UPDATES Labor Jurisprudence

1. Atty. Marlon J. Manuel UPDATES Labor Jurisprudence

2. Probationary employees can join a union and can vote in a CE • Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor organization. In a certification election for the bargaining unit of rank and file employees, all rank and file employees, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. As long as probationary employees belong to the defined bargaining unit, they are eligible to support the petition for certification election. • NUWHRAIN-Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter v. Secretary, July 31, 2009

3. Confidential Employees • Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two (2) criteria are cumulative, and both must be met • The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the “confidential employee rule.” • Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery v. Asia Brewery, August 3, 2010

4. Confidential Employees • Payroll Master and employees who have access to salary and compensation data are NOT Confidential employees. Their position do not involve dealing with confidential labor relations information. • San Miguel Foods v. SMC Supervisors and Exempt Union, August 1, 2011

5. 20% requirement must be at the time of union registration • Art. 234(c) requires the list of names of all the union members of an INDEPENDENT UNION comprising at least 20% of the bargaining unit. This should not be equated with the list of workers who participated in the organizational meetings (par [b]). • Subsequent affidavits of retraction (withdrawal of membership) will not retroact to the time of the application for registration or even way back to the organizational meeting. • Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club v. CA, March 18, 2010

6. Charter Certificate NOT required to be certified under oath • The charter certificate need not be certified under oath by the local union’s secretary or treasurer and attested to by its president. • Considering that the charter certificate is prepared and issued by the national union and not the local/chapter, it does not make sense to have the local/chapter’s officers certify or attest to the due execution of such document. • SamahangManggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER) v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, 2011

7. Mixture of R&F and Supervisory employees does not negate the union’s legitimacy • The mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in a union does not nullify its legal personality as a legitimate labor organization. • Samahang Manggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER) v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, 2011 • As amended by R.A. 9481, the Labor Code now allows a R&F union and a Supervisory union of the same company to be part of the same federation.

8. Voluntary Recognition • An employer cannot ignore the existence of a legitimate labor organization at the time of its voluntary recognition of another union. The employer and the voluntarily recognized union cannot, by themselves, decide whether the other union represented an appropriate bargaining unit. • The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in unorganized establishments. SLECC WAS NOT AN UNORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENT WHEN IT VOLUNTARILY RECOGNIZED SMSLEC AS ITS EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE ON 20 JULY 2001. CLUP-SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION ON 27 FEBRUARY 2001 AND THIS PETITION REMAINED PENDING AS OF 20 JULY 2001. THUS, SLECC’S VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION OF SMSLEC ON 20 JULY 2001, THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS AND RESULTING REGISTRATION OF A CBA EXECUTED BY SLECC AND SMSLEC ARE VOID AND CANNOT BAR CLUP-SLECCWA’S PRESENT PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION. • Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation v. Hon. Secretary Of Labor, August 14, 2009

9. Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping NOT required in PCE • There is no requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping in the Labor Code or in the rules. • A certification proceeding, even though initiated by a “petition,” is not a litigation but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character. Such proceedings are not predicated upon an allegation of misconduct requiring relief, but, rather, are merely of an inquisitorial nature. • SAMMA-LIKHA v. SAMMA Corporation, March 13, 2009

10. Petition for Certification Election • The Secretary of Labor and Employment dismissed the first petition as it was filed outside the 60-day freedom period. Subsequently, another petition for CE was filed, this time within the freedom period. Is this later Petition barred? • At that time therefore, the union has no cause of action since they are not yet legally allowed to challenge openly and formally the status of SMCGC-SUPER as the exclusive bargaining representative of the bargaining unit. Such dismissal, however, has no bearing in the instant case since the third petition for certification election was filed well within the 60-day freedom period. Otherwise stated, there is no identity of causes of action to speak of since in the first petition, the union has no cause of action while in the third, a cause of action already exists for the union as they are now legally allowed to challenge the status of SMCGC-SUPER as exclusive bargaining representative. • Chris Garments Corporation v. Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas and Chris Garments Workers Union-PTGWO, January 12, 2009

11. Union’s legal personality not subject to collateral attack • The legal personality of petitioner union cannot be collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings. A separate action for cancellation of the union’s registration/legal personality must be filed. • Samahang Manggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER) v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, 2011 • As amended by R.A. 9481, the Labor Code now provides that, in certification election cases, the employer shall not be considered a party with a concomitant right to oppose a petition for certification election.

