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Revenue Decoupling:. A proposed solution to the utilities’ traditional incentive to encourage wasteful energy use. Christopher Grubb cbrucegrubb@gmail.com Energy Law, 2010. Presentation Roadmap.
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Revenue Decoupling: A proposed solution to the utilities’ traditional incentive to encourage wasteful energy use Christopher Grubb cbrucegrubb@gmail.com Energy Law, 2010
Presentation Roadmap • Problem: The traditional electric utility business model provides a perverse incentive to encourage wasteful electricity use • Alternative Solutions • Revenue decoupling • Straight fixed variable (SFV) rate design • Proposed Solution: Revenue decoupling • Questions for Regulators / Policymakers
Energy Conservation • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion
Rate Regulation 101 • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion • “Market Power” problem led states to create regulatory commissions • One of the four key functions of regulatory commissions: • Set the rates that public utilities can charge customers for providing electricity
Rate Regulation 101 • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion • Traditional approach: Rate = • “Authorized Revenue” • Divided by • Amount of energy utility expects customers to consume
The Throughput Incentive • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion • Once rates are set, usually once every few years, a utility’s ability to recover its authorized costs depends on how much electricity its customers use • Creates an incentive for utilities to encourage electricity use beyond what was anticipated in the rate-setting process
Revenue Decoupling • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion • A mechanism to remove the throughput incentive whereby the regulatory commission initiates: • Small but regular adjustments to rates • Ensures the utility recovers no more and no less than its authorized costs
Revenue Decoupling • Primary difference with traditional rate-setting process: • Process established where regulator regularly compares authorized revenue with amount of revenue actuallycollected from a utility’s customers • Regulator periodically adjusts rates to make sure the two are equal • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion
Revenue Decoupling • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion • Result of small, automatic adjustments: • Either gives back to customers or restores to utility amount over or under-collected as a result of fluctuations in sales
Revenue Decoupling • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion • You’re going to charge me more for using less?!?!
Decoupling Adjustments are Small • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion
Straight Fixed-Variable Rate Design SFV recovers fixed costs by putting monthly fixed cost charges into customers’ energy bills • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion Fixed cost charge here
Straight Fixed-Variable Rate Design • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion Proponents argue SFV makes sense because these fixed costs are incurred on behalf of each customer regardless of usage
Straight Fixed-Variable Rate Design • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion • Opponents dislike SFV because it: • reduces customers’ rewards for reducing energy use • Can hit people who use less electricity harder
Decoupling in Practice • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion Decoupling policy Electric and gas decoupling Gas decoupling Electric decoupling Other
Decoupling in Oregon • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Conclusion • Termed “Distribution Margin Normalization” (DMN) • Applied to one natural gas utility • Initial period 2002-2005
Decoupling in Oregon • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Conclusion • Monthly calculations, annual adjustment • Adjustments were < 1% up or down 2003-2008
Decoupling in Oregon • 2005 independent report recommended decoupling be continued • In 2007, NW Natural and Oregon PUC agreed to continue through 2012 • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Conclusion
Questions facing Regulators • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion • How often to make rate adjustments? • Across the board adjustments or by customer class? • What about the weather?
Revenue Decoupling in Ma. • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion
Revenue Decoupling in Ma. Cont’d • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion • Massachusetts Attorney General wanted “consumer protections”: • exclude effects of weather • “deadband” • DPU rejected both in favor of full decoupling
Does Decoupling Work in Partially Deregulated States? • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion • Most profitable part of unbundled electric utility is its unregulated electric generation component • Even if the utility is made indifferent to sales losses from its distribution business through decoupling, doesn’t it still have big incentive to increase sales from its generating business?
Summary • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion • SFV and decoupling are alternatives to removing the throughput incentive • Unlike SFV, decoupling does not reduce customer incentives to invest in energy efficiency • Questions remain, but experience of states like Oregon demonstrates decoupling can work well
But, Decoupling ≠ Energy Efficiency • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion • Decoupling only removes the throughput incentive • Should be paired with other policies to promote energy conservation
Thank You ` • Problem • Alternative Solutions • Revenue Decoupling • SFV • Proposed Solution • Case studies • Questions • Conclusion Questions: cbrucegrubb@gmail.com