Political Warfare Executive (PWE) - Propaganda

1. Political Warfare Executive (PWE) - Propaganda Four areas to covert propaganda campaign for OVERLORD: Daily newspapers (Nachrichtenfür die Truppe– or ‘News for the Troops’) Radio broadcasts of news and music (Soldatensender Calais and KurzwellensenderAtlantik) Subversive leaflets distributed by air and agents Medium wave broadcasts of talks for opposition movements • May 1941 Churchill authorised PWE to invest in a 500kW Medium Wave (MW) transmitter called ASPIDISTRA – could reach the whole of occupied Europe and jam significant radio broadcasts like the Nazi Party celebrations in Berlin broadcasting to public radio sets. • Two Short Wave (SW) transmitters at Potsgrove and Gawcott weren’t powerful enough. ASPIDISTRA would become the most powerful MW transmitter in Europe 13th Amplifier Unit (AU) mobilised with loudspeakers on the 14th April 1944 with 4 other specialist Amplifier units – provide mobile loudspeaker support to psychological/civil affairs activities for OVERLORD

2. Leaflet ZF4 dropped on D-Day by Munroe leaflet bombs Pre-D-Day period estimated 2,750,000,000 leaflets were printed and distributed by RAF and US 8th Air Force. Over 90% of all the leaflets air-dropped on occupied Europe were printed and designed in Britain and dispersed by bombers flying out of British airfields. Front page of Issue 51 of Nachrichtenfür die Truppe, dropped on German positions in Normandy on D-Day By D-Day 1 million copies of Nachrichtenfür die Truppe were being produced a day, packed into 100 leaflet bombs.

3. DECEPTION – Op BODYGUARD The OVERLORD deception plan involved: Wireless traffic Lighting deception Double Agents Controlled leaks of information Physical deception – use of decoys and dummies Planting high profile staff at areas in public eye Juan Pujol Garcia – Agent GARBO Glyndwr Michael, 34 year old Welshman 195,000 tonnes of bombs dropped by Allied aircraft between April – June 1944, 2/3 of which outside Normandy area. TAXABLE – 5th June 1944 16 Lancaster’s from 617 Sqn – fly at 3000ft 180mph – dropped sequenced and sized chaff/window bundles to mimic RADAR returns

4. X-craft midget submarines & COPP • Lt Cdr Nigel Clogstoun-Wilmott RNVR • COPP trained with X-Craft from November 1943 – needed 2 months minimum training at HMS VARBEL on Loch Striven • COPP teams trialled equipment at Brancaster beach in Norfolk, under direction of Professor Bernal, COHQ Chief Scientific Advisor (two COPP swimmers Major Logan Scott-Bowden RE and Sgt Bruce Ogden-Smith of SBS). Estimates of sand stability for load bearing etc could be gleaned from a small 60 gram sample • Ogden-Smith and Scott-Bowden reconnoitered GOLD beach over New Year period 1943/1944 • Late January 1944 did beach recce for OMAHA for General Bradley. Scott-Bowden visited Bradley in person at SHAEF HQ, Norfolk House a day after returning • Op POSTAGE ABLE between 17-23 January 1944 • Op GAMBIT 4-6 June 1944

5. 712th LCP (Survey) Flotilla • Survey unit based out of HMS VECTIS – West Cowes • 6 joint beach surveys from early 1943 – January 1944 to help sight the MULBERRY/GOOSEBERRY artificial harbours • Under command of Lt Cdr Frank Berncastle – skilled hydrographer • LCP(L)s towed to littoral coast by MGB from 1st Coastal Force Flotilla. Used Echo-Sounding Taut Wire (ESTW) to measure beach gradients. Also measure tidal streams – using 15ft long pole. Some Ops run jointly with COPP • Achieved good success on 26/27th November 1943 (Op KJG)

6. FDT, HMS HILARY & WHADDON – Collecting/Dispersing SIGINT • HMS HILARY acted as HQ and SIGINT ship for Commander of Naval Force ‘J’ attacking JUNO beach • Three Fighter Direction Tenders (FDT) FDT217 positioned off JUNO, SWORD and GOLD beaches, FDT216 covered OMAHA & UTAH, FDT13 located 40 miles off JUNO beach protecting shipping lanes • Acted as deployed Y service collection platform to intercept German wireless signals from ashore. Each had around 250 staff onboard. Stayed in position 17 days after D-Day • Major military commands within SHAEF had Special Liaison Units (SLU) attached to them on Special Communications Unit (SCU) radio links • SLU teams headed by British Army Officer (referred to as Special Liaison Officer) who passed ULTRA intelligence (via WINDY RIDGE typex) to cleared senior officers within military command • Units were recruited, trained and deployed under SIS Section VIII based at Whaddon

7. TIS – Theatre Intelligence Section • TIS intelligence cell established in ‘Martian Room’ in Storey’s Gate, off St James’s Park in London. Nearly 500 personnel • Responsible for distribution of Top Secret intelligence to tight circle of cleared military planners for D-Day • Headed up by Oxford don Professor John Austin • Owned originally by British Home Forces but command later transferred to COSSAC via 21st Army Group. • February 1942 subsumed into SHAEF G-2 Intelligence Division • Reports nicknamed ‘Martian Reports’ issued weekly – included all sources except ULTRA • TIS responsible for ‘Invade Mecum’ pocket books and NEPTUNE Monograph on beach defences NEPTUNE Monograph 21 April 1944 It has been said of Austin that…. ‘he was more than anybody responsible for the lifesaving accuracy of D-Day intelligence.’ Estimated over 50,000 eyewitness reports on German defences in Normandy from French Resistance had worked their way to TIS

8. LCOCU & NCDU • LCOCU [Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Unit] diver teams from the RN/RM – the first men ashore in D-Day • Beach obstacles had been recreated at COXE (Combined Operations Experimental Establishments) at HMS APPLEDORE in Devon– where LCOCU and COPP teams trained • LCOCU had 120 men split into 10 units • NCDU 9 man team – 32 teams deployed to clear 50 yard gap in defences US NCDU 6 June 1944 - 37 killed and 71 wounded – casualty rate of 52% made D-Day bloodiest day of USN SF history It would require 36 individual pieces of PE to reduce the 2.5 ton steel mass Belgian Gate obstacle to just 2 ft high On GOLD beach alone there were 2500 obstacles on a 3.5 mile stretch of beach

9. 'A meticulous and outstanding piece of research throwing light on the intelligence and reconnaissance missions which were to significantly shape the final outcome of D-Day’ General Sir Gordon Messenger KCB DSO* OBE ADC Vice Defence of Defence Staff Dr David Abrutat BSc(Hons) PhD PGDip PGCert FRGS abrutat@blueyonder.co.uk www.abrutat.com