12. Union’s legal personality not subject to collateral attack • The legal personality of petitioner union cannot be collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings. A separate action for cancellation of the union’s registration/legal personality must be filed. • Legend International Resorts v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legend, February 23, 2011

13. Employer as Bystander • Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof. • Republic of the Philippines, represented by DOLE, v. Kawashima Textile, July 23, 2008 • Holy Child Catholic School v. HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS, July 23, 2013

14. Whoever alleges fraud/misrepresentation has burden of proof • The charge that a labor organization committed fraud and misrepresentation in securing its registration is a serious charge that should be clearly established by evidence and the surrounding circumstances. • The petitioner (the party that filed the Petition for Cancellation) has the burden of proof. • Yokohama Tire Phils. v. Yokohama Employees Union, March 10, 2010; Heritage Hotel Manila v. PIGLAS-Heritage, October 30, 2009

15. Signing of Petition for CE not disloyalty • The mere signing of the authorization in support of a Petition for Certification Election before the “freedom period,” is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of union members under the Union Security Clause respondents inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed during the freedom period. • PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Tañeca, August 9, 2010

16. CBA’s 5-year term • While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s original five-year term together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the union’s exclusive collective bargaining status. By express provision of the above-quoted Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years, either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining union’s exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s first five years. • FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (FVCLU-PTGWO) v. Sama-Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa Sa FVC-Solidarity Of Independent And General Labor Organizations (SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO), November 27, 2009

17. Bargaining Unit • The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interest. • There should be only one bargaining unit for employees involved in “dressed chicken” processing and workers engaged in “live chicken” operations. • Although they seem separate and distinct from each other, the tasks of each division are actually interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a single bargaining unit. • San Miguel Foods v. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Union, August 1, 2011

18. 1 Union; 2 Bargaining Units • An academic institution should have two bargaining units: one for academic personnel; and another for non-academic personnel. • The differences, however, between the two categories of employees are no substantial enopugh to warrant a dismissal of a petition for certification election, seeking an election for only one unit. • The solution should be to hold two certification elections. • Holy Child Catholic School v. HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS, July 23, 2013

19. ULP • Violation of the union shop agreement in the CBA, even assuming it was malicious and flagrant, is not a violation of an economic provision in the agreement. Hence, not ULP. • An outsourcing program that would not result to any transfer or dismissal of the employees who are members of the bargaining unit cannot be considered as a “reduction of positions in the collective bargaining unit” and cannot be considered as interference with the right to self-organization. • BPI Employees Union-Davao v. BPI, July 24, 2013

20. ULP • Retrenchment in good faith is not ULP. • The fact that the retrenchment program was implemented on a company-wide basis shows that the scheme was not calculated to stymie union activities. • Absent any perceived threat to the union’s existence or a violation of the employees’ right to self-organization, the company cannot be said to have committed ULP. • Pepsi Cola Products v. Molon et al., February 18, 2013

21. ULP • Removal of chairs, which had been provided for more than three decades, was not ULP. The rights of the Union under any labor law were not violated. • Since the CBA stated that any benefit not expressly provided for in the CBA shall be deemed as purely voluntary acts, and shall not be construed as obligation of the company, its subsequent removal was valid. The long practice did not convert it into an obligation or a vested right in favor of the union. • Chairs not “benefits”, hence, not covered by the prohibition against diminution. • Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca Cola Bottlers, April 15, 2013

