200 likes | 314 Views
HEALTH SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE EU (generic preparedness planning for public health threats). Charalambos Charilaou MSc , Bed, BSc ( Hons ),DCN, RGN, Phd canditate First Nursing Officer Representative of Ministry of Health of Cyprus in the HSC. Health Security Committee (HSC) mandate.
E N D
HEALTH SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE EU (generic preparedness planning for public health threats) CharalambosCharilaou MSc, Bed, BSc(Hons),DCN, RGN, Phdcanditate First Nursing Officer Representative of Ministry of Health of Cyprus in the HSC
Health Security Committee (HSC) mandate Exchange information on health-related threats from acts of terrorism or any deliberate release of CBRN agents Share information and experience on preparedness and response plans and crisis management strategies Be able to communicate rapidly in case of health-related crises Share and coordinate health-related crisis responses by Member States and the Commission Facilitate and support coordination and cooperation efforts and initiatives undertaken at EU and international level
Health Security Committee (HSC) • Generic Preparedness and Response for public health emergencies • Public health preparedness and response to chemical, biological and radio nuclear (CBRN) attacks • Influenza preparedness and response
Priority Issues of HSC • Detection and communication • Threat and risk assessment • Preparedness • Scientific advice • Crisis management and testing of plans • Cooperation
Generic Preparedness and Response for Public Health emergencies Generic Preparedness is about developing and strengthening capacities to respond rapidly to any kind of emergencies affecting or likely to affect Public Health in more than one EU country
Essential components of Generic Preparedness Planning • Information management • Communications • Scientific advice • Liaison and command and control structures • Preparedness of the health sector • Preparedness in all other sectors and inter-sectorally
Chemical, Biological and Radio Nuclear (CBRN) threats EU preparedness focuses on all types of CBRN hazard (man made, natural, accidental or deliberate). • e.g deliberate contamination of drinking water, accidental radio-nuclear contamination or the emergence of a new infections disease icluding those that take the form of pandemic.
Chemical, Biological and Radio Nuclear (CBRN) threats EU activities • Crisis management arrangements and strategies • Communication systems linking up EU countries • Expert advice on prevention, treatment and mitigation • Health risk assessment • Promoting research in CBRN related topics
Early Warning and Rapid Alert Systems • EWRS (Communicable diseases threats) • RAS BICHAT (Deliberate release of CBRN agents) • RAS CHEM (Incidents including chemical agents relevant to terrorism and other events)
EU CBRN Action Plan Objectives • Ensuring that unauthorized access to CBRN materials is as difficult as possible (prevention) • Having the capability to detect CBRN materials (detection) • Being able to efficiently respond to incidents involving CBRN materials and recover from them as quickly as possible (preparedness and response)
Influenza pandemic preparedness An influenza pandemic can occur whenever a new flu virus appears against which humans have no immunity. Pandemics can be severe and require a high level of preparedness
Influenza pandemic preparedness Main objectives • Preparedness plans • Assessment of national preparedness • Exchange of best practices • Vaccination
Early Lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 outbreak • Investments in pandemic planning paid off • Public health departments did not have enough resources to carry out plans • Response plans must be adaptable and science – driven • Providing clear, straightforward information to the public was essential for allaying fears and building trust
Early Lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 outbreak • Even with a mild outbreak, the health care delivery system was overwhelmed • Communications between the public health system and health providers was not well coordinated • WHO pandemic alert phases caused confusion • International coordination was more complicated than expected
Health Security Committee Work Plan 2011-2013 • Preparedness planning • Influenza Preparedness and planning • Risk assessment • Risk management • Risk communication
References The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union (2005/C53/01) EU emergency and crisis co-ordination arrangements (15106/05, Limite, CAB 48,JAI 469, PROCIV 194) Reinforcing the EU¨s emergency and crisis response capacities (5228/06, Limite, CAB 1, PESC 21, JAI 12, PROCIV 2) Interim EU emergency and crisis coordination arrangements in Brussels (8380/06, Limite, CAB 14, JAI176, PROCIV 64
References Emergency and crisis coordination arrangements in Brussels (CCA) – Internal GSC standard operating procedures (SOPs) 8888/07, LIMITE, CAB18 Council conclusions on Lessons learnt from the A/H1N1 pandemic – Health security in the European Union, 13 September 2010 Council conclusions on Health Security Committee, 22 February 2007 http:/ec.europa.eu/health/ph-threats/bioterrorism/docs/keydo-bio-05-en.pdf