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Measuring Land Use Benefits in Auction Markets. Francisco Martínez University of Chile European Transport Conference Cambrigde 2001. Economic context. The urban land market Multiple consumers: residents and firms Multiple location attributes Location externalities
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Measuring Land Use Benefits in Auction Markets Francisco Martínez University of Chile European Transport Conference Cambrigde 2001
Economic context The urban land market • Multiple consumers: residents and firms • Multiple location attributes • Location externalities • A variety of zone-building options • Auction market: imperfect competition • Market equilibrium analysis Measures of benefits of land use changes • Regulations • Transport projects
Modelling Consumers’ behaviour Indirect & conditional utility p: exogenous price for z yieldingU Max value for z to achieve U Compensated demand Expenditure funtion
Auction markets:linear marginal utility of income Location prices are endogenous: highest bid Def. auction equilibrium : Theorem 1: Thus for More...
Proof: From Roy’s theorem and demand =1: In E: Variation in U: Variation in z:
Interpretation Theorem 1: Since: • in the auction market prices are always the WP for the final consumer • for two identical consumers in (I,), these endogenous prices are different at different sites, but utility is the same Then, such prices HAVE to comply with theorem 1; other prices do not.
Consumers’ WP function Theorem 2: within E, WP is doubly linear, in I and U Follows from comsumption of one unit and Roy’s Theorem under Theorem 1 then
Measuring consumers’ surplus The classical measures: for (p,z,U) at equilibrium Notice U1 p=WP
Measuring total benefits For a given location: Total Benefit = Consumers’ + Producers’ surplus Change in WP caused by changes in built environment Obs.: 1) extenal conditions 2) location externalities, agents interacction
Summary Urban market characteristics: One location.......WP linear in I + Auction market....WP linear in U • WP is doubly linear • Income variation EV=CV=CS • Total benefits measurable from WP values
Some implications Total benefits are • change in WP valued at constant U, or • change in U plus change in rents, or • change in consumers value of built environment. They are NOT equal to change in rents
Application: building & land supply consumers clusters Logit auction model (short term) Auction best bid rule zvi All agents are allocated bh
Land use benefits Consumers’ surplus Producers’ surplus