22. ULP • In Silva v. National Labor Relations Commission, we explained the correlations of Article 248 (1) and Article 261 of the Labor Code to mean that for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and for the NLRC to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereon, the allegations in the complaint must show prima facie the concurrence of two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; and (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA. • This pronouncement in Silva, however, should not be construed to apply to violations of the CBA which can be considered as gross violations per se, such as utter disregard of the very existence of the CBA itself, similar to what happened in this case. When an employer proceeds to negotiate with a splinter union despite the existence of its valid CBA with the duly certified and exclusive bargaining agent, the former indubitably abandons its recognition of the latter and terminates the entire CBA. • Employees Union of Bayer v. Bayer Phils., December 6, 2010

23. ULP • A CBA which prescribes three categories of employees (probationary, regular, casual) and provides for the definition, functions and duties of each, serves as a limitation on management’s prerogative of outsourcing parts of its operations, particularly if it involves functions or duties specified under the CBA. • While the engagement of a contractor was not ULP, it was not in keeping with the intent and spirit of the CBA. With the provision on casual employees, the hiring of contractual employees was not in keeping with the spirit and intent of the CBA. • The CBA delimit the free exercise of management prerogative pertaining to the hiring of contractual employees. • Goya v. Goya Employees Union, January 21, 2013

24. ULP • For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that the employer was motivated by ill-will, bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor. The employer must have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy causing social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain collectively with each other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement. • Manila Mining Corporation Employees Association v. manila Mining Corp., September 29, 2010

25. ULP • Basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. By imputing bad faith to the actuations of CAB, CABEU-NFL has the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the allegation of unfair labor practice. Apparently, CABEU-NFL refers only to the circumstances mentioned in the letter-response, namely, the execution of the supposed CBA between CAB and CABELA and the request to suspend the negotiations, to conclude that bad faith attended CAB’s actions. The Court is of the view that CABEU-NFL, in simply relying on the said letter-response, failed to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice to rebut the presumption of good faith.  • Central Azucarera de Bais Employees Union v. Central Azucarera de Bais, November 17, 2010

26. Bonus in the CBA • Generally, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. For a bonus to be enforceable, it must have been promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by the parties. Given that the bonus in this case is integrated in the CBA, the same partakes the nature of a demandable obligation. Verily, by virtue of its incorporation in the CBA, the Christmas bonus due to respondent Association has become more than just an act of generosity on the part of the petitioner but a contractual obligation it has undertaken. • Lepanto Ceramics v. Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association, March 2, 2010; Eastern Telecoms v. Eastern Telecoms Employees Union, February 8, 2012

27. Grievance • Petitioners clearly and consistently questioned the legality of RGMI’s adoption of the new salary scheme (i.e., piece-rate basis), asserting that such action, among others, violated the existing CBA. Indeed, the controversy was not a simple case of illegal dismissal but a labor dispute involving the manner of ascertaining employees’ salaries, a matter which was governed by the existing CBA. • Article 217(c) of the Labor Code requires labor arbiters to refer cases involving the implementation of CBAs to the grievance machinery provided therein and to voluntary arbitration. • Moreover, Article 260 of the Labor Code clarifies that such disputes must be referred first to the grievance machinery and, if unresolved within seven days, they shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration. • Santuyo v. Remerco Garments, March 22, 2010

28. Grievance • Individual employees cannot raise a grievance. • Only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. • A FEDERATION cannot raise a grievance on behalf of members of its local/chapter. • Insular Hotel Employees Union v. Waterfront Insular Hotel, September 22, 2010

29. Arbitral Award • While an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because it requires the intervention and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction, the arbitral award can be considered an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties, hence, it has the force and effect of a valid contract obligation. • Cirtek Employees Labor Union v. Cirtek Electronics, November 15, 2010

