REFINING A FUTURE CONCEPT for HOMELAND DEFENSE and CIVIL SUPPORT

1. REFINING A FUTURE CONCEPT for HOMELAND DEFENSE and CIVIL SUPPORT Professor Bert B. Tussing Director, Homeland Defense and Security Issues United States Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership

2. Purpose • To describe the series of Limited Objective Experiments (LOEs) being conducted to refine the Department of Defense’s Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept • To focus particularly on the results of LOE’s 1 and 2, devoted to achieving Unity of Effort and validating and/or refining the Lines of Effort for Homeland Defense and Civil Support

3. Joint Operating Concepts • Describing how Joint Forces are expected to operate across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) in the period 2012-2025

4. Joint Operating Concepts • Lead Force Development and Employment • Service Concepts and subordinate joint concepts will expand on the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) • Experimentation will test the concepts and offer recommendations for improvement across DOTMLPF and policy. Mission Capability Package Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities

5. Joint Operating Concepts • Strategy for achieving military objectives while contributing to broader national objectives through unified action/integration with other interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. • Postulates where the Joint Forces and other elements of the U.S. government may find common ground on which to best integrate the efforts.

6. Joint Operating Concepts • Anticipate an adaptive enemy that will attempt to keep the Joint Force from being successful across the Range of Military Operations • Postulates what the future Joint Force will do to overcome future challenges

7. JOC’s in Development • Deterrence Operations • Major Combat Operations • Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) • Homeland Defense and Civil Support

8. Limited Objective Experiments • Key Players • U.S. NORTHCOM Strategy and Policy Division • U.S. NORAD-NORTHCOM Analysis Division • U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Division

9. Subject Matter Experts Government and Non-Government Partners LOE Campaign Plan Revised DOD HD and CS JOC HD and CS LOEs DOD HD and CS JOC LOE Campaign Plan Joint Task Force Futures Concept Development LOE5 CCJO Domains / HD & CS Nov 08 DOD HD and CS JOC LOEs will foster military innovation in Homeland Defense and Civil Support concept development LOE4 Assessing HD and CS Risk Aug 08 LOE3 Force Construct for HD and CS Mar 08 LOE2 HD and CS Lines of Effort Oct 07 LOE1 Unity of Effort Jun 07

10. LOE Structure • Approximately 36 participants – • Three groups of 10 to 12 participants (06 /GS15 Level) • Targeted participants such as DOD, DHS, DOJ, DOS, USAID, State Government, Local Government • Locations: Determined during planning phase • (Washington, DC; Monterey, CA; Carlisle, PA) • LOE Participants – Subject Matter Experiments identified by USNORTHCOM & host organization

11. Expectations • Identify future issues for HD and CS concept development and experimentation • Bring together key stake-holders, including government and non-government officials, to examine and collaborate HD and CS issues

12. Limited Objective Experiment 1“Unity of Effort” • Objectives- to gain insight • Guidance/organization/system and processes necessary to synchronize and integrate implementation of the National Security Strategy • Achieve unity of effort in execution of its essential tasks • How to better integrate and coordinate national security efforts, to include roles, responsibilities and lines of communication among organizations • Barriers that must be overcome to achieve unity of effort (lexicon/cultures/agendas)

13. Limited Objective Experiment 1“Unity of Effort” • Insights • There exists a need for a national level plan to integrate and coordinate interagency efforts to detect, deter, prevent and defeat threats to the nation • The interagency community does not necessarily view their internal authoritative documents as nested beneath the National Security Strategy, but as parallel and complimentary to it.

14. Limited Objective Experiment 1“Unity of Effort” • Insights • A national level plan to detect, deter, prevent and defeat threats to the nation requires a programmatic foundation to properly identify and resource desired interagency capabilities • A national level plan to detect, deter, prevent and defeat threats to the nation requires an organizational structure to properly coordinate and integrate interagency execution

15. Limited Objective Experiment 1“Unity of Effort” • Insights • The Mission Definition construct contained within the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept did not completely resonate with the interagency community

16. Mission Definition Construct for Homeland Defense and Civil Support Shaping… Preparatory Actions

17. Limited Objective Experiment 1“Unity of Effort” • Insights • The Active, Layered Defense construct contained within the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept applies across DoD’s family of JOC’s and should be considered for inclusion in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

18. Active, Layered Defense • “Forward Regions” • Detect and Prevent • Deterrence • Preemption • Assure Allies • Threat Reduction • “Approaches” Detect and Defeat • Missile Defense • Air Interdiction • Maritime Interdiction • “Homeland” • Deter and Defend • Air & Space Defense • Land Defense • Maritime Defense • Critical Infrastructure Protection • “Approaches” Detect and Defeat • Missile Defense • Air Interdiction • Maritime Interdiction • “Forward Regions” • Detect and Prevent • Deterrence • Preemption • Assure Allies • Threat Reduction Homeland defense requires seamless geographic and functional integration

