World War II: Normandy

1. World War II: Normandy Lesson 18

2. Operation Overlord • At the Trident Conference the Allies had agreed to plan for a cross-channel invasion in May 1944 • The planners rejected Pas de Calais as being too obvious a choice and instead selected Normandy • However they would mount a significant deception campaign to convince the Germans Pas de Calais was the intended landing site

3. “… it is more effective to find out what the enemy is predisposed to believe and to reinforce those beliefs while at the same time altering your plans to take advantage of these reinforced false beliefs.” John Chomeau Fictitious army Inflatable tanks Targets Ultra Weather Surprise

4. Surprise: Fictitious Army • By spurious radio transmissions, the Allies created an entire phantom army, “based” in southeast England (opposite Pas-de-Calais) and alleged to be commanded by Patton. • In addition, on the night of the invasion itself, airborne radar deception presented to German radar stations a “phantom” picture of an invasion fleet crossing the Channel narrows, while a radar blackout disguised the real transit to Normandy.

5. Inflatable Tanks

6. Surprise: Ultra • At the same time, through the top-secret Ultra operation, the Allies were able to decode encrypted German transmissions, thus providing the Overlord forces with a clear picture of where the German counterattack forces were deployed.

7. Surprise: Targets • The air campaign was designed not only to disrupt German anti-invasion preparations but also to serve as a deception operation. • Two-thirds of the bombs were dropped outside the invasion area, in an attempt to persuade the enemy that the landings would be made northeast of the Seine, particularly in the Pas de Calais area, rather than in Normandy.

8. Surprise: Weather • Germans had a false sense of security about the weather • Rommel was visiting his wife on D-Day • “There is not going to be an invasion. And if there is, then they won’t even get off the beaches!”

9. Unity of Command: German Defenses • Debate between Rundstedt and Rommel over whether to deny the initial landing on the beaches or to destroy them with strong, mobile counter attack forces Rundstedt Rommel

10. German Defenses: Rommel’s Plan • Rommel was appointed commander of Army Group B in 1943 • Began to reinforce the Atlantic Wall in order to immediately and absolutely defeat any Allied landings

11. Weakness of Rommel’s Plan • Atlantic Wall had no true depth to its defenses • An enemy force that breached the thin Atlantic Wall would face no further fortified positions of significance

12. German Defenses

13. German Defenses: Rundstedt’s Plan • Rundstedt, the overall commander in the west, placed great reliance on mechanized reserves that could respond quickly and flexibly to an enemy penetration • He stationed a newly created armored command, Panzer Group West, near Paris • From there, the force could move toward the site of an enemy assault in either Pas de Calais or Normandy

14. Weakness of Rundstedt’s Plan • Rundstedt lacked the authority he needed • Hitler exercised direct control over Rundstedt’s forces • The navy commanded most of the coastal artillery that would be called upon to repel an Allied attack. • The air force controlled the bulk of the antiaircraft and parachute units stationed in the region. • Some armor units also came under the administrative supervision of the SS which answered first to Hitler and Berlin rather than to its supposed commanders in the field. Hitler’s “Wolf’s Lair” Headquarters in Gierłoż

15. German Defenses: Compromise • Rundstedt and Rommel couldn’t settle their disagreement over which defensive strategy was best so they compromised and combined the two plans • This resulted in the worst of both • Beach defenses not strong enough to stop landing; reserves not strong enough to destroy the beachhead Rommel inspecting the beach defenses

16. Unity of Command: Allies • In contrast to this German lack of unity of effort, the Allies form an excellent coalition • Eisenhower was the epitome of a coalition commander • Extremely sensitive to the need to maintain Anglo-American cooperation • Saw the purpose of his staff as being to “utilize the resources of two great nations . . . with the decisiveness of a single authority”

17. Unity of Command: Allies • Eisenhower (US) • Supreme Allied Commander • Tedder (British) • Deputy • Ramsey (British) • Naval • Leigh-Mallory (British) • Air • Bradley (US) and Montgomery (British) • Ground

18. Levels of War • Strategic • Level at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives • Operational • Level at which campaigns and major operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operation • Link tactics and strategy • Tactical • Level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces

19. Objective: Allies (Strategic) • Combined Chiefs directed Eisenhower to “enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with other Allied nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces” • To do that he would need a beachhead (Normandy) • To protect the amphibious forces he would drop airborne forces inland

20. Objective: Allies (Operational) • Secure a foothold on the Continent from which to support offensive operations against Germany

21. Objective: Allies (Tactical) • Objectives of the airborne forces were to • secure exits from the beaches to allow the amphibious forces to move inland • block German counterattack routes to protect amphibious forces

22. Allied Plan • The Allied plan would involve amphibious landings on the Normandy beaches supported by airborne assaults behind the beaches to block German counterattacks

24. Maneuver: Allies

25. Maneuver: Allies • Frontal assault against the Atlantic Wall expected to contain 15,000 concrete strong points, 15 coastal batteries and 300,000 defenders. • A frontal assault against such defenses required heavily suppressing enemy fire, tearing gaps in the imposing defenses, isolating enemy reserves from the lodgment area, destroying German mobility and supporting the deception. • The official US Army history notes that the “task of smashing through enemy beach defenses was to be facilitated as far as possible by naval fire and air bombardment.”

26. What Made the Allied Plan Work • Mass • Surprise • Allied soldier

27. Mass

28. Priorities • Europe or Japan? • Europe • France or Italy? • France • Northern France or Southern France? • Northern • (Operational Anvil postponed until Aug 15)

29. Pro Could make use of French divisions US had reorganized after North Africa Protect southern flank of forces breaking out from Normandy Create additional ports Con Not enough LSTs Overlord now required a five division landing instead of the original plan for three Anzio was requiring more resources than expected Operation Anvil

30. France: Aug 26 to Sept 14, 1944 • Anvil: Postponed until August 15 because of the lack of landing craft

31. Mass: Allies • Debate over whether to have a secondary landing somewhere besides Normandy (Operation Anvil) • Change in size of force from March 43 to Jan 44 plan • 3 divisions to 5 divisions

32. Mass: Allies • Massive build up of forces after initial landing; huge logistical effort • Mulberry artificial harbors and Whale floating piers

33. Allied Soldier

34. The Allied Soldier At low tide, the assaulting troops had to cross more than 300 meters of completely exposed beach to gain entrance to the Vierville draw.

35. 506th PIR Drop Dispersal

36. Offensive • The Germans launched no tactical counteroffensives against the American airborne assault. • American paratroopers gathered in ad hoc small groups and executed operations in accordance with the commander’s intent. • SLA Marshall

37. Offensive • “… the performance of the Wehrmacht’s high command, middle-ranking soldiers, and junior officers was just pathetic. The cause is simply put: they were afraid to take the initiative. They allowed themselves to be paralyzed by stupid orders coming from far away that bore no relation to the situation on the battlefield. Tank commanders who knew where the enemy was and how and when he should be attacked sat in their headquarters through the day, waiting for the high command in Berchtesgaden to tell them what to do.” • Stephen Ambrose

38. Breakout

39. Security: Allies • Poor Allied intelligence about flooded marshes of the Merderet River and the hedgerows

40. Bocage as it looks today

41. Breakout

42. The Breakout • http://www3.sympatico.ca/angels_eight/campaign.html

43. How it Ends • July 25: Beginning of Operation Cobra • Aug 15: Operational Anvil landings in southern France • Sept 17: Operational Market Garden • Dec 16: Beginning of the Battle of the Bulge • Apr 20, 1945: Russians take Berlin • Apr 25: Americans and Russians meet at the Elbe River • Apr 30: Hitler commits suicide

44. Surrender of Germany

45. Principles of War • Objective • Offensive • Mass • Economy of force • Maneuver • Simplicity • Unity of command • Security • Surprise

46. Objective • What type of strategy did the Allies use against Germany (annihilation, attrition, or exhaustion)? Explain. • Describe how the objectives for the airborne forces supported the amphibious forces.

47. Offensive • Discuss the small unit tactical offensive actions of US paratroopers in Normandy as an example of mission type orders and initiative. • Contrast the German Army’s doctrine of Aufstragtaktik with its actual performance on D-Day.

48. Economy of Force • How did the shortage of landing craft affect Allied planning? • What effects did landing craft have on operations in northern France, southern France, and Italy?

49. Maneuver • The invasion of Normandy was essentially a frontal attack. Why was this form of maneuver selected and how was it supported?

50. Security • Why is poor intelligence about the bocage country considered by some to be the greatest security failure of Allied operations in Normandy?