetoric, which make it difficult for international community to smoothly launch humanitarian intervention.

  26. Wheeler’s Criteria

  27. Supreme humanitarian emergency • ◯ • The death toll of direct violence: 73,700~108,588 • At least 1.8 million people were forced to flee their homes • Malnutrition and the widespread of disease in camps for displaced people • Janjaweed was conducting a systematic killing against civilian and ethnic cleansing • It is believed that the total casualty in Darfur reached to 300,000

  28. Last Resort • △ • The deeper exploration of non-military countermeasure and the following enforcement of sanctions could have forced Khartoum to change its policy. • However, the threat was imminent and there was no time to hesitate to conduct humanitarian protection in Darfur.

  29. Proportionality • △/✕ (more negative) • No fulfillment of the actual authorized deployment of 26,000 troops.(UNAMID) • The expected number of troops was believed to have provided safe havens for Darfurian people but lack of concrete goal and tactics hindered it. • NO ADEQUATE MATERIAL SUPPORT.

  30. Positive Humanitarian Outcome • △/✕ (more negative) • The UN forces was unable to stop escalations of violence. • 7 UN peacekeepers killed in action and 19 were wounded. • The UN’s unsuccessful humanitarian mission contributed to militant groups’ violent actions in Darfur, causing massive amount of casualties. • Although UN forces saved dozens of lives in Darfur, the result was bloodcurdling. The casualties are unjustifiable.

  31. Humanitarian Motives • ◯/△ (more positive) • The AU played a crucial role in conducting humanitarian intervention although its capability was limited. • While Western countries were reluctant to lead humanitarian mission, the AU deliberately deployed military forces to Darfur. AU showed its willingness to conduct a large-scale civilian protection operation.

  32. Humanitarian Justification • ◯( for AU)/✕(for P-5) • As mentioned previously, AU mission was ‘deliberately’ formed. • On the contrary, P-5 members showed their reluctance; ‘No commitment to the area or country where vital national interests are involved’.

  33. Legality • ◯ • UN mission was conducted based upon the agreement of Sudanese government. • Non-consensual military deployment such as Second Gulf War was not conducted.

  34. Selectivity • ◯(for AU)/✕(for P-5) • Russia and China undermining of sanctions because of their national interests. The Western countries(especially US and UK) did not want to provoke hostility from Muslim world by allowing the Sudanese government to use rhetoric of “Neo-imperialism or colonialism”.

  35. Present situation in Sudan and Darfur • In 2009, UNAMID said the war was over in Darfur, although low-level disputes still remain. • South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011. • Border conflicts between Sudan and South Sudan occurred in 2012. The diplomatic relations between these two countries are strained. The situation is unstable.

  36. Present situation in Sudan and Darfur Ⅱ • Darfur region is now divided into 5 federal states : Central Darfur, East Darfur, North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur. • After a lot of arguments, in July 2011, new Darfur Peace Agreement (a.k.a. Doha Agreement) was signed between Khartoum and LJM. This agreement is about the establishment of a compensation fund for victims of conflict in Darfur, providing a power sharing, and creation of Darfur Regional Authority. It also allows the President of Sudan to appoint a vice-president from Darfur. • UNAMID is still active in Darfur to monitor the peace development.

  37. End

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