United Nations Human Rights Council: Structure and Functions

1. Internationale Organisationen Kapitel VI: Die Vereinten Nationen –Nebenorgane & Sonderorganisationen Prof. Dr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard)

2. Nebenorgane

3. Menschenrechtsrat

4. Menschenrechtsrat GA Res. 60/251: Reaffirming the commitment to strengthen the United Nations human rights machinery, with the aim of ensuring effective enjoyment by all of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, and to that end, the resolve to create a Human Rights Council, Decides to establish the Human Rights Council, based in Geneva, in replacement of the Commission on Human Rights, as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly; the Assembly shall review the status of the Council within five years; […]

5. Menschenrechtsrat Wahl der Mitglieder, GA Res. 60/251, para 7: Decides further that the Council shall consist of forty-seven Member States, which shall be elected directly and individually by secret ballot by the majority of the members of the General Assembly; the membership shall be based on equitable geographical distribution, and seats shall be distributed as follows among regional groups:

6. Menschenrechtsrat GA Res. 60/251, para 8: Decides that the membership in the Council shall be open to all States Members of the United Nations; when electing members of the Council, Member States shall take into account the contribution of candidates to the promotion and protection of human rights and their voluntary pledges and commitments made thereto; the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, may suspend the rights of membership in the Council of a member of the Council that commits gross and systematic violations of human rights;

7. Menschenrechtsrat General Assembly Res. 60/251, para 8 Decides also that members elected to the Council shall uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights, shall fully cooperate with the Council and be reviewed under the universal periodic review mechanism during their term of membership;

8. Suspendierung Libyens General Assembly Res. 65/265: Recalling its resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006, in particular paragraph 8, which states […], Noting Human Rights Council resolution S-15/1 of 25 February 2011, Welcoming the statement issued by the League of Arab States on 22 February 2011 and the communiqué issued by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 23 February 2011, Expressing deep concern about the human rights situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1. Decides to suspend the rights of membership in the Human Rights Council of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; 2. Decides also to review the matter, as appropriate.

9. Menschenrechtsrat Instrumente: • Universal Periodic Review • Spezialverfahren (Special Procedures) • Beschwerdeverfahren (complaint procedures)

10. Peacebuilding-Commission SC Res. 1645 (2005) und GA Res. 60/180: Decides, acting concurrently with the Security Council, in accordance with Articles 7, 22 and 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to operationalizing the decision by the 2005 World Summit, to establish the Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body

11. Peacebuilding-Commission Aktuell unterstützt die Kommission die Friedenskonsolidierung in: • Burundi (seit 2006) • Sierra Leone (seit 2007) • Guinea-Bissau (seit 2006) • Zentralafrikanischen Republik (seit 2008) • Liberia (seit 2010) • Guinea (seit 2011)

12. Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) General Assembly Res. 60/180: Also reaffirms its request to the Secretary-General to establish a multiyear standing peacebuilding fund for post-conflict peacebuilding, funded by voluntary contributions and taking due account of existing instruments, with the objective of ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery

13. ILC - Mitglieder Mohammad Bello Adoke (Nigeria) Ali Mohsen Fetais Al-Marri (Qatar) Lucius Caflisch (Switzerland) Enrique J.A. Candioti (Argentina) Pedro Comissário Afonso (Mozambique) Abdelrazeg El-Murtadi S. Gouider (Libya) Ahmed Laraba (Algeria) Donald M. McRae (Canada) Shinya Murase (Japan) Sean D. Murphy (USA) Bernd H. Niehaus(Costa Rica) Georg Nolte (Germany) Ki Gab Park (Republic of Korea) Chris M. Peter (Tanzania) Ernest Petric (Slovenia) Concepción Escobar Hernández (Spain) M.F.F.K. Gevorgian (Russian Federation) Juan Manuel Gómez-Robledo (Mexico) Hussein A. Hassouna (Egypt) Mahmoud D. Hmoud (Jordan) Mr. Huang Huikang (China) Marie G. Jacobsson (Sweden) Maurice Kamto (Cameroon) Kriangsak Kittichaisaree(Thailand) Gilberto Vergne Saboia (Brazil Narinder) Singh I. P. Šturma (Czech Republic) Dire D. Tladi (South Africa) Eduardo Valencia-Ospina (Colombia) Stephen C. Vasciannie (Jamaica) Amos S. Wako (Kenya) Nugroho Wisnumurti (Indonesia) Sir Michael Wood (UK)

14. Funktionen der ILC • Die Weiterentwicklung des Völkerrechts • Seine Kodifizierung • Sowie die bessere Zugänglichmachung der Quellen des Völkergewohnheitsrechts

15. ILC • The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties • The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties • The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations • The Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts • Seerechtskonvention

16. Sonderorganisationen

17. Sonderorganisationen Artikel 57 Abs. 1 UN-Charta: 1. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63. 2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.

18. Sonderorganisationen Article 63 UN-Charter 1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly. 2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations

19. Die 17 Sonderorganisationen • Internationale Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) • Ernährungs- und Landwirtschaftsorganisation der Vereinten Nationen (FAO) • Internationale Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (IBRD) • Organisation der Vereinten Nationen für Erziehung, Wissenschaft und Kultur (UNESCO) • Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) • Weltbank: Internationale Finanzkorporation (IFC) • Internationale Entwicklungsorganisation (IDA) • Internationaler Währungsfonds (IWF) • Internationale Zivilluftfahrt-Organisation (ICAO) • Weltpostverein (UPU) • Internationale Fernmeldeunion (ITU) • Weltorganisation für Meteorologie (WMO) • Internationale Seeschiffahrts-Organisation (IMO) • Weltorganisation für geistiges Eigentum (WIPO) • Internationaler Fonds für landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung (IFAD) • Organisation der Vereinten Nationen für industrielle Entwicklung (UNIDO) • Welttourismusorganisation (UNWTO)

20. International Labour Organization – ILO

21. World Health Organization – WHO

22. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization-UNESCO

23. Food and Agriculture Organization – FAO

24. International Telecommunication Union- ITU

25. International Civil Aviation Organization – ICAO

26. International Atomic Agency – IAEA

27. IEAE THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND THE AGENCY FOR THEAPPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATIO OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Article 1 The Government of Iran undertakes, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty, to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

28. IAEA Article 9 • (a) (i) The Agency shall secure the consent of the Government of Iran to the designation of Agency inspectors to Iran. • (ii) If the Government of Iran, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after a designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall propose to the Government of Iran an alternative designation or designations. • (iii) If, as a result of the repeated refusal of the Government of Iran to accept the designation of Agency inspectors, inspections to be conducted under this Agreement would be impeded, such refusal shall be considered by the Board, upon referral by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Director General”), with a view to its taking appropriate action.

29. IAEA [Fortsetzung Art. 9] (b) The Government of Iran shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can effectively discharge their functions under this Agreement. (c) The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as: (i) To reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the Government of Iran and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected; and (ii) To ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the inspectors’ knowledge.

30. Reformdiskussion finden in vielen Bereichen statt: • Zusammensetzung und Entscheidungsfindung im SR • Peacekeeping • Finanzierung • Menschenrechte • Umweltschutz

31. Erweiterung des Sicherheitsrats • Reformvorschläge 2005 vorerst gescheitert • Vorschläge waren: • Modell A und B (High Panel Report) • G4 Vorschlag (u.a. Deutschland) • Vorschlag der Afrikanischen Union • Uniting for Censensus (u.a. Italien)