Liderazgo, capacidad y crisis en las reformas institucionales de América Latina

1. Liderazgo, capacidad y crisis en las reformas institucionales de América Latina Alejandro Bonvecchi Universidad Torcuato Di Tella Argentina

2. This Presentation • Survey of explanations of institutional change in political science with a focus on those developed to explain changes in fiscal institutions • Structure-based Explanations • Actor-based Explanations • Integration of Different Explanations

3. Structure-based Explanations • Origin of Institutional Change: economic crises; diffusion of policy ideas • Process of Institutional Change: state capacities, political regime type, distribution of power among government branches, party system, level of electoral competition,representation of subnational politicalunits. • Nature of Institutional Change: state capacities, diffusion of policy ideas

4. Actor-Based Explanations • Origin of Institutional Change: actors’ pressures on governments; mandates; risk perceptions; elite circulation; autonomous strategic choice. • Process of Institutional Change: organization of actors; strength of actors; relations between governments and economic actors; Executive-ruling party relations; risk perceptions. • Nature of Institutional Change: internal configuration of actors; organizational strength; institutional leverage over other actors

5. Integration of Explanations • Four General Hypotheses: • 1-Changes are initiated when governments perceive the status quo to be highly risky due to crisis situations or to pressures by IFIs or financial-market actors. • 2-Processes of institutional change are faster and deeper the lesser the number of veto players, the weaker and more fiscally dependent the veto players, the more coordinated the bargaining, and the farthest-reaching the coverage of bargains. • 3-Changes are farthest from the status quo the more discredited the policy legacies, the more flexible the administrative structures, and the strongest the national party leaders • 4-Changes are more centralizing the more flexible the administrative structures, the stronger the national party leaders and the national, single, disciplined peak associations, and the weaker the particularistic legislators, regional peak associations, and subnational party leaders.

6. Integration of ExplanationsBudgetary Rules • Process of institutional change of fiscal rules should be faster and deeper than the process of changing procedural and transparency rules. • Process of institutional change of procedural rules should be the more protracted and shallow of budgetary rule changes. • Process of institutional change of transparency rules should stand somewhere in the middle. • Nature of changes of fiscal rules can be explained by the general hypotheses. • Nature of changes of procedural rules is affected by level of electoral competition and executive-ruling party relations • Nature of changes of transparency rules depends upon flexibility of administrative structures, strength of national party leaders, and weakness of particularistic legislators and subnational governments

7. Integration of ExplanationsTaxation • Process of institutional change for tariff cuts and tax administration reform is typically faster and deeper than for the rest of the tax changes. • Processes of institutional change of corporate and individual income taxes and VAT are typically protracted, uncoordinated, and generate a diversity of particularistic negotiations with different actors. • Nature of changes in tariffs, corporate taxes, and VAT depends on strength of executives and national party leaders, and strength and coverage of peak associations, particularistic legislators, and subnational governments. • Nature of changes in the tax administration depends on the flexibility of administrative structures and the strength of executives.

8. Integration of ExplanationsSocial Security • Process leading to the substitution of public with private social security systems is typically faster and inherently deeper than the process leading to any of the alternative outcomes. • Process of change towards a mixed system is typically the most protracted, hardest to coordinate, and prone to particularistic negotiations. • Process of change towards a parallel system typically stands in the middle. • Process of partial reforms to the public system varies in speed and depth according to which part of the system is being targeted. • The more discredited the public system, the more flexible the administrative structures, and the stronger the executive vis-à-vis the legislature, the ruling party and the public sector unions, the farthest the change away from public social security systems.

9. Integration of ExplanationsFiscal Federalism • Process of change for expenditure decentralization is typically faster and deeper than for any of the other areas. • Process of institutional change of subnational tax and debt policies and intergovernmental transfer systems is typically protracted. • Nature of institutional change in fiscal federalism depends on the institutional and electoral strength of national party leaders vis-à-vis the subnational.