30. Arbitral Award • The hold-over principle, i.e., the duty of the parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing CBA until a new agreement is reached by the parties applies to an imposed CBA (i.e., an arbitral award). • The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain its force and effect. Likewise, the law does not distinguish between a CBA duly agreed upon by the parties and an imposed CBA. • General Milling Corporation-ILU v. General Milling Corp., June 15, 2011

31. Union Security Clause • Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. • A stipulation in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code, since “a CBA is the law between the company and the union and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor.” • In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union security provision of the CBA. • General Milling Corporation v. Casio, March 10, 2010

32. Union Security Clause • “Union security” is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends “closed shop,” “union shop,” “maintenance of membership,” or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. • There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. • There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. • A closed shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part. • General Milling Corporation v. Casio, March 10, 2010

33. Union Security Clause • The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. However, this is not without limitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. x xx. • While respondent company may validly dismiss the employees expelled by the union for disloyalty under the union security clause of the collective bargaining agreement upon the recommendation by the union, this dismissal should not be done hastily and summarily thereby eroding the employees’ right to due process, self-organization and security of tenure. The enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due process. Even on the assumption that the federation had valid grounds to expel the union officers, due process requires that these union officers be accorded a separate hearing by respondent company. • General Milling Corporation v. Casio, March 10, 2010

34. Union Security Clause • The Union Shop Clause in the CBA simply states that “new employees” who during the effectivity of the CBA “may be regularly employed” by the Bank must join the union within thirty (30) days from their regularization. There is nothing in the said clause that limits its application to only new employees who possess non-regular status, meaning probationary status, at the start of their employment. Petitioner likewise failed to point to any provision in the CBA expressly excluding from the Union Shop Clause new employees who are “absorbed” as regular employees from the beginning of their employment. What is indubitable from the Union Shop Clause is that upon the effectivity of the CBA, petitioner’s new regular employees (regardless of the manner by which they became employees of BPI) are required to join the Union as a condition of their continued employment. • BPI v. BPI employees Union-Davao, August 10, 2010

35. Union Security Clause • Theoretically, there is nothing in law or jurisprudence to prevent an employer and a union from stipulating that existing employees (who already attained regular and permanent status but who are not members of any union) are to be included in the coverage of a union security clause. Even Article 248(e) of the Labor Code only expressly exempts old employees who already have a union from inclusion in a union security clause. • BPI v. BPI employees Union-Davao, August 10, 2010, October 19, 2011

36. STRIKE • Article 212 of the Labor Code, as amended, defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. • The term “strike” shall comprise not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities and similar activities. Thus, the fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. • Solidbank Corp. v. Gamier, November 15, 2010

37. STRIKE • “Mass leave” refers to a simultaneous availment of authorized leave benefits by a large number of employees in a company. • If only 5 employees were absent on the same day, and they went on leave for various reasons, they cannot be considered to have gone on “mass leave”. They did not go on strike. • “Concerted” is defined as “mutually contrived or planned” or “performed in unison” • Naranjo v. Biomedica Heath Care, September 19, 2012

38. STRIKE & PICKETING • To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The work stoppage may be accompanied by picketing by the striking employees outside of the company compound. While a strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing focuses on publicizing the labor dispute and its incidents to inform the public of what is happening in the company struck against. A picket simply means to march to and from the employer’s premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. It is a strike activity separate and different from the actual stoppage of work. • PHIMCO Industries v. PHIMCO Industries Labor Association, August 11, 2010

39. STRIKE & PICKETING • While the right of employees to publicize their dispute falls within the protection of freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble to air grievances, these rights are by no means absolute. Protected picketing does not extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company premises. That the picket was moving, was peaceful and was not attended by actual violence may not free it from taints of illegality if the picket effectively blocked entry to and exit from the company premises. • PHIMCO Industries v. PHIMCO Industries Labor Association, August 11, 2010

