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Security capabilities for Light Communications

Security capabilities for Light Communications. Date: 2017-11-01. Author:. Abstract. This presentation discussed the security benefits of LC. Jamming an entire LC Network?. Jamming a LC AP typically requires the eavesdropper to use a directional beam.

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Security capabilities for Light Communications

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  1. Security capabilities for Light Communications Date: 2017-11-01 Author: Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

  2. Abstract This presentation discussed the security benefits of LC. Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

  3. Jamming an entire LC Network? • Jamming a LC AP typically requires the eavesdropper to use a directional beam. • Due to the dense deployment of APs in a LC network, users are likely to roam between different AP frequently. • It is almost impossible for an eavesdropper to point to the ‘right’ AP. Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

  4. Where can eavesdroppers be? • Wi-Fi: the location of the eavesdropper can be arbitrary • LC: eavesdroppers have to be within the coverage are of the AP (more difficult!) LC eavesdropper Wi-Fi eavesdropper legitimate user Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

  5. source What is the Secrecy Capacity/Rate? link 1 link 2 legitimate user eavesdropper S. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. Hellman, “The Gaussian Wire-Tap Channel,” in IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 451-456, July 1978. Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

  6. source LC PHY-Security NLOS LOS legitimate user eavesdropper Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

  7. source LC PHY-Security legitimate user eavesdropper • This means if the eavesdropper has twice the link distance than the legitimate user, at least 4 bit/s/Hz secrecy rate can be achieved. Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

  8. source LC PHY-Security • Existing power lines offer the possibility for LED cooperation (e.g., MISO, MIMO) • Secrecy performance can be further enhanced through precoding techniques. legitimate user eavesdropper A. Mostafa and L. Lampe, “Physical-layer security for MISO visible light communication channels,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 33, no. 9, pp. 1806-1818, Sept. 2015. Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

  9. source LC PHY-Security legitimate user eavesdropper Simulation parameters: transmit power 1 W; Lambertian order 1; L = 2.15 m; PD area 1 cm^2; PD responsivity 0.4 A/W. Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

  10. Angle Diversity Transmitter • Optical beamforming • Narrower beam -> more secure, also higher rate because of less interference Z. Chen and H. Haas, “Physical-layer security for optical attocell networks,” in Proc. IEEE ICC, Paris, 2017, pp. 1-6. Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

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