19. Limited Objective Experiment 1“Unity of Effort” • Insight • The Department of Defense’s family of Joint Operating Concepts would benefit from an increased interagency perspective

20. Limited Objective Experiment 2“Lines of Effort” • Objectives- to gain insight and determine • Whether Lines of Effort described in the Department of Defense Homeland Defense & Civil Support Joint Operating Concept (HD & CS JOC) comprehensively and definitively explain how the Joint Force Commander will defend and secure the homeland • If warranted, what HD and CS Lines of Effort need to be modified, added or deleted • How these Lines of Effort relate to the overall national goal of securing the Homeland and achieving unity of effort

21. Lines of Effort • “…represent the activities in which the Joint Force Commander must engage to successfully accomplish objectives during a campaign.” Capstone Concept for Joint Operations • The Department of Defense Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support suggests these lines of effort are Detect Deter Prevent Defeat Support

22. Desired End State A secure US homeland effectively defended from external threats and aggression and capable of managing consequences of attacks by state and non-state actors as well as natural disasters Lines of Effort Detect - Discover & Characterize Intention & Capability of Adversaries Deter - Impose Costs, Deny benefits, Encourage Restraint of Hostile Action Prevent - Preclude Initiation of Hostile Action (shape/neutralize) Defeat - Dominate the Battlespace & Deny Adversary’s Objectives Support - Enable Civil Authorities & Stabilize the Environment

23. Limited Objective Experiment 2“Lines of Effort” • Insights- in general • Existing lines of effort are generally good, but not comprehensive • Important to consider how words will be interpreted, • --especially by state and local authorities

24. Limited Objective Experiment 2“Lines of Effort” • Insights • The Detect, Deter, Prevent, Defeat and Support lines of effort in the HD & CS JOC are not comprehensive and should incorporate additional factors, especially ongoing/steady state actions that include those prior to detection of an event • Some of the words associated with the lines of effort have different (sometimes negative) connotations among DoD Audiences and state and local authorities, which could badly impact unity of effort

25. Limited Objective Experiment 2“Lines of Effort” • Insights • The desired end state depicted in the JOC may not be adequate • Seems to preclude actions against internal threats • Does not adequately address the Civil Support mission for events other than natural disasters

26. Limited Objective Experiment 2“Lines of Effort” • Insight • The JOC lines of effort are perceived to be disproportionately weighted toward homeland defense and the “Support” line is perceived to insufficiently account for Civil Support actions • Civil Support Lines of Effort Excursion

27. Civil Support Lines of Effort • Objective: Determine whether “Support” is a comprehensive and definitive LOE that describes how the Joint Force Commander must execute the Civil Support mission • If yes, what supporting words best capture the necessary activities to execute effective “support” • If not, what LOEs would best describe the civil support mission

28. Existing Model- SSTRO Desired End State Full HN responsibility across the mission elements in the context of a New Domestic Order resolving earlier sources of instability to ensure a viable, sustainable peace Major Mission Elements of an SSTR Operation Establish & maintain a Safe, Secure Environment Deliver Humanitarian Service Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure/Essential Services Support Economic Development Establish Representative, Effective Government

29. Existing Model- DHS Integrated Planning System • “The Integrated Planning System is designed to meet the preparedness requirement of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness” • The Integrated Planning System will enable the DHS to “coordinate Federal Preparedness activities and operations within the U.S. to respond to and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.” HSPD 5, Management of Domestic Incidents

30. Existing Model- DHS Integrated Planning System • Operational Objectives • Prevent • Protect • Respond • Recover • The Better Model…but • Too Reactive • Too Sustained

31. DoD Civil Support Lines of Effort Pre-Event Event Post-Event Prepare Respond Recover • Support ≠ Primary Responsibility • Restore the Duly Constituted Authorities(and then get out…because) • There is the Day Job

32. Strategic Communications Civil Support Lines of Effort Transition Respond Recover Prepare Detect Deploy Mitigate Secure Facilitate Enable Supply Restore Reconstitute Facilitate Plan Anticipate Train Organize/Equip Facilitate

33. Limited Objective Exercise Campaign Plan Measure of Success A Joint Operating Concept that has influenced National and DOD strategic direction, is easy to understand, kept simple, and makes a difference in the hands of the Joint Force Commander

34. Questions? Professor Bert B. Tussing Director, Homeland Defense and Security Issues United States Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership Phone 717-245-4516 Email bert.tussing@us.army.mil