Saudi Arabian National Security

1. Saudi Arabian National Security

2. Saudi Arabian National Security

3. Saudi Arabian National Security

4. Saudi Arabian National Security • Birth place of Islam and site of two of the holy cities of Islam • World’s largest oil producer • Under nominal Ottoman control 1517-1918 • Monarchy built upon alliance between family of Al-Saud & Muwahhidun(“Wahhabis”) • Three Saudi state-formation and state-building experiments: • 1st Saudi state 1745-1818 • 2nd Saudi state 1824-1891 • 3rd Saudi state 1902-Present • Will the third Saudi state survive external & domestic threats??

5. 1st Saudi State & State-formation1745-1818 • Alliance between Muhammad ibnSa`ud, Amir of Di`iriyyahand Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab; secular & religious authority brought together • Proselytism and expansion: 1765 Nejd conquered, 1790 all Arabian peninsula except Hedjaz, 1798 tried to attack Mesopotamia • Military overconfidence and barbaric behavior of muwahhidun • Egyptians under Muhammad Ali smash the 1st Saudi state in 1818 Lack of foreign support, alienation of neighbors, overconfidence in mil. capabilities

6. 2nd Saudi State and State-formation:1824-1891 • In 1824 TurkiibnAbdallah rallies tribes under Wahhabi banner and drives Egyptians out of Nejd. Est. of capital in Riyadh • Turki begins strategy of re-conquest of peninsula, carried on by son Faisal • Egyptians in peninsula in 1838: overthrow Faisal; vassal Saudi state under Khalid (1838-42) and Abdallah (1842-1843) • Faisal seizes control again (1842-1865): massive expansion and consolidation, confrontation w/ British, recognition of British mil. superiority • 2nd Saudi state weakened by severe internecine 1865-1889 conflicts and overthrown by rivals Al-Rashids another prominent Nedji tribe. Internal dissension = threat & collapse

7. 3rd Saudi State & State-formation:1902-1953 • Emir Abd- al Aziz (Ibn Saud) recaptures Riyadh: extends control over neighboring provinces: e.g. southern Nejd & Al-Qasim, Al-Hasa • Uses the IkhwanMovement for consolidation of power • Annexation of Jamal Shammar, delimitation of borders w/ neighbors, conquest of Hedjaz & Asir • The IkhwanRebellions and their defeat at Sibilla,1929 • Oil Concessions and Consolidation of Power, 1934-1945 • Emergence of U.S.-Saudi Informal Alliance • Kingdom’s emerging role in regional politics

8. Saudi National Security &Threat Perceptions, 1954-1973 • Internal: intra-dynastic squabbles, nationalists and radicals, Shi`is, army officers, progressive princes, vulnerability of oil infrastructure and oil export routes • External: Arab nationalism and radicalism, Arab-Israeli conflict, Egypt, Republicanism in Yemen, Marxist movements (Dhufar Rebellion), Soviet penetration of Middle East, Iraq, Imperial Iranian pretensions

9. Saudi National Security and Threat Perceptions: 1974-Present

10. Saudi National Security and Threat Perceptions: 1974-Present • Internal: Religious radicalism, Succession crisis (?), Shi`i mobilization, vulnerability of oil infrastructure, massive socioeconomic distress, demographics & youth bulge, foreign workers, jihadists • External: Iraq, Iran (Pahlavi & IRI), Israel, Yemen, unsettled Arab-Israeli conflict, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, collapsing informal alliance w/ U.S.

11. Beyond The CairoEffect • A radical anti-Western regime in SaudiArabia—whichproduces one of every four barrels of oil world-wide—clearlywouldendangerthe world economy. • Unless the regimerapidly and radicallyreformsitself, itwillremainvulnerable to upheaval. • The gap betweenagedrulers and youthfulsubjectsgrowsdramatically as the information gap betweenrulers and ruledshrinks. • The averageage of the kingdom's trio of ruling princes is 83, yet 60% of Saudis are under 18 years of age. Thanks to satellite television, the Internet and social media, the youngnow are wellaware of government corruption—and that 40% of Saudis live in poverty and nearly 70% can'tafford a home. • TheseSaudis are living Third World lives, sufferingfrompooreducation and unable to find jobs in a privatesectorwhere 90% of all employees are imported non-Saudis. • Through new media the young compare theircircumstancesunfavorablywiththose in nearby Gulf sheikhdoms and the West. • The combination of revolution in Cairo and governmentineptitude in JeddahproducedwidespreadSaudicynicism and anger on social media. • The traditional sources of stability in SaudiArabia have been the royal family and the Wahhabireligious establishment withwhichitiscloselyintertwined. These twinpillarswerelosingcredibilityandlegitimacyevenbeforeevents in Egypt. • The royal familyincreasinglyisseen by itssubjects as profligate, corrupt and unable to deliver efficient government. • The religious establishment, even as itenforcesitsuniquelyaustere brand of Islam, isincreasinglyseen as prostitutingitself by using religion to support whatever the rulingfamilywants. • As events in Cairo have played out, someworriedyounger princes have privatelyacknowledged the need to curb corruption, better serve citizens, and reform the dysfunctionalgovernmentbureaucracy.