40. PICKETING • As we have stated, while the picket was moving, the movement was in circles, very close to the gates, with the strikers in a hand-to-shoulder formation without a break in their ranks, thus preventing non-striking workers and vehicles from coming in and getting out. Supported by actual blocking benches and obstructions, what the union demonstrated was a very persuasive and quietly intimidating strategy whose chief aim was to paralyze the operations of the company, not solely by the work stoppage of the participating workers, but by excluding the company officials and non-striking employees from access to and exit from the company premises. No doubt, the strike caused the company operations considerable damage, as the NLRC itself recognized when it ruled out the reinstatement of the dismissed strikers. • PHIMCO Industries v. PHIMCO Industries Labor Association, August 11, 2010

41. STRIKE • Employees’ refusal to work on three consecutive holidays, prompted by their disagreement with the management-imposed new work schedule, was considered a strike that was grounded on a non-strikeable issue, and a violation of the No-Strike Clause in the CBA. • A. Soriano Aviation v. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation, August 14, 2009

42. Placards/Banners may make strike illegal • The display of placards and banners imputing criminal negligence on the part of the employer and its officers, apparently with the end in view of intimidating the employer’s clientele, are, given the nature of its business, that serious as to make the strike illegal. The putting up of those banners and placards, coupled with the name-calling and harassment, indicates that it was resorted to to coerce the resolution of the dispute. That the alleged acts were committed in nine non-consecutive days during the almost eight months that the strike was on-going does not render the violence less pervasive or widespread to be excusable. Art. 264 does not require that violence must be continuous or that it should be for the entire duration of the strike. • A. Soriano Aviation v. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation, August 14, 2009

43. In Pari Delicto rule • When management and union are in pari delicto, the contending parties must be brought back to their respective positions before the controversy, i.e., before the strike. • Automotive Engine Rebuilders v. Progresibong Unyon ng mga Manggagawa sa AER, July 13, 2011

44. Termination of Strikers • Strikers who were not covered by the charges for illegal strike cannot be among those found guilty of illegal strike. They cannot be considered in pari delicto. They should be reinstated and given their backwages. • Automotive Engine Rebuilders v. Progresibong Unyon ng mga Manggagawa sa AER, January 16, 2013

45. Termination of Strikers • Union members who were illegally dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike are entitled to separation pay (in lieu of reinstatement) but not to backwages. • The principle of a "fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor" remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. For this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal. • VCMC v. Yballe, January 15, 2014

46. LIABILITY OF OFFICERS • The effects of illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code, make a distinction between participating workers and union officers. The services of an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; proof must be adduced showing that he or she committed illegal acts during the strike. The services of a participating union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated, not only when he actually commits an illegal act during a strike, but also if he knowingly participates in an illegal strike. • PHIMCO Industries v. PHIMCO Industries Labor Association, August 11, 2010

47. Employer may dismiss employees for illegal acts during a strike even if there is no petition to declare a strike illegal • The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. The filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal is thus unnecessary. Article 263 provides that an employer may terminate employees found to have committed illegal acts in the course of a strike. • Jackbilt Industries v. Jackbilt Employees Union, March 20, 2009

48. Illegal Strike • A strike conducted by a union which acquired its legal personality AFTER the filing of its Notice of Strike and the conduct of the Strike Vote is ILLEGAL. • Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood v. KMLMS, October 19, 2011

49. Termination Due to Strikes • Conformably with the long honored principle of afair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor, employees dismissed for joining an illegal strike are not entitled to backwages for the period of the strike even if they are reinstated by virtue of their being merely members of the striking union who did not commit any illegal act during the strike. • Escario v. NLRC, Pinakamasarap Corp., September 27, 2010

50. Assumption of Jurisdiction • Article 263(g) is both an extraordinary and a preemptive power to address an extraordinary situation – a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. This grant is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place. • As the term “assume jurisdiction” connotes, the intent of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout; it includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from or related to the dispute, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. • Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Triumph v. Secretary, July 5, 2010