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Market Enabling Network Architecture NSF FIND PI Meeting Arlington, VA June 27, 2007. John Musacchio Assistant Professor Technology and Information Management University of California, Santa Cruz johnm@soe.ucsc.edu Jean Walrand, Venkat Ananthram, Galina Schwartz EECS
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Market Enabling Network ArchitectureNSF FIND PI MeetingArlington, VAJune 27, 2007 John Musacchio Assistant Professor Technology and Information Management University of California, Santa Cruz johnm@soe.ucsc.edu Jean Walrand, Venkat Ananthram, Galina Schwartz EECS University of California, Berkeley Shyam Parekh Alcatel-Lucent
Shortcomings • Inconsistent Service Quality • Security John Musacchio
Missing Markets ISP User with high willingness to pay For high rate, real time service. Zzzz Negative externality John Musacchio
Approach • Ideal architecture: • Enable Markets • Service choice • Security • Flexible to allow innovation at the application layer • “Lightweight” – strongpoint of current Internet • Questions • What should be in the architecture? • What should not be in the architecture? John Musacchio
Service Choice • Users offered real-time choice: “red” and “blue” • “Red” and “blue” not specified to users in detail • ISP incentivized to improve along dimensions that matter • Unlike ATM, IntServ, DiffServ, service definitions not standardized John Musacchio
Service Choice: Issues • Coordination of service definitions • Getting ISPs to invest • No one wants to be first mover [1] • Quantifying value of differentiation [2] • Oligopoly pricing efficiency loss • Social welfare less than if social planner set prices • Studying effects of service choice on efficiency loss [3] John Musacchio
Should A have to pay ISP 2? Net Neutrality: Issues $ ??? $ $ ISP 1 ISP 2 A B $ Content providers pay their ISP • Would allowing 2 to charge A • encourage 2 to invest? • discourage A to invest? • What revenue sharing mechanisms should new Internet have? • Ongoing work: game model [4] John Musacchio
Internet Today – Security Inadequacy ANALOGY • Users do not bear full cost of poor computer maintenance • Drivers do not bear full cost of reckless driving. • Liability insurance incentivizes drivers to be careful. Zzzz John Musacchio
$ Zzzz Markets for Security • Example: • Users pay to be certified by a Certification Agency (CA) • CA takes on liability for attacks traced back to user • CA incentivized to encourage users to take due care OS Update Antivirus Update John Musacchio
Markets for Security • Possible incentives for users to go to CA • Network drops discards uncertified packets in crisis. • Adverse selection a problem • Make insurance mandatory? • Architectural Requirements: • Improve traceability of attacks • Mechanism for dropping uncertified packets John Musacchio
Conclusions • Internet is both • an engineered system • an economic system • We must consider engineering and economic issues jointly John Musacchio
References + Work in Progress [1] J. Musacchio, S. Wu, “A Game Theoretic Model for Network Upgrade Decisions,” Allerton Conference 2006. [2] S. Ayani, J. Walrand, “Increasing Wireless Revenues with Service Differentiation,” in submission. [3] J. Musacchio, S. Wu, “ The Price of Anarchy in a Network Pricing Game,” in submission. [4] J. Musacchio, J. Walrand, “Economic Consequences of Weak Network Neutrality,” to appear at Asilomar 2007. [5] P. Honeyman, G. Schwartz, “Interdependence of Reliability and Security,” Workshop on Economics of Information Security, CMU, June 2007.