100 Days of President Viktor Yanukovych : Domestic and Foreign Policies

1. 100 Days of President Viktor Yanukovych: Domestic and Foreign Policies Dr.Taras Kuzio Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University, 2 June 2010

2. Ukraine After Five Years of Viktor Yushchenko Low trust in state institutions and public disillusionment in political leaders.

3. Approval of Ukraine’s Transition (Pew Associates, November 2009) Approval of Change to Democracy: • 1991: 72% • 2009: 30% (-42) Approval of Change to Market Economy: • 1991: 52% • 2009: 36% (-16)

4. Positive and Negative Impressions of Prominent Politicians (IFES) “I will now name several prominent politicians. For each of these, please tell me whether you have very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or very negative impressions of the politician?” (n=1,498)

5. Yushchenko Calls on Voters in 2010 Elections to Vote Against Both Candidates

6. 2010 Presidential Elections • Ukrainian voters unenthusiastic about 2010 elections; • Comparison with Round 2, December 2004: • Yanukovych: half million fewer votes; • Tymoshenko: 3.5 million fewer votes; • Yanukovych Victory: • first president to not win 50% of vote; • won same number of administrative regions as in 2004 (10 out of 27); • won by only 3.5% (8-16%, 1994-2004 elec.)

7. Politics, Corruption and Rule of Law Return to presidential rule and weak opposition

8. New Political System • Constitution Infringed: • Constitutional Court contradicted its own 2008 ruling that only factions could form coalitions. • parliamentary system becomes semi-authoritarian presidential system; • overturn election results inside parliament; • foreign military bases. • Party of Regions: Ukraine’s first ruling party. • Opposition: weak, lacks leaders, divided, viewed by authorities as illegitimate. • Return to media censorship. The Donetski are Returning Ukraine to the Soviet Union

9. Towards the ‘Donetski Model’? AntyTila Kyiv rock band

10. Political corruption, ‘is the main obstacle for the further development of Ukraine as a full blown democratic state’. Ukrainian (Razumkov) Centre for Economic and Political Studies Political Corruption Razumkov Centre 2009

11. Oligarchs and Privatisation • Not independent of oligarchs. • Oligarchs and gas lobby dominate Party of Regions. • Akhmetov: wealthiest person in Eurasia and Europe (2008). • Never espoused anti-oligarch rhetoric. • Continued support for economy dominated by big business. • Preference for non-transparent (insider) privatisation. • Corrupt Kyiv Mayor Leonid Chernovetsky supported Yanukovych in the 2010 elections.

12. RosUkrEnergo Gas Intermediary and Political Corruption • 2005-2008: gas lobby becomes main financier of pro-Russian Party of Regions; • Gas lobby provide greater financial resources for Yanukovych election campaign than oligarchs; • President Yanukovych: gas lobby run presidential administration, foreign ministry and SBU; ‘Corruption in the gas industry is the factor most responsible for driving the revolution off track’. Andrew Wilson, European Council on Foreign Relations, (Wall Street Journal, 28 January 2009) Political Corruption Consequences

13. Opposition Grows, But Divided • Committee Defence of Ukraine (10 May). • Brings together most, but not all opposition. • Mass protests outside and inside parliament. • BYuT and Svoboda are main protestors. • But, Yushchenko still anti-Tymoshenko. Opposition Riot in Parliament over BSF Treaty Ratification

14. Opposition Grows

15. There Will be No Censorship!Stop Censorship! (Kyiv 2010)

16. Opposition Grows to Censorship

17. Opposition Grows to Censorship

18. National Identity and Education Counter-Revolution: Yanukovych Administration Overturning Nationality Policies of Three Presidents

19. Minister of Education Dmytro Tabachnyk • Sovietophile and russophileviews. • Believes Galicians are ‘not real Ukrainians’. • Supports re-writing of history textbooks jointly with Russia. • Reverse three presidents policies on education and national identity. • Changed his views on famine as a genocide in the Kuchma era to not a genocide today.

20. A New Russian-Ukrainian National Identity • No equality of Churches: Russian Orthodox Church has first place (inaguration); • Russian as a second state language; • Re-writing of history school textbooks: downplay historical conflicts with Russia; • Russian view of 1933 famine as not a genocide and not only in Ukraine; • WWII now Great Patriotic War; • OUN-UPA were Nazi collaborators: return to Soviet era ideological negativity towards Ukrainian nationalism.

21. Jozef Stalin Returns to Ukraine (Zaporozhzhia, May 2010) Stalin is Unpopular in Eastern Ukraine: 57% oppose Erection of Stalin Monuments, including majority over 60 years old (76% West Ukraine)

22. Return to Equating Ukrainian Nationalism With Nazism • Return to Soviet era equating of “Ukrainian nationalism” with Nazism. • First begun in 2002 and 2004 elections as a response to growth in support of Yushchenko and Our Ukraine. • Opposition to reconciliation of nationalist partisans and Soviet partisans/troops. • Revision of school textbooks on Ukrainian nationalism. Slavic Unity Party Remove SymonPetliura Street Name, May 2010, Kyiv

23. Language Policy • Donetsk and Crimea: less than 10% Ukrainian schools. • Prime Minister Azarov (illegally) refuses to learn Ukrainian. • 87% of books in Russian. • 83% of journals and magazines in Russian. • 67% of newspapers in Russian. • 50% of television and majority of radio programmes. • Top 100 web sites in Russian, with only one third including Ukrainian-language versions • 2004, 2006, 2010 elections: Party of Regions and Yanukovych supported Russian as a second state language. • Dropping Ukrainianisation of TV and foreign films. • Provide for regional autonomy on language policies. • Volodymyr Lytvyn (20 deputies in coalition) opposed to radical changes in language policies. • Language policy changes will radicalise the opposition.

24. Protest Against Education Minister Tabachnyk(Pink Floyd, Another Brick in the Wall)

25. Separatism and the Crimea • Initiated and supported GUAM regional group. • Georgia seen as a Ukrainian ally: arms exports. • 2008: supported Georgian territorial integrity. • Never recognize separatist enclaves. • Hostile to Russian nationalists in the Crimea. • November 2004, Severdonetsk: supported separatism. • 2006 Crimean elections: For Yanukovych bloc = Party of Regions and 2 Russian nationalist parties. • Support independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. • Hostile to Georgian leadership. • No need for GUAM. • Trans-Dniestr united with Ukraine? • SBU halt operations against separatists. President Leonid Kuchma and Orange Political Forces President Viktor Yanukovych and Party of Regions

26. Foreign and Security Policy: From Single Vector Pro-Western to Single Vector Pro-Russian Foreign Policy

27. Foreign and Security Policy • Medvedev’s European Security Treaty; • Extension of Black Sea Fleet base to 2042-47; • Gas consortium with Russia; • Recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia? • Join CIS Single Economic Space Customs Union? • Join CIS Security Treaty? • Cooperation with NATO Partnership for Peace programme? • NATO membership; • EU membership? • 2008 IMF Stand By Agreement; • 2009-2010 gas contract; Ambiguous or Support Seek to Revise or Oppose

28. Cedes Sovereignty to Russia • 25-30 year Black Sea Fleet (BSF) base extension - agreed; • Additional BSF bases in southern Ukraine? • Gas consortium; • Gazprom-NaftohazUkrainy merger? • Dual citizenship? • Membership of CIS Customs Union and CIS Security Bloc? Undertaken and Proposed Sevastopol for “Discounted” Gas

29. Yanukovych Cedes Sovereignty to Russia Lord (of the country) I serve Russia

30. Russia, Energy and Gas • No gas consortium with Russia; • Gas pipeline modernisation with the EU; • No gas intermediaries (RosUkrEnergo); • Support for energy sovereignty; • February 2007: mobilised parliament for law blocking transfer of pipelines. • Support gas consortium with Russia; • Gas pipeline modernisation with the EU and Russia; • Gas lobby supports gas intermediaries; • Energy corruption returns: 40 bn cubic metres of gas to be imported. • Gas subsidies in exchange for Black Sea Fleet base extension. Opposition Leader and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko President Viktor Yanukovych

31. Conclusion: Yanukovych is more Pro-Russian than was Kuchma • Supported an Autocephalous Orthodox Church. • Supported Ukrainophile nation-building and historiography. • NATO: • 2002: backed NATO membership. • Twice requested a Membership Action Plan in 2002 and 2004. • Ukraine became the most active CIS country in NTO’s Partnership for Peace. • Opposed the extension of the Black Sea Fleet base beyond 2017. • Was strongly anti-separatist in the Crimea and saw Russian nationalists as his enemies. • Russia recognised as a potential threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the 1990s and in 2003 over the Tuzla island. • Launched the GUAM regional group. • Exported arms to Georgia. • Ally of the Russian Orthodox Church and opposes Ukrainian autocephaly. • Tabachnyk supports Russophile nation-building and historiography. • Foreign Policy: • Prefer lower levels of cooperation within Partnership for Peace. • Opposed to NATO membership. • Support for Russian security proposals for Europe. • Black Sea Fleet extended to 2047; • Party of Regions aligned with Russian nationalists in the Crimea. • Russia not considered a threat to Ukraine. • Complete disinterest in GUAM. • Supported separatism in Georgia and support Russia’s anti-Georgian stance. Leonid Kuchma Viktor Yanukovych