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Groupthink. The Destruction of intellegence. What is Groupthink.
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Groupthink The Destruction of intellegence
What is Groupthink • Irvin Janus defines it as: A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action • Origins • This term was coined by William H. Whyte in Fortune • Group think was is remincient of doublethink and duckspeak of George Orwell’s 1984
Symptoms of Groupthink • Conditions • High Stress • Little hope for a better alternative • High Group Cohesiveness • Persuasive strength of the group leader
Symptoms of Groupthink Cont' • Eight indicative Symptoms • Illusion of invariability • Unquestioned believe in groups’ morality • Collective Rationalization of decisions • Shared stereotypes of out-group, especially opponents • Self-censorship • Illusion of unanimity • Direct pressure for dissenters to conform • Self-appointed mind-guards, prevent neg. info.
Symptoms of Groupthink Cont' • Seven Symptoms of Affects • Incomplete survey of Alternatives • Incomplete survey of Objectives • Failure to examine risks of preferred choices • Failure to reevaluate rejected alternatives • Poor information search • Selective Bias • Failure to work out contingency plans
Prevention • Dissolve decision power • Appoint someone to disagree or Dissent Papers • Anonymity of suggestions • Preserves social capital • Have an inspector or outside role which individuals can appeal to • Consensus Decision Making • Group works in a less competitive situation to agree on terms
Son Tay Raid • US special ops raid of a North Vietnamese POW camp • Bright leadership • Brigadier General Leyor Simons and Colonel Arthur D. Bull Simons • Perfect execution / Stupid mistake
Son Tay Raid • Illusion of invulnerability • “Everything is going to work out all right because we are a special group.” - ““95 to 97 percent assurance of success” • They placed an exact estimate of assured success without thinking of their alternate outcomes • Inherent mortality of the group • We’re saving POWs how can it be bad • “How could anyone not approve this?” (President Nixon)
Son Tay Raid • Collective rationalization • General Blackburn, General Bennett and Admiral Moore meet to decide if it is a go • Blackburn was the sponsor and felt the mission was the only option, but had fears that Bennett or Moore would feel different • Despite recent intelligence they felt the same.
Son Tay Raid • Out-group stereotyping • Planners lamented the lack of HUMINT and over reliance on technical means • Yet they discarded all HUMINT that did not support a “GO” decision • Lucky Break assulting a secondary school • Self-censorship • Admiral Train admitted 12 hours before the raid they had almost indisputable evidence the campe was empty • A Four Star Flag Officer remained silent to be a team player
Son Tay Raid • Illusion of unanimity • By remain silent the group interpreted it as agreement • If the fall out was bigger, like Watergate, there would have been more dissenters afterward • Direct pressure on dissenters • After being told the camp was empty by DIA Intelligence agents General Blackburn scolded them “How the hell can you make heads or tails out of the data • Shortly after they thought that the prisoners were moved back