1 / 26

Fiscal Policy in Europe : A Long View Second annual Berkeley-Vienna conference:

Marco Buti (European Commission) and André Sapir (Université Libre de Bruxelles, Bruegel and CEPR). Fiscal Policy in Europe : A Long View Second annual Berkeley-Vienna conference: The US and European Economies in Comparative Perspective Berkeley, September 12-13 2005.

prue
Download Presentation

Fiscal Policy in Europe : A Long View Second annual Berkeley-Vienna conference:

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Marco Buti (European Commission) and André Sapir (Université Libre de Bruxelles, Bruegel and CEPR) Fiscal Policy in Europe : A Long View Second annual Berkeley-Vienna conference: The US and European Economies in Comparative Perspective Berkeley, September 12-13 2005 1

  2. I. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

  3. EUROPE SINCE WWII: Three sub-periods 3

  4. An interpretation: the Musgravian triangleGolden age + Redistribution Stabilisation Allocation • No trade offs: setting up of the welfare state allows improvement of allocation (correct market failures in unemployment and social insurance), redistribution (via the same programmes) and stabilisation (tax and welfare systems as automatic stabilisers) • Social welfare maximisation increases the chances of re-election: benevolent government = political economy approach + + 4

  5. Fall from heaven Redistribution Stabilisation Allocation • Trade offs emerge: between allocation and redistribution/ stabilisation (work incentives hampered) • Social welfare maximisation ≠ politically motivated behaviour • Sustainability becomes a problem - - 5

  6. Maastricht consolidation • Redistribution Stabilisation • Consolidation • Allocation • Primary focus: discipline/sustainability • Maastricht consolidation: higher taxes, lower spending  impact on Musgrave, in the short and longer run • Beyond a critical level, reducing taxes may improve allocation and stabilisation - -/+ - -/+ - 6

  7. II. THE PAST 30 YEARS 7

  8. 8

  9. 9

  10. 10

  11. 11

  12. 12

  13. 13

  14. 14

  15. 15

  16. III. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES: AGEING KICKS IN 16

  17. Demographic changes 17

  18. LONG TERM BUDGETARY PROJECTIONS 18

  19. The “maximum sustainable” level of debt is decreasing sM(a)↓, y (a) ↓, r ? a = ageing 19

  20. IV. EMU’S FISCAL FRAMEWORK:HELP OR HINDRANCE? 20

  21. SGP spirit The approach chosen by the framers of the SGP was two-pronged: • The 3% of GDP reference value should be treated as much as possible a ‘hard ceiling’. • Member States should commit themselves to a “medium-term budgetary objective” of “close-to-balance or in surplus”. 21

  22. In the steady state Sustainability ↓ public debt Stabilisation CTB + automatic stabilisers Allocation ↓ public spending … BUT WE NEVER GOT THERE 22

  23. Lessons from the first 5 years of EMU Economic assessment • High structural deficits and debts • Lack of consolidation in good times • Somewhat better stabilisation (but largely in spite of the rules) Political assessment • Fading ‘ownership’ • Large countries/small countries divide • Enlargement of the EU heightens the problems 23

  24. SGP reform: motivation • Sustainability ↓ public debt plus reforms for ageing • Stabilisation CTB + automatic stabilisers plus country differentiation • Allocation ↓ public spending plus expenditure quality 24

  25. The reformed SGP • Economic governance • Stability programme for the legislature • Involvement of national parliaments • Reliable forecasts • Better statistical governance • Preventive arm • Diversified MTOs • At least 0.5% structural adjustment • Corrective arm • Exceptional circumstances • ‘All ORFs’, but only if d>3% is ‘close and temporary’ • Debt and sustainability • Repeatability of EDP steps 25

  26. THE OLD AND THE NEW STABILITY PACT: two readings 26

More Related