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Discussion of Michelacci and Schivardi. Francesco Caselli. Four Questions on Intepretation. Theoretical Motivation. Productivity (Endogenous). Volatility of returns in high return projects (exogenous). Theoretical Motivation. Productivity (Endogenous). With good risk-sharing
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Discussion of Michelacci and Schivardi Francesco Caselli
Theoretical Motivation Productivity (Endogenous) Volatility of returns in high return projects (exogenous)
Theoretical Motivation Productivity (Endogenous) With good risk-sharing Opportunities With poor risk-sharing Opportunities Volatility of returns in high return projects (exogenous)
Empirical Result • Negative coefficent on (Risk-Sharing Opportunity) X (Volatitlity) • Consistent with theoretical framework …
… but also consistent with Productivity (Endogenous) With good risk-sharing Opportunities With poor risk-sharing Opportunities Volatility of returns in high return projects (exogenous)
or with Productivity (Endogenous) With good risk-sharing Opportunities With poor risk-sharing Opportunities Volatility of returns in high return projects (exogenous)
or even with Productivity (Endogenous) With good risk-sharing Opportunities With poor risk-sharing Opportunities Volatility of returns in high return projects (exogenous)
Therefore • I am not yet convinced that Idiosyncratic risk discourages entrepreneurial activity and hinders growth (from abstract) • Finding seems to concern the role of risk-diversification opportunities, not risk per se • Does this call for a change of title? • Role of risk remains an open question
From levels to growth rates • Theoretical argument framed in temrs of levels • Empirics in terms of growth rates • Transition is not entirely trivial
From project returns to size of investments • Theory: investment size constant, but different returns • Empirics: results driven partially by amounts invested • Reconciliation: high-return projects more capital intensive? • That would be interesting
Family firms as (inverse) measure of risk-sharing opportunities • Idea: concentrated ownership results from lack of diversification opportunities • But: many other interpretations possible • E.g. suppose family firms are intrinsically more risk averse. Then (family X risk) interaction would be negative • Not sure that instrumenting with demographic shocks helps: it isolates variation in family ownership not due to lack of risk-sharing opportunities. Seems to be the opposite of what you want
Blonde-Blue-Eye Dummy • Identification assumption: Dnk, Nor, Swe, Fin have same coefficients in risk regression • Next year: paper by a Scandinavian economist assuming that Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece have same coefficients in some regression
Conclusion • Should paper be recast in terms of effects of risk sharing opportunities, rather than risk per se? • Tighter link between theoretical arguments and empirical estimates (levels v. growth, productivity v. investment) • Can we think of a more convincing measure of risk-sharing